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ABSTRACT

Nancy Wellington Bookhart

THE BLACK VEIL OF FREEDOM: ON KARA WALKER
AND THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF THE BLACK MAN
This project is charged with the illumination and application of Jacques Ranciere’s theory
of the distribution of the sensible and regimes of art in the examination of the historical posturing
of black masculinity and what I propose as the new slavery inherent in mass incarceration.
Paramount to this survey is the retrospection of the dialectic work of Kara Walker who is said to
have desecrated black testament of freedom while contriving white desire. Contrary to this I argue
Walker as artist-philosopher and her work as having the potential for the emancipation of the
black man. Dissentient in nature Walker draws a comparison to the revolutionary comportment of
Harriet Tubman and Nat Turner in the legislation of violence lodged against the archetypes of the
master/slave narrative of history in her indispensable commission for the souls of black men. The
distribution of the sensible is understood as the configuration of the sensible world as an ethical
ought in the cartography of the Platonian republic as “living speech.” The silhouette participates
in this discourse as the concatenation of knowledge and the soul vis-a-vis Plato. In this
partitioning lies the birth of the Other as colonized thought. Knowledge as an epistemological grid
shapes the discourse and terrain governing the black man as Other assigning him historically as an
inferior product. The psychological predisposition of the black man as inferior is performed in
history and recapitulated through the representative regime ad infinitum. The problem is the
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question concerning history as immutable law. How has law and legislation failed the black man
in his procuration of freedom? I argue that the emancipation of the black man will be
accomplished through an aesthetic education in his return to the primal scene of history as history.
What comportment does genius have in this most critical excavation? How does art as knowledge
participate in this intervention? Art is no abstract concept of community but its substratum taking
form. How is form imperious to the fashioning of black masculinity, or at that Heidegger’s
nothing?

Keywords: Kara Walker, silhouette, Enlightenment, stereotypes, aesthetics, Jacques Ranciere,
mass incarceration, Johann Kasper Lavater, Frantz Fanon, primal scene, narrative.
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Introduction
The Question Concerning History
History’s potency is mighty. The oppressed need it for identity and inspiration; the
oppressors for justification, rationalization and legitimacy.
—Herbert Aptheker, A review of William Styron’s Nat Turner
Here are my papers [Legitimationspapiere], now show me yours.
—Franz Kafka, The Trial
So, have you a device that will make them believe that story.
—Plato, Republic
History never confesses.
—Maurice Merleau-Ponty
A familiar image that has now become the staple of the history of the black man as slave,
cargo, human product in this ever-unfolding tragedy is the slave ship (e.g., see fig. 1). The slave
ship is imprinted on the white psyche and generations of black men who perceive this image as
their genealogy.1 This image of the slave ship is as fundamental to the black man's education and
station as learning his ABCs. Paralyzed in his position, he is looked on as a product of industry
and as a commodity. Birthed into a new history, the black man belongs to no one, principally
himself. He is no longer man, and so began his metamorphosis into the son of darkness, into
embodied evil, into the curse of God, into manufactured nothingness. Greg Grandin’s The
Empire of Necessity: Slavery, Freedom, and Deception in the New World notes this capitalistic
encounter as the “machinery of civilization” (234).2 The black man is composed by civilization
and a culture that would keep him breathing, but only at the expense of production, have him
speak, but only with a tongue that produces noise. And, as Jean-Paul Sartre proposes of the
European elite and their creation of a native nobility, that they “gagged their mouths with
sounds, pompous awkward words that twisted their tongues” (Fanon Wretched of the Earth xliii).
And have him think only as a dumb animal, with the permission of those who supervise his
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intelligence, lest he mistakes himself at any juncture as a man. Frantz Fanon would assert that the
black man came into the world as a subject but has transformed into “an object among other
objects” (Black Skin, White Masks 89).
The slave ship as a signifier will always be the starting place of the black man in the

Figure 1. A plan of the British slave ship Brookes. Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade.

society of white hierarchical thought as a silhouette, flat, with no content, a shadow
systematically placed. And it is a stark reminder that here the fabrication of identity began. A
new history. It is true not only because this is the transfer of identity in the long treasonous path
of humanity lost but also ground zero for the black man's disassembling and recreating process.
In the disassembling, the Africans were removed from their homes; their knowledge center
dismantled; language as the hermeneutics of culture was fractured; the locale for shaping self-
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consciousness and nurturing was ravaged. These were abolished when the Africans were
divorced from any source of knowledge and validation through their community. The Africans'
once free bodies and minds are now captured, chained, and at the mercy of another. They no
longer maintain their free course of movement in the world. Fanon would affirm that “blacks
have had to deal with two systems of reference. Their metaphysics, or less pretentiously their
customs and the agencies to which they refer, were abolished because they were in contradiction
with a new civilization that imposed its own” (Black Skin, White Masks 90). The black man was
forbidden to speak his language. “No effort is spared to demolish their traditions, to substitute
our language for theirs, and to destroy their culture without giving them ours” (Fanon Wretched
of the Earth l).
The black man was relegated to beggary, hunger, illness, neglect, and beatings. With his
body mangled, his spirit deprived, his knowledge devoured, he entered into a new agreement,
survival. Horace Mann is quoted in Head Masters, stating that the black slave was “irredeemably
and hopelessly crushed, extinguished, obliterated so that nothing but the animal, which the
master can use for his selfish purposes, remains” (288). He was naked. This nothing but the
animal refers to the black body's use-value in concatenation with labor while disregarding the
black man as an intellectual being.
Thus, the black man is a recent invention of history,3 emerging on the world stage in
eighteenth-century Europe vis-à-vis science, technology, and art. Racist politics during this
period concretized his characterology.4 But it would be The Thirteenth Amendment that will seal
his fate as constitutionally criminalized owing to mass incarceration as modern-day slavery.
Some of the questions for this examination are: how did science, technology, and art fashion
black male subjectivity? How did the Thirteenth Amendment further subjugate the black man
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and problematize his emancipation? How does art participate in the black man’s human
condition of marginalized humanity and at once liberate him in a self-emancipatory project? This
study will engage four major ideas: history as construction, not as a chronological assessment of
events in time, but history as ideas, history as the primal scene of black masculinity, the black
man as a recent invention examined through the lens of Jacques Ranciere’s regimes of art and the
distribution of the sensible. And, finally, I will argue Kara Walker’s images as an aesthetic
education in ascertaining emancipation for the black man. One might inquire: from what does the
black man needs emancipating? I would have to reply as Fanon, that the black man must be
saved “from himself” (Black Skin, White Masks xii). Further, he must redeem himself from this
racist system intent on his demise.
As recent as August 11, 2019, a violent racial clash between Neo-Nazis, white
supremacist groups, and blacks in Charlottesville, Virginia precipitated. The Atlantic published
an article on August 27th by former Vice President Joe Biden, which bore the title “We Are
Living Through a Battle for the Soul of This Nation.” The title of the article is significant for
several reasons. First, the Nation, as we know it, America, was built on the backs of black
slaves, and therefore the generational master/slave narrative is inherent. Secondly, today's
perpetuation of the same rhetoric and action is part of a cycle inherited by the forefathers.
Instead of confronting and eradicating racism, it is agitated and fostered by individuals who
support historical racist claims of superiority and inferiority.
Consequently, it is not only the soul of the black man that is at stake but the essential
nature of the Nation that portrays itself as the land of the free in the global marketplace. These
freedom and racial disparities have long reigned as the subject of controversy and wars
throughout human history and are still tenacious in their employment. The article is not
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discharged then from the core contention of this project regarding the great racial divide, the
color line. In his article, Biden accuses the Trump administration of emboldening and
supporting hate groups, making it possible for those previously hidden in anonymity to show
themselves in the light of day. Biden boldly asserts in the article that “today we have an
American president who has publicly proclaimed a moral equivalency between Neo-Nazis and
Klansmen and those who would oppose their venom and hate” (Biden).
History has forgotten itself. Believing its own lie, it operates as truth, performing
legitimation in the name of science, technology, and art. Fanon’s polemical Black Skin, White
Masks decries history and its perpetual hold on the black man. Fanon argues in his work that
history has constructed the black man in body and soul, conscious and unconscious. He
implicates history as a type of narrative, the weaving of a story. He uses the term fabrication to
imply a certain ontological predisposition of Being constructed vis-à-vis myths and fairytales.
Fanon emphatically states, “the black man is not. No more than the white man” (206). These
attributes are social constructs with one intent, ascertaining power over the Other. The black
soul, argues Fanon throughout the text, is but a conjecture of white desire. He implicitly avows
that the black man emerged on the landscape of history, in gestation, having “no culture, no
civilization, and no historical past” (Black Skin, White Masks 17). This emergence into history
not as a development but as a new entity is implied in “gestation,” fully operational as
ahistorical. A new creation.
We are living in a disturbing time regarding race relations in America as it concerns the
black man. The black man is slaughtered by our police state5 in the streets without penalty to
those who abuse the law sworn to be protectors of the law. Activists have called out these
cowardly acts in the similitude of lynching.6 In a National Geographic article by Deneen L.
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Brown, she quotes the historian, Arica Coleman of George Floyd’s death as “a modern-day
lynching” (Brown). Derek Chauvin’s knee on the neck of Floyd was but a substitution for the
rope.7 These heinous exploits occur without provocation. Our educational system, judicial
system, and prison system form what I designate as the triangulation of corruption8 in America's
invention, legalization, and marketing of the modern slave trade. Corporate America is involved
in the flesh trade, the selling of the soul of the black man at a great cause to his family,
community, and the Nation.9 In our present-day, the racist, derogatory images of blackface are
revisited on many platforms by politicians, celebrities, and everyday citizens, awakening the
memories of the painful and arduous atrocities leveled against the black character, stirring the
waters of superiority and inferiority’s best practices.10 These performances masquerade as black
and thereby undermine any authentic undertaking of the black agenda in politics, and justice, as
these acts recast the stereotypes of history in their display. The affinity of our current age to the
Civil War11 and the Reconstruction era12 is uncanny as the black man seeks to repudiate the lie
of history and at once maintain ground for liberation.
Emptied into readymade racism and seemingly at an impasse, the black man is thrust
into a world in which the agencies of history are aligned like galaxies, where worlds are created,
and others collide. Still, a divided nation, there is one justice system for the black man and
another for the white; the black man still lives within the veil. The term “veil” can be understood
here, in part, by examining its place in W. E. B. Du Bois’s seminal work, The Souls of Black
Folk as a condition of seeing oneself through the eyes of another, realizing one's consciousness
through the perceived gaze of the white world (2). This state of seeing is not a gift from nature.
Instead, it is a societal curse because it ultimately means that the black man is invisible. In A
Colony and a Nation, Chris Hayes notes that “different systems of justice are a centuries-old
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American tradition, indeed a foundational one” (24). He further implies that law and order
politics is a code for racism that further divides America into a black colony inside a white
nation. The nation creates the laws, while those in the black colony obey them. Hayes insists that
order and peace are for whites only against an accused disorderly black community.
Additionally, he contends that calculated laws create a more significant gap in the prison
population for the black man at a 3 to 1 ratio, favoring the white man.
According to Ava Duvernay’s documentary 13th, our prisons13 are calculated business
ventures where black men are housed and sold to the highest bidder. Duvernay names a leading
organization as being charged over this criminal enterprise. This inhumane endeavor ALEC
(American Legislation Exchange Council) is a billion-dollar venture whose primary campaign
and pursuit is economic profitability for the company and its stockholders. Fortune 500
corporations and legislators are members of this agency who have formed partnerships to
propose legislation for lawmakers to adopt in locking up our own.14 The creation of new laws
from this partnership guarantees the supply of black male bodies in free labor. The paradox is
that the black community patronizes many of these companies. At the same time, these diabolical
corporate creatures of industry undercut the rights of the black man to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. The list is an extensive and familiar one of companies who have betrayed
the human project of freedom. Instead, they have become conspirators in the death of the Other.
Some of these are Exxon Mobile, Time Warner, Direct TV, Pfizer, Walmart, American Bail
Coalition, State Farm, Comcast, Dupont, FedEx, KOCH, Verizon, and many others, including
Corrections Corporations of America.
While companies depend on a supply of black bodies, Corrections Corporations of
America—the first private prison company—depend on legislation to advance their agenda to
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build and populate prisons. Corrections Corporations of America contract with states mandating
that prisons are at capacity. According to Durvernay’s documentary, the Florida law, Stand Your
Ground, which Zimmerman adopted at the time of the stalking and slaughtering of Trayvon
Martin, was birthed by ALEC (13th 47.35). Duvernay’s research pulls back the covers of the
structure and sustainability of the penal system, funneled through the justice system as the
prostitution of truth and equality under the law. At the time of the Trayvon Martin incident,
ALEC was a powerful political force with politicians and corporations working in concert to
write and propose legislation to enact into law. President Ronald Raegan endorsed ALEC during
his administration, referring to its mission as a unique opportunity and its members as leaders.
Durvenay’s documentary states that “nearly every ALEC bill benefits one of its corporate
funders” (13th 56.34). Walmart benefited enormously from the Stand Your Ground legislation as
it is the largest retail seller of long guns and the highest seller of bullets globally (13th 56.34).
These corporate giants mobilize in boardrooms across this republic to lobby and strategize for
more stringent legislation that will ascertain and ensure a viable enterprise of black male bodies
in the service of capitalism with no regard for humanism. Duvernay’s documentary is a searing
account of the bidding war in the trading of black lives in corporate America.
These corporate leeches are no different from those during the Transatlantic Slave Trade
aboard the countless slave voyages, innumerable auction blocks, and plantations throughout this
nation. Master Samuel would state in The Confessions of Nat Turner in the selling of Nat Turner,
“yes, it could be that mankind has yet to be born. Ah, what bitter tears God must weep at the
sight of the things that men do to other men” (221)! Samuel would further confess that selling
Turner was “in the name of money!” (Styron 221). In his aesthetic letters, Friedrich Schiller
bemoaned civilization’s evolution, and in a backward glance, stated that humankind should have
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lingered in innocence as the “bondslaves of humanity” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 45)
to avoid the calamity of the overreach of reason and what comes down to the loss of the soul of
humankind. And Sartre proposed that the human race had not yet reached maturity (Fanon The
Wretched of the Earth lix).
The title The Black Veil of Freedom: On Kara Walker and the Aesthetic Education of the
Black Man speaks to the aesthetic education in Schiller’s aesthetic letters. But the title also points
to art’s dark history as the determined object and the veiling of its capacity to liberate. Art in the
Greek city-states participated in the collective whole of human orchestration and development
and was, therefore, an integral component of the educational system. We are made aware of the
disbanding of the system in poetic terms15 in Schiller’s “Sixth Letter,” in which he rebuffs the
State as holding the principal role in the subversion of form, leading to an alienated subjectivity.
Schiller: “At that time, in that lovely awakening of the intellectual powers, the senses and the
mind had still no strictly separate individualities, for no dissension had yet constrained them to
make hostile partition with each other and determine their boundaries” (On the Aesthetic
Education of Man 38).16
Knowledge, and therefore, the essence of humankind, was singularly conjoined until the
division in the form of the narrative. Johann Kasper Lavater extended the assignment of value in
his physiognomic project. As for art in its hiddenness, there lies within the cavity of its walls the
possibility for emancipation. Schiller implicates art as being involved in both the underside of
ontology and the restoration of humankind. What he suggests appears paradoxical, confusing, a
riddle even. How can art be cause and effect? Schiller insists that “we must be at liberty to
restore by means of a higher Art this wholeness in our nature which Art has destroyed” (On the
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Aesthetic Education of Man 45).17 I will return to this statement numerous times throughout this
project as a testament of freedom for the black man.
Schiller set the stage for what Ranciere will later introduce in the regimes of art as the
distinction between art as representational and art belonging to the aesthetic regime.
Representational art has as its end to serve the agenda of the hegemonic order and state
apparatus. An array of illustrations are available in the Western art tradition. One such example
is the theme of Madonna and Child. The message transposed upon the flesh of the figures in the
works is a declaration of the redemption of humankind through divine conception (Mary) and the
godchild (Jesus). For thousands of years, the message resounded through the lens of the Holy
Roman Catholic Church. The arrangement is an arrangement of ideas. The aesthetic regime of art
frees the form as determined knowledge and liberates the spectator, allowing perception as free
will. This freedom of form is what Immanuel Kant postulates as the shift in the subject/object
relationship in what he deems his Copernican Revolution.18
It is not that the form does not come with some semblance of content, but it does not
arrive as a law of perception, rather, as what Kant describes as a maxim. Yet, there remain works
of art that have the appearance of liberation but have a finite end. Kara Walker’s work as an
offering of indeterminate perception is critical to this project in confronting historical racism in
black representation. In her work, history, art, and the narrative are disfigured, scattered, ending,
in a sense, the traditional modes of seeing in a reconfiguration belonging to an equilibrium of
visibility. Kara Walker’s enigmatic silhouettes are an aesthetic appearance wherein emancipation
for the black man can be conceived through what Ranciere refers to as a rupture. The veil in the
title can also be understood in history as the primal scene for the black man, as a looming death,
an insurmountable wall, a secret chamber, inaccessible, closed off, but now examined as
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dialectic, passable, restorative. Previously, history was viewed as an irretrievable past in its
inability to restore time. Now, we recognize history’s restorative means through the very act of
time in a return and its fragmentations as informing a new perception. But what is perception
barring its concatenation to knowledge?
I would propose, for all practical purposes, that this is a report on knowledge. When I
state that this project is a report on knowledge, I do so by two means. In the one, this project
regards what Karl Jasper’s read of Kant states as the two stems of knowledge, (27) the
intellectual and the sensible, and Schiller refers to as humankind’s “whole power” (On the
Aesthetic Education of Man 23). I am at once contemplating Jean-Francois Lyotard’s The
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, in which Lyotard surmises that science insists
on using unscientific knowledge in the narrative to prop up their scientific discoverables. Lyotard
claims that it is the narrative that science has relied on throughout history to validate and
authenticate its scientific hypotheses. Further, is it not knowledge, perpetrating as history that
sealed the fate of the black man through various chains of representation? What relationship can
there be of history and emancipation for the black man? How then can history, the instrument for
the formation and defamation of black masculine subjectivity, redeem itself as a “dialectic
turnabout” (Buck-Morss 338)?19 Theologically speaking, Nicodemus came to Jesus by night and
asked, “How can a man be born when he is old? can he enter the second time into his mother's
womb, and be born” (King James Version John 3.4)? This second return, as far as this project is
concerned, is to the womb of history.
So, it accounts that knowledge and the question concerning history are indelibly
intertwined in the contrived construction of the black man. The question concerning history is
lodged not in the black question but in the very question of history’s legitimacy and how
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specific knowledge was assigned to the black man's purported history. For this vital proposal,
that of the emancipation of the black man, it is necessary to set history straight, to exact an
account of history, not history as event, but history as agency, as apparatus, even. An apparatus
“appears at the intersection of power relations and relations of knowledge” (Agamben What is
an Apparatus 3)?20 History then can be identified as a particular compilation of knowledge,
legitimating a selective regime of consciousness. How did history become the agency to a
certain regime of thought, parading the grand narratives in its concealment of non-thought?
These power relations, these relations of knowledge, are allocated to a few and forbidden
to others. Even as the tree of the knowledge of good and evil theologically speaking was
forbidden, attributing such audacity of inquiry as sin and the threat of death in banishment,
separated from the supreme being of knowledge who claimed total dominion of thought. Michel
Foucault’s The Archaeology of Knowledge: And the Discourse on Language identifies history as
a discipline created to establish unmovable chains of thought. What Foucault is questioning is
the document (written record) of history. The document is a living witness to the tracing of time
but not a faithful witness (6). And Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Preface” to Jacques Derrida’s
Grammatology contends that “humankind’s common desire is for a stable center, and for the
assurance of mastery—through knowing or possessing” (xi).
The problem encountered in this study is the question of knowledge and its participation
in the invention and construction of history and the black man as an unintelligible, distorted
product of nature (e.g., see fig. 2). The question concerning history is relegated to the codified
model of the ordering of things. It is concerned with the practitioners who specialize in the
acquisition not of punctuated events but in the aggregation of what calls for myths, fairy tales,
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and legends. The question of history comes down to the question of knowledge and its
compartmentalization, the question of the Word made flesh and dwelling among us.21
The problem lies in the very
question of history and its legitimacy,
or more adequately, whether history is
autonomous as an agency unto itself or
a hegemonic handmaiden utilized as the
carrier of Western elitist thought. And
it is, therefore, in this knowledge that
lies the question of freedom and
subjugation. Ranciere insists that
“Schiller’s notion of the aesthetic
education of man . . . established the
idea that domination and servitude are,
in the first place, part of an ontological
Figure 2: Colored Rule in a Reconstructed State, 1874.

distribution (the activity of thought
versus the passivity of sensible matter)” (The Politics of Aesthetics 27).22
For the task of deciphering the relationship of knowledge to art and art to the politics of
freedom, we will appropriate Ranciere’s theories of the regimes of art and the distribution of the
sensible. Ranciere expands some of the major theoretical concepts of Kant and Schiller. I will
reference many of Ranciere’s texts throughout this study. Abbreviations will be placeholders for
the protracted titles to move through the body of the text seamlessly. These abridged titles will
be used after the first entry of the text in the body and will appear as such: The Politics of
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Aesthetics (will be abbreviated as Politics), Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (abbreviated
as Dissensus), The Future of the Image (abbreviated as Future), The Aesthetic Unconscious (as
Unconscious), Film Fables (as Film), The Emancipated Spectator (as Spectator), and The
Ignorant Schoolmaster (as Schoolmaster).
Ranciere distinguishes the regimes of art as the ethical regime, the representative regime,
and the aesthetic regime. These regimes give way to structures of power and arrangement of
visibilities. “The ethical regime . . . characteristic of Platonism is primarily concerned with the
origin and telos of imagery in relation to the ethos of the community. It establishes a distribution
of images . . . to educate the citizenry concerning their role in the communal body” (Politics 4).
In Plato’s Republic, Socrates controlled the images circulated in the community, deeming moral
suitability for unifying the singularity of thought in the republic. The representative regime sets
up a system of visibility by categorizing perception. The representative regime “is an artistic
system of Aristotelian heritage that liberates imitation from the constraints of ethical utility and
isolates a normatively autonomous domain with its own rules for fabrication and criteria of
evaluation” (Politics 4). Finally, the aesthetic regime abolishes “the dichotomous structure of
mimesis in the name of a contradictory identification between logos and pathos.” (Politics 4). It
transforms the a priori categorization and hierarchy of visibility that is at work in the
representative regime (Politics 4). The distribution of the sensible in Ranciere refers to:
The system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the
existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts
and positions within it. A distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the
same time something common that is shared and exclusive parts This apportionment of
parts and positions is based on a distribution of spaces, times, and forms of activity that
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determines the very manner in which something in common lends itself to participation
and in what way various individuals have a part in this distribution. (Politics 12)
Our current political milieu involves the disturbing tactics of dividing the community into
factions and groups, occupying specific spaces and encampments into parts that are not
necessarily equal. This partitioning, beginning with the project of Plato, assigns specializations
and determines the space which each of these separate units occupies. This distribution is
engaged in time as measured and limited in factoring participation of one’s occupation and
ability to interact otherwise with the community at large.23 An example used by Ranciere in this
demarcation is the occupation of the shoemaker whose primary task is that of manufacturing
shoes and nothing else.24 And in this nothing else, he cannot participate in communal forums
because he is otherwise preoccupied (determined) in his station as a shoemaker. Nor can he be
involved in the work of any other specialized field. This specialization of Being is problematic
on so many levels and creates pockets of nomenclature of knowledge and mechanized humanity.
The question concerning history undergirds the theoretical scope for all philosophical
inquiries. From the onset of Western thought from Plato to Kant, we are not without witnesses as
the sons refute the fathers. Therefore, it necessitates that this same posturing is involved in the
case of the black man and emancipation. There can be no resolution without this redress. The
question concerning history, if not the most important question relating to the acquisition of
emancipation for the black man in this project, is the cornerstone where what counts for
questioning commences. Therefore, there is no moving beyond history except in the undertaking
of history.
Consequently, history is exposed for its crafty seduction, beguiling the ages with the
serpentine representation of time and matter in the guise of the natural order of things while
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concealing the truth. For these false presumptions of history to perpetuate as truth, they would
have been passed over in silence. This passing over in silence is passing over as silence. Hegel
posits familiarity as deception and passing as the very account of familiarity (Of Grammatology
xiii). What has been silenced from the onset of Western thought is desire, and that desire is of the
Other. “Derrida has reminded us to say it anew, is that a certain view of the world . . . has been
accepted as the correct one, and, if the minute particulars of that view are examined, a rather
different picture (that is also a no picture, as we shall see) emerges” (Of Grammatology
xiii). This emptying out in Derrida as a “no picture” can be perceived as concocted history as
world.
What then is the birth of Western civilization except that of the birth of desire,
recognition, and predilection of value attributable to Plato as the progenitor of a certain school of
thought? I am not alone in this charge against Plato. Lyotard accused Plato of using narratives to
prop up his “scientific discussion” (29). Heidegger situates Plato’s doctrine and assignment of
value as the manipulation of truth in his essay “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” (Barrett, Aiken 251).
And Ranciere’s ethical regime is predicated on Plato reordering desire by calling into question
the desires of others. Claims such as these are noted throughout this study. These theoretical
postulates of desire, recognition, and value originate in the republic's founding principles in
pursuit of an absolute apart from Nature, raising the specter of the Other. We need only return to
Du Bois to understand the black man as one of the categorizations defining the Other in his
concept of “double consciousness” and “two-ness” (The Souls of Black Folk 2). Desire, so
readily locatable in Hegel and Sigmund Freud, is first enunciated in the nascent womb of the
Socratic dialogues. Human history is but the history of desire, contends Alexandre Kojève in his
reading of Hegel, maintaining that the self-conscious emerges in “risking his life to satisfy his
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human Desire—that is, his Desire directed toward another Desire” (7). A will to power is present
in Friedrich Nietzsche. And Arthur Schopenhauer asserts that “human beings are not essentially
rational, but are desiring, emotional animals, whose rationality was developed to serve and
maximize the will to life” (The World as Will and Idea xxv).
In Plato’s republic, we experience the original seed of the dialectic of desire, recognition,
and the establishment of value. In the republic, the great divide of humankind will be weighed
one against the other in the master/slave narrative in anticipation of Hegel. Reason will be
valorized through the supposed fair exchange of discourse with the interlocutors and gain
primacy, while art will be cast as the darker Other in this drama. The intellect will take the
position of the transcendentally charged sacred, while the sensible disavowed as profane. Will as
idea should be understood as becoming the world of visibility, of form, and image.25 As for the
desire of the Other, the Other is always in opposition of what is present, and at once, the
presencing of what is absent, which has been determined by a will and predicated as the
established or chosen order of things. It is always in the presence of things that absence makes its
appearance: matter/form, intellect/sensible, visible/invisible, speech/silence/ nature/humankind,
body/mind, profane/sacred. Spivak, in the Preface to Grammatology, states, “Derrida suggests …
such is the strange ‘being’ of the sign: half of it always ‘not there’ and the other half always ‘not
that.’ The structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of that other which is forever
absent” (Derrida xvii). Yet never absent.
These divisions, clearly marked and understood as inventions are identified as belonging
to the same in Giorgio Agamben),26 as abject in Julia Kristeva,27 and what has always been a
taxonomy of oppositions in the experimentation of Being in Donna Haraway.28 These
dichotomous entities, unable to abide as a unified whole, separated at the birth of thought, must
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only exist separately, so demand the grand narratives of history. The innocence of history has
long been shattered beneath the weight of questioning. Hidden beneath the veneer of art lies the
question of history, which is only answerable by art in its hiddenness as far as this project of the
black man and emancipation is concerned.
Let me satisfy the question lingering for some behind another study on the black man.
The black man is still a problem because he remains a challenge for the hegemonic order where
racism is ordered, practiced, perpetuated, and marketed at a high demand. He remains obstinate
in his penetratingly palpable resistance. The constant antagonism of purpose and persistence of
will with no impulsion of surrender is what we understand as a fight to the death. And I would
also state that to a larger degree, as Karl Marx indicated of capitalism, racism is a machine that
subsists on its own. Today the crisis of the black man and emancipation is no less allayed as we
eyewitness escalating assaults, which remains salient regarding the disposition and the soul of
the black man.
The history of the black man in America is the history of his struggle for freedom against
systemic racism. If systemic, then conspiracy. So, the question begs, where does the
emancipation for the black man reside? What is the role of epistemology in emancipation and
identity, and what has this to do with art? And the black man, though resisting on every side in
every manner, finds no resting place, no liberation. These resistances are always already filtered
into a history of the narrative of the black man as savages and aggressors as in the case of Nat
Turner’s Rebellion (e.g., see figs. 3-4) and the Amistad revolt as well as countless other
incidences of insurgency. These insurrections are numerous and recorded in the annals of
history. These uprisings are a living testament to defiance.29 These rebellions are perceived as
crimes against the state by lawless creatures. In Wages of Rebellion, Chris Hedges declares that
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these rebels work in a type of blind leading, some to the point of sublime madness, perhaps,
faith. Faith is not based on facts or logic but moving into darkness, matter unformed,
nothingness. “The rebel, possessed by inner demons and angels, is driven by a vision. I do not
know if the new revolutionary wave and the rebels produced by it will succeed. But I do know
that without these rebels, we are doomed” (20). Whatever name in history is assigned to these

Figures 3-4. A woodcut of Nat Turner’s Rebellion, 1831. The Birth of a Nation film poster, 2016.

dissenters, the defiance against an authoritative beast bearing the title of governance is a hashtag
for unfathomable human suffering.
Who or what has shaped this creature of destiny, the black man? He has been shaped in
history (time) as history (event) for history (agency). In establishing the breadth and depth of this
study, I must concur with Fanon that this project does not seek to make the black man a superior
race. (Black Skin, White Masks 201). In so doing, he has become the master and, in his
mastering, the slave in Hegelian terms.30 When discussing political maladies and history’s role in
emancipation Susan Buck-Morss invokes Walter Benjamin, who persisted that it is not about the
overturn of history in favor of another. “Rather, the goal is to bring to consciousness those
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repressed elements of the past . . . which place the present in a critical position” (338). Benjamin
is inferring a confrontation, a recognition.
By limiting this project’s scope to the black man in America, I do not mean to further
demarcate an already divided congress. This project has no interest in diminishing black
femininity by concentrating its efforts on the black male. Nor do I wish to make a greater offense
by replicating phallocentrism or imperialism already noted as having subverted history. I seek to
interrogate the binaries created by society in the reconciliation of the present posture of the black
man. As to the question of the black man as the focus of this proposal, I will again invoke Fanon
as to state, “it is a question not of educating them but of teaching the black man not to be a slave
of their archetypes” (Black Skin, White Masks 18). The black man is slaughtered exponentially in
our streets; the black man has a higher yield in our criminal justice system and prisons.
Therefore, I want to remain in the grid of the black man's proposed historical appearance to map
a way forward. Bell Hooks attests that the black man is “victimized by stereotypes that were first
articulated in the nineteenth century but hold sway…in the present day. Black male selfhood is
constructed in white-supremacist capitalistic patriarchy as the image of the brute—untamed,
uncivilized, unthinking, and unfeeling” (xi). No wonder the black man is feared and dreaded. He
is the American Monster. In the Preface to The Wretched of the Earth, Sartre declares that the
colonized cry out against the colonizer incessantly: “You are making monsters out of us; your
humanism wants us to be universal, and your racist practices are differentiating us” (xliv).
Further, Sartre insists that “the only way the European could make himself man was by
fabricating slaves and monsters” (The Wretched of the Earth lviii).
I seek no individual freedom for the black man in contradistinction to the white.
Descartes’ cogito belongs to all thinking beings. As Martin Luther King, Jr. declared, injustice
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marked for the black community lies at the doorstep of all communities. Freedom is rightfully
the inheritance of the black man, not as a privilege but as a fundamental element of being human.
To mandate a charge of emancipation for the black man outside the rigors of the already
determined enslavement of the politics of history serves only to negate this project and turn it
into a ghost ship. But if we are willing to understand to some degree what necessitates his
emancipation, we must be willing to walk the line of history to his enslavement. Fanon
acknowledged that he hoped all could “feel the open dimension of every consciousness” (Black
Skin, White Masks 206). A fair assessment of this statement lies in the equality of thought
inherent in all thinking beings.
Am I bewitched by Western white philosophers, deeming them the salt of the earth,
masters of esoteric knowledge that I would simply pass over black philosophical thought as
inferior in my interrogation? Plato is recognized as the father of Western thought and Aristotle
after him. It is not my position in this work to prove otherwise. Again, I state this as historical
posturing that I will persist in lodging my complaint. Am I to assert that this is a myth? Should I
ask, as Ronald Barthes “in other words, is there a mythology of the mythologist” (xii)? I contend
as Slavoj Zizek in that the way out is through, betraying the letter of thought to excavate a truth
lodged in the “creative impulse” (13). We must then go beneath consciousness and retrieve
unconsciousness as thought which is the creative aspect of reason. Therefore, the falsity of
history must first be acknowledged, exposed, and then reckoned with to begin anew. These dead
white men are just as relevant for this undertaking as the legion of black voices. All must be
excavated, all examined as living documents to uncover some semblance of truth.
So, history, no longer unable to be challenged by the canons of language and art, is
revisited for its intrinsic dialectic of freedom. And Walker, whose work we revisit to disclose
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its philosophical significance in terms of history, politics, and aesthetics, proclaims the following
in her 1998 Letter from a Black Girl, from the anthology Kara Walker: My Complement, My
Enemy, My Oppressor, My Love (e.g., see fig. 5). “I am left here alone to recreate MY WHOLE

Figure 5. Kara Walker, A Letter to a Black Girl, transfer text on wall, dimensions variable, 1998.

HISTORY without benefit of you” (Vergne 161). Walker names history as contrived as an
invention by maintaining that she must now recreate her past on an empty canvas. And she
further stakes her claim of history as invention in the phrase an upon a time. She states, “before,
when there was a before, an upon a time I was a blank space defined in contrast to your
POSITIVE, concrete avowal” (Vergne 161). This statement is explosive in its disclosure of
history as a construction through always already stations of identity and power in this
nothingness of being against the backdrop of a confirmed white existence in all social arenas.
This positive which Walker evokes defines a visible, fastened, absolute existence.
The return to Walker is not to examine Walker, the artist, but Walker the artistphilosopher, not to deliberate her work in the torture and trauma of slavery, but the torture of art
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in its emancipatory potential. Ranciere, recalling Gilles Deleuze, asserts that “when Deleuze
speaks to us of the work that tears the percept from perception and the affect from affection, he
is expressing . . . the original formula of aesthetic discourse” (Dissensus: On Politics and
Aesthetics 173). This is the torture of art that must be dismantled in its subjugated gaze. To state
artist-philosopher indicates the end of art and philosophy in the conventional division of
knowledge in the West and the evocation of aesthetics. Dialectic always presupposes a way
back, not to return to the womb of history as time, but by way of an “awakened consciousness”
(Buck-Morss 338). This activated state should be understood in Walker as belonging to the
same “awakened consciousness.” One must approach her work not as a monument to slavery
but as its abolition. History is no longer regarded as the closed book of determinism. Rather,
rhizomatic with possibilities of “lines of flight” (Deleuze & Guatarri A Thousand Plateaus 9).
And Zizek insists that “in theological terms, Redemption does not follow the Fall; it occurs
when we become aware of how what we previously (mis)perceived as Fall “itself” already was
Redemption” (14). Can we not follow this thought in the assumption of history?
It may seem unreasonable to elevate Walker’s work to such a position as to discuss it in
the same vein as philosophy. But, if one is offended by this, is this not the problem of
philosophy and the vanity of reason? Ranciere incriminates philosophy in Dissensus, in which
he states that “the coming Revolution will be at once the consummation and abolition of
philosophy; no longer merely ‘formal’ and ‘political,’ it will be a ‘human’ revolution. The
human revolution is an offspring of the aesthetic paradigm” (120). The term “political” in this
reference implies what Ranciere contends politics has become, a hegemonic tool for
domination. In the aesthetic paradigm, the form offers itself as emancipation without directing
the intent or gaze of the spectator. Throughout the history of Western art, Greek art has been
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viewed as a model of how art should work in the community as a living form. Accordingly,
permeating in these works was the “fullness of form with fullness of content, at once
philosophic and creative . . . uniting the youthfulness of fantasy with the manliness of reason in
a splendid humanity” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 38). A “splendid humanity” speaks to
the equilibrium of community.
In Schiller’s “Sixth Letter,” he states that “the Greek nature…united all the attractions of
art and all the dignity of wisdom, without, however, becoming the victim of them as does our
own” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 37). The victimization of art in Schiller refers to the
lure of form in the reconstitution of nature. He further states that “however high Reason might
soar, it always drew its subject matter lovingly after it, and however fine and sharp the divisions
it made, it never mutilated” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 38). This state of art’s
pursuance as “lovingly” is the application of knowledge in the actualization of form as ideal.
When Hegel sought to correlate art to the doctrine of the absolute, he did so by specifying three
moments of art, symbolism, classicism, and romanticism. Hegel proposed that art manifests
itself in history in correlation to knowledge in producing a specific form.
When I posited Walker’s work as the end of art, history, and philosophy in the case of
the black man, history, and slavery to the end of emancipation, I am following Ranciere’s lead
in the aesthetic posturing of art. This posturing involves moving away from the traditional role
that art has sustained in the representative order towards its essentialness. Ranciere proposes
that “in the aesthetic regime of art, art is art to the extent that it is something else than art . . . it
is always posited as a ‘form of life’” (Dissensus 118). And this freedom of form, which
Ranciere suggests is possible, is not art for art’s sake, which rejects history. Nor is it art for life,
as in the concept that all things are art, but a form of art that ushers in a shared vision, no longer
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autonomous but bearing witness to a living community.31 How is this possible? The aesthetic
regime does this by “destroying the mimetic barrier that distinguished ways of doing and
making affiliated with art from other ways of doing and making . . . it simultaneously
established the autonomy of art and the identity of its forms with the forms that life uses to
shape itself” (Politics 23). In this, neither the hierarchy of the subject matters nor its autonomy
as elite. Instead, it is the leveling of visibilities to that of life.
In other words, when the mimetic component became an acceptable form in the
Aristotelean regime (representative regime of art), it identified itself not with life but as a
separate entity, autonomous. Doing so disrupted the relationship of art to the community
because it had its own rules creating hierarchized perception and visibility. In the aesthetic
regime of art, the relationship to the community, politics originary, and life is restored. Art as a
singularity of form was the privileged visibility relieving itself of the responsibility to the
community. Aesthetics, the proper name for art as liberation, is returned to the community in its
offering of grace32 as emancipated perception. How do we account for the silhouette in this
equation of the interrogation of the black man and emancipation?
Far more profound than tracing as mere appearance, the silhouette is already involved in
Jacques Lacan’s theory of the mirror image. This tracing of the silhouette, then, is philosophical.
In Chapter One, “The Silhouette in the Age of Enlightenment and Modern Oblivion,” I argue
that the silhouette participates in the discourse on knowledge from the beginning. This is
examined in three moments. First, specific to Plato’s dialogues in Republic, secondly, the
silhouette as it relates to Lavater’s eighteenth-century physiognomic project, and finally, Kara
Walker’s silhouettes. Was not Plato involved in setting the parameters of knowledge in his
division of the shadow and the light in the cave allegory? We will examine Heidegger’s essay,
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“Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” in which Heidegger explicates the cave allegory in the role of
Plato’s ethical postulation in the republic. In Lavater’s project, the silhouette’s role is that of a
witness in the field of Positivism33 and its influence during the era that shaped the discourse

Figure 6. Kara Walker, Darkytown Rebellion, 2001

belonging to scientific racism. It is paramount to follow the first sightings of the shift of
knowledge in the republic and the implication of the silhouette in philosophical discourse. And
this knowledge reaching back to Plato became divided and assumed a position of legitimacy
through speech as the thus said. And the evening and the morning were the first day (Genesis
1.5).34
The silhouette in Walker will take another form as liberating, not in the discharge of
interest, but as a visual suspension introduced in Kant as disinterest with interest, not as law, but
as a maxim. Schiller would advance the idea of disinterest in the suspension of the rational and
sensible impulses35 and the introduction of a third impulse in the aesthetics paradigm. Walker’s
silhouettes, no longer performing in their conventional roles as master and slave, have liberated
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themselves from the manacles of history (e.g., see fig. 6), which is the inverse of what we see in
Plato and Lavater. The pursuing pages will reveal that the Enlightenment in which Lavater’s
physiognomy thrived was not only the pinnacle of racism but was the very site of a vintage
harvest in the consignment of race. Cornell West proposes this when discussing the slave ship in
The Cornell West Reader in his chapter on “The Paradox of Modernity.” “These Dantesque
journeys were the ignoble origins of Western modernity and the criminal foundations of
American democracy. They constituted the night side of the Age of Enlightenment, the reality
left unlit by the torch of natural reason. African slavery sits at the center of the grand epoch of
equality, liberty and fraternity, a center often concealed by modern myths of progress and
liberation” (51). This hypocrisy of the Enlightenment is the burden of racism we now live with,
whose paradox is not lost to our present age involving the black man and mass incarceration.
The representative regime is the subject of Chapter Two, “The Souls of Black Folk:
Performing Race in 19th and 20th Century Representation.” There is a fundamental difference
between the 1915 film The Birth of a Nation which presents the black man as a deplorable
human being, and the more recent 2017, The Black Panther, which positions him as having
oversight of his destiny and a command of the sciences and technology, not the invention of it.
The storyline is not far-fetched or imaginary but recorded singularly in the historical mysteries of
the construction of the pyramids. In Birth, the soul of the black man is black, and his value nondistinct. While in Panther, the black man’s soul is beautiful, intelligible, admirable. Throughout
history, in one form or the other, it has been the soul of the black man that has been the subject
of white polemics. The dichotomous soul/body relationship is one of the dominant ideas in
Western history and cannot be otherwise. Hanging in the balance, the black man oscillates
between the soulless depiction in Birth symbolic in the lone KKK rider as an organization who
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would (e.g., see fig. 7) redeem lost white supremacy who will rid the South of this disease. In its
opposition, Panther seeks to recoup the black man’s lost subjectivity as an intellectual being
(e.g., see fig. 8).
We are still living witnesses to the virulent fire of D.W. Griffith’s Birth and its impact on
the image of the black man. Birth is the adaptation of Thomas Dixon, Jr.’s novel The Clansman.
Clansman is Dixon’s response to the defeat
of the South and Harriet Beecher Stowe’s
literary success Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Stowe
attempts to redeem the fate of the black man
by elevating him to the level of human
through her writing. However, many would
argue that she instead reiterated the
stereotypes of history in language and
characterization. The film Birth had fulfilled
the long-awaited fantasy of the white man in
his attempt to destroy any hope of
redemption for the black man in America.
Figure 7. The Birth of a Nation film poster, 1915.

The narrative in Birth intended to heighten

the suspicion and hatred directed at the black race and the black man in specificity.
Chapter Two interrogates the concretization of the black man in America in the nineteenth
and twentieth-century representation vis-à-vis the arts as performance. The legislation of
freedom, the Thirteenth Amendment, will be examined for its re-enslavement of the black man
through the criminality clause as legal permission to profile and police the black man. This
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chapter examines the representative regime of art as the extended project that formulates the
social concept of black masculinity in its construction and dissemination through various social
institutions. Here, we will examine literature and the visual arts in white and black
representation. I argue that media (art) constructed and performed race in America, thereby
fabricating black male subjectivity, wherein lies the continuum of the myth of the black man in
science and technology.
In Chapter Three, Walker’s work is
examined as a redistribution of the sensible.
The redistribution of the sensible in
Rancierian terms reorders the world always
already formed through art and charged with
specific meaning and value. This concept is
critical for the reevaluation of the stereotypes
that have defined the black man. Walker’s
silhouette inverses the Platonic value of the
shadow as inferior, pronounced in the
“allegory of the cave.” Additionally, her work

Figure 8. Black Panther film poster, 2018.

dismantles Lavater’s racist physiognomic charge of the perfect form endowed by nature and God
as circumscribed to the Aryan nation and the inferior model assigned to the black man.
Some critics have identified Walker’s work as belonging to the same field of influence as
Lavater, mocking the black race and confirming the stereotypes projected by Lavater. However,
Walker’s silhouettes do not in any way validate Lavater’s in form, content, or intent. Instead,
Walker’s silhouettes are a total repudiation of the silhouettes used to represent the black
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stereotypes in Lavater’s racist agenda. She traces the historical trajectory in which Lavater’s
silhouettes had established certain truths of Being. She then refashions a new narrative cut from
the same cloth of racism in the stereotypes.
Walker’s work is a new form of the silhouette than those previously perpetuating
ontological false readings. Walker’s silhouettes liberate the stereotypes from history as
suspended desire. One way we can conceive the act of
liberation in Walker’s work is seen in the image of the male
youth with the enlarged penis in Walker’s Gone: An Historical
Romance of a Civil War as it Occurred between the Dusky
Thighs of One Young Negress and Her Heart (e.g., see fig. 9).
In its enlargement, the penis signifies the magnification of
history through repeated stories bearing the same narrative that
became the impetus for the myth of the black man as animality.
Figure 9. Kara Walker, Gone
detail, 1994.

The enormous genitalia create the myth of the black man as

removed from humanity as either mystical or a monster. Fanon discusses this phenomenon in
Black Skin, White Masks, in which he relays Michel Cournot’s writing on this subject. Cournot
illustrates how these lies of history spread in condensation, which he skillfully crystallizes in as
little as these two paragraphs.
When Cournot compares the black man’s penis to that of a sword, he speaks not just of
his virility but also his insatiable appetite as sensual (147). Cournot participates in the lore of the
myth of black male virility as animality. When Cournot writes, “when he has thrusted it into your
wife” (B1ack Skin, White Masks 147), he is framing the black man as amoral, and therefore, a
monster. The term “thrust” conjures violence, and “wife” is a statement of ownership and
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property once in the possession of the white man, now belonging to the black man. The black
man as embodied evil is the central theme in Birth, illustrating the black man as wreaking havoc
on the white race by disregarding order, pillaging their homes, raping their women, and
decimating his laws. Cournot tells a joke as means to validate his previous assertion. He relays
that “four black men with their dicks out in the open will fill a cathedral” (Black Skin, White
Masks 147). Fanon followed the excerpt from Cournot by stating, “when we read this passage a
dozen times, and we let ourselves be carried away by the movement of its images, no longer do
we see the black man; we see a penis: the black man has been occulted. He had been turned into
a penis.36 He is a penis” (Black Skin, White Masks 147). Unfortunately, to be occulted is a state
of non-existence to a certain degree unless one believes in unicorns.
Walker’s work provokes not only a discussion of her art and its place in the history of
ideas, subject matter, technique, method, and materials as belonging to the materiality of the
work. Walker’s work also consciously and unconsciously provokes discourse on philosophy.
What does this suggest? To discuss art in general terms isolates art from ideas that involve
thinking philosophically.37 These matters of thinking were left to the philosopher, the overseers
of knowledge.38 This division profoundly stated in Plato’s republic is the delineation between the
poets and the philosopher-king. The poets were liars and could not be trusted, while the
philosopher-king was entitled and expected to lie to portray the ideal. These were noble lies.39
As for art, traditionally, art criticism analyzes a work of art formally for its purpose
during a specific period, in a certain region, and belonging to a specified culture. Ranciere
proposes that such art is that of representation. In Ranciere, representational art illustrates a
specified regime of thought in the manipulation of the object. This selected thought is
traditionally the realm of the philosopher, while the artist's participation in communal discourse
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(politics) is marginalized. However, in Walker’s dialectical images, an interdependent exchange
of thought runs concurrently. A dialectic image assumes the form of what Ranciere describes as
“living speech” (Politics 16). Walker’s work does not belong to the traditional canon; therefore,
the critique of her work is challenging for some. Walker’s work confounds not only the
spectators, but critics scramble to place her work in a familiar category to be understood and
appreciated by the art world and the masses. The work’s pictorial abstruseness is confounding
because there appears before us, conceptually, the Platonist mixing of the metals.40 Walker’s
work exacts what art should do: open up closed fields of interdisciplinary discussion, add to the
political landscape of resistance and revolt, and contribute to the continued body of knowledge
towards a form of ethical humanity.41
One of the reasons to rethink Walker is to reexamine her work through the lens of
Ranciere’s distribution of the sensible and the aesthetic regime, which I argue is imperative for
its emancipatory potential in the case of the black man. The enduring problem of knowledge in
the West is the division of knowledge which I alluded to earlier. Through Ranciere’s regimes of
art, we can begin to grasp the split of knowledge. Kant’s thing-in-itself and Hegel’s
phenomenology of the spirit as the interrogation of that division, which comes down to the role
of the artist and philosopher in society and the artist’s participation in the visibility of forms of
knowledge. Walker’s work can be perceived as a reworking of the artist's role with the
community and the philosopher's role in supervising and distributing knowledge. In Joseph
Tanke’s assessment of Ranciere’s fundamental concepts in Jacques Ranciere: An Introduction,
the author asserts that in Socrates’ republic, the philosopher is responsible for the absolute
control of the community, its production, its reproduction, its orchestration of labor, and
spectacles (29). Ranciere sees the aesthetic regime as a dismantling of the philosopher as the
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master of knowledge. This reconfiguration of the philosopher’s role allows the artist’s
participation in the field of knowledge previously occupied by the philosopher alone.
Similarly, the dissemination of knowledge is found in Agamben’s concepts in The
Coming Community. He suggests that the West has always been in the business of prioritizing
certain knowledge while rejecting or veiling others. He explains:
Ethics begins only when the good is revealed to consist in nothing other than a grasping
of evil and when the authentic and the proper have no other content than the inauthentic
and the improper. This is the meaning of the ancient philosophical adage according to
which “veritas patefacit se ipsam et falsum”. Truth cannot be shown except by showing
false, which is not, however, cut off and cast aside somewhere else . . . truth is revealed
only by giving space or giving a place to non-truth. (The Coming Community 12)
Morality, ethics, justice, and equality are met only at the site of visibility. In other words,
Agamben is engaging Schiller’s posture, which clarifies the purpose of the dialectic image as the
transparency of visibility. In the illustration of good and evil, freedom is exercised in choice. It is
the same in the realm of art. There can be no community of equals that Agamben recognizes in
the coming of community, except there is a visibility of both. Morality is only true ethics when
Being yields to what is proper and morally answerable in the Other.
In Chapter Three, I will assess Walker’s work for its potential in politics, aesthetics, and
in turn, emancipation. But it is not my commission to instruct you in seeing, but only to
anticipate that we will reexamine Walker concurrently. Walker’s chosen method of the silhouette
is perceived as profane and treasonous to the black community, who, by all accounts, have
diligently endeavored to move past the traumatic stereotypes of history as markers of black
identity.42 Walker’s work does not have its origin as belonging to a regime of categorization to
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which traditional modes of observing and analyzing a work of art anchor itself. Instead, her work
is involved in the rupture of the hermeneutics of perception. As polyphonic, her work returns to
the Tower of Babel43 to reconstitute what had otherwise been disrupted as unnatural. After a
presentation of Walker’s work, I was asked why Walker’s work was so replete with violence. I
don’t remember my response at the time, but I will respond now with Sartre’s reiteration of
Fanon. In the “Preface” of The Wretched of the Earth, Sartre asks us to recall that Fanon spoke
of violence as a means of recreating oneself and that violence is its own causality. This statement
is critical and may explain to some degree the way Walker works. Sartre states,
No indulgence can erase the marks of violence; violence alone can eliminate them. And
the colonized are cured of colonial neurosis by driving the colonists out by force. Once
their rage explodes, they recover their lost coherence, they experience self-knowledge
through reconstruction of themselves; from afar we see their war as the triumph of
barbarity; but it proceeds on its own to gradually emancipate the fighter and
progressively eliminate the colonial darkness inside and out. (lv)
In another place in the text, Sartre states, “for it is not first of all their violence, it is ours”
(The Wretched of the Earth lii).44 The European colonizer or the white man is the reference for
the term “ours” as universal. The prolongation in the torture of the body, soul, and mind was its
own system of violence useful in the conversion of the African from man to animality. There is a
convenient problem in our society, immersed in amnesia—deluge. The history of America is the
history of violence. The history of slavery is the history of violence. The history of the socioeconomic system of capitalism is a history of violence. The history of the division of race is the
history of violence. Genocide, gentrification, zoning, segregation, desegregation, religion,
factions, doctrines, and many other social and political variants in America have their history in
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unsettling apocalyptic violence. Our history books not only attest to this violence that plagues
America but at times glorifies it. Ranciere uses phrases such as tearing and snatching to illustrate
the violence used to reconstruct Being in the redistribution of the sensible.
So, for those who seek to analyze Walker’s work under the rubric of the law, you will not
find her there. Why seek ye the living amongst the dead.45 Her work is a work of aesthetic grace.
Aesthetic grace is no theological theory I particularize in Walker, although the grace I speak of
derives from doctrines intrinsic in theology. The Christian doctrine of grace occupies the middle
ground between the Old Testament Biblical law and sin, whose end is death. The doctrine of
Christian grace is the hermeneutics of the New Testament, in which Christ’s death fulfilled the
law that required blood sacrifice. The grace applied to Walker is understood from the reading of
Schiller’s essay, “On Dignity and Grace” as aesthetics, the middle ground of reason, and the
sensuous impulse that no longer favors the one but ennobles both. It should also be remembered
that many, if not all of the Enlightenment aestheticians were emerging from a substantial
Christian foundation and most of them reworked or transferred the previous terminology and
doctrines once ascribed to God to the theory of art. One example of this is easily recognizable in
Hegel’s phenomenology of the spirit. He transposed the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, Father,
Son, and Holy Ghost, to his phenomenology of the spirit in the incarnation of man vis-à-vis art
through time.46
Walker’s work is not representative in any sense of the word and can be viewed as the
work of an artist-philosopher. And could be seen as a treatise on Kantian epistemological chasm
in the quest for the thing-in-itself. Walker’s images address the subject of labor in Rancerian
terms of doing and making and, on some level, could speak to the Marxian attempts at
proletarian art. Perception is a matter of habit and habit, education. And in Heidegger, “education
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(Bildung) is above all molding and giving direction by means of a form” (Barrett, Aiken 256).
And form, as we know, was the very epicenter of Plato’s metaphysical project, which held
precedence over and above the “world we engage in on a daily basis” (Herman 21). To use
Ranciere’s phraseology, Walker “restages the past” (Politics 24). This restaging alters the
otherwise readability of Walker’s work as belonging to the representative regime.
Chapter Four, “The Black Male Agenda: The Future Image of Race,” seeks to examine
how the theory of aesthetic education transmits to the everyday struggle and life of the black
man. In other words, how is emancipation to be captured in an aesthetic education? It may help
to ask: how is subjugation and oppression deliverable in a humanist education or reason?
Another significant question is the role of beauty in Plato’s republic and Schiller’s aesthetic
letters, in which Schiller defines an aesthetic education as the state of making beautiful objects.
Finally, how can the future image of race be conceived as emancipatory in the twenty-first
century and beyond? I cannot emphasize enough the importance of Schiller’s polemic stance in
his aesthetic letters regarding the indispensable role of art that must return to humankind what art
destroyed. However, I am well aware of those who conceive this theory as hypocrisy and a cyclic
move of returning art to utility. What can we conclude from this meandering in attaining
emancipation for the black man, or at that, the dilemma of mass incarceration? We will return to
West and Gates in their re-examination of Du Bois’s 1937 essay “The Talented Tenth,” which
posits a certain elitist disposition in a humanist education.47 One of the important lessons of the
“allegory of the cave” is the exploration of the dialectics of seeing. And the prisoner went up into
the light to perceive the true Forms. What do these true Forms add to our discussion of education
in general and aesthetic education in specificity? What lesson in perception can be activated to
replace the subjugated one in its visibility?
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Chapter 1
The Silhouette in the Age of Enlightenment and Modern Oblivion
If the fine habits in someone’s soul and those in his physical form agree . . . wouldn’t
that be the most beautiful sight for anyone capable of seeing it?
—Plato, Republic
Scientific knowledge is a kind of discourse.
—Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge
Next to the sex linked, they discovered the racial linked.
Science should be ashamed of itself.
—Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks
The shift in Western epistemology from what Malcolm Heath’s introduction to
Aristotle’s Poetics calls “primitive mythmaking” (x) to that of the birth of philosophy began not
with some resounding revelation, no esoteric knowledge delivered by an oracle, nor of Plato
being summoned to a burning bush.48 Instead, it would be marked in time as belonging to stories,
to once-upon-a-times, allegories, and myths. And Deleuze and Pierre-Félix Guattari state in What
is Philosophy that “philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts” (2).
The silhouette, an important component in this project, has a prominent and lasting place
in Western ideology because it is there from the beginning as a form of knowledge in one of
these stories. One early allegory in concatenation with the silhouette and mythmaking is found in
Book 7 of the Republic and is important because of its affinity to the subject of knowledge and
the silhouette. In other words, what appears to stand for reason in the scheme of knowledge is
founded on the narrative. What is even more weighty is that the settling of the division of
knowledge rests on these tales set in place long before their naming in Kantian transcendental
deductions. In the allegory, Plato hermeneutically qualifies the one branch of knowledge as clear
and defined while discounting the other. We need only turn to the concepts pronounced in the
cave allegory for clarification. There we will find the split of knowledge, the primacy of reason,
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and the shadow or silhouette cast as unclear knowledge. In the story of the cave, Socrates
establishes the shadow as inferior. He draws this conclusion when speaking to Glaucon of the
shadows which the prisoners perceive as real, stating, “and if you think of the upward journey
and the seeing of things above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you
won’t mistake my intention” (211). This statement is a moral evocation of the condition of
humankind, at least, a certain lot of humanity. And is it curious that the allegory should involve
prisoners, stripped of rights, devoid of sight, blind and bound—the scene of subjugation
throughout the ages. Further, Socrates notes, “What do you think he would say if we told him
that what he had seen before was silly nonsense . . .” (Republic 209). Socrates is resolute that
education is the product and cornerstone of his industry, his republic.
The dialogues are the very act of educating in jurisprudence, virtue, love to the end of
eschatology. Even the indictment handed over by the state in the case of Socrates is not
necessarily because he spread what was deemed false knowledge to the youths of Athens, but
that he would place himself as the possessor of knowledge endowing himself principally through
his own authority. Socrates was charged for peddling to the youth of the city unfounded
knowledge not approved for dissemination by the state apparatus. Socrates is in constant
engagement with knowledge, as evidenced by the many conversations with the interlocutors.
This engagement sets the stage for the allegory that situates knowledge as a form of a specific
lesson, the lesson of educating perception.
I am certain that when Plato made the statement in the epigraph concerning the perfect
embodiment of beauty, he had no thought of the silhouette as its representation. If anything, it
was its opposite. It is the shadow that Plato used to examine the realm of the intelligible and the
unintelligible. And it is the shadow that fell on the side of the unintelligible. Later, Lavater
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would raise the lowly shadow in the form of the silhouette in his pursuit of physiognomy as a
science and the silhouette as its true form in eighteen-century Germany as a revelation of the
perfect humanity and the defective humanity. I state lowly in the sense that the shadow,
synonymous with the silhouette, first emerged in the republic as representing the defective soul.
The silhouette performs as an archetype in the creation of grand narratives and meta-narratives of
race easily inserted in the ideology of the myth of race, which will be examined conceptually
through the lens of Ranciere’s theories of the ethical, representative, and aesthetic regimes of art
distinctively.
In discussing the silhouette, I want to establish its presence and importance in the history
of thought and its relationship to Walker, which is critical for discussing her work as an artistphilosopher. The problem we encounter with the silhouette is that it has been viewed historically
as an enigma, an afterthought, not only in prehistory but throughout history proper. This
recursive summation is predicated on the limited analysis of the subject juxtaposed against the
numerous social usages in which the silhouette makes its appearance. I speak here of the cave
drawings, the thousands of rock art, Greek Vases, Roman murals, etc., that illustrate the
silhouette in ink, paint, and stone, marking out its social quiddity (its thereness). Central to the
correlation of form to knowledge in Plato, the silhouette has not gained much traction in the field
of philosophy. It seems to have fallen into abeyance. I do not imply that the “allegory of the
cave” has not been the subject of much debate and research in which the shadow makes its
appearance as unintelligible, but the silhouette as an intellectual examination is not the subject of
historical investigation and analysis. Georges Vigarello cites the lack of scholarly contribution to
the silhouette by proposing that there has been “no work to date” (10). Their iconographic or
cultural significance is, therefore, mute (Vigarello 10).
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I have included in this study Heidegger’s essay “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” in which
Heidegger implicates the cave allegory exclusively as the shift of truth in the West. Yet, there is
not much scholarship that explicitly explains the silhouette or shadow as it regards its
philosophical tenets. Hans Christian Andersen examines the silhouette in his short story “The
Shadow.” He tells of the shadow overtaking the scholar in a reversal of fortune after the
shadow’s acquaintance with poetry. Aestheticians and other scholars may examine the
correlation in Andersen’s poetic gesture and find it attributable to the aesthetic paradigm. But
Andersen’s approach is metaphoric. Though it speaks directly to the problem which the division
of knowledge and the arrogance of reason raises, Andersen does not necessarily frame his
writing as a philosophical argument.
Furthermore, unlike Andersen, this project does not seek to overthrow one type of
knowledge or form in exchange for the other. Instead, the reader should use their prescribed
human intellect to draw what necessitates an emancipated perception of things. I also found it
curious that an important commentary on the silhouette as a form of protest was not included
among the many philosophical texts and articles I perused on the subject. Instead, a brief yet
arresting passage was found in an art appreciation textbook.49 The clause relayed that the
silhouette served as a revolt, germane to my argument on knowledge and Walker. The protest in
which the text refers was directed toward the practices of Louis XV’s finance minister Etienne
de Silhouette, who was a silhouettist. His tenure as the financier earned him a reputation for the
heavy taxation of the poor. It was noted that the “peasants, in fact, took to wearing only black in
protest: ‘we are dressing a la Silhouette . . . We are shadows, too poor to wear color. We are
Silhouettes!”’ (Sayre 208). This revelatory entry of the silhouette as protest and other unveilings
prompt interrogation of the silhouette as a dialectic image in philosophical discourse.
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The silhouette in the history of ideas is significant. Plato’s engagement with the silhouette
signals its profundity when signifying the silhouette as the lesser light of intelligibility and its
association with art and the sensible. Establishing the silhouette in both the field of philosophy
and art is imperative here as we embark upon the reinvestment of the critique of Walker’s
silhouettes which we can perhaps agree belongs to a new discourse of the silhouette. One cannot
study the silhouette without evoking Plato as having established the archetype through the
insistence of the silhouette as defective knowledge. Nor can we fully understand the silhouette's
relationship to that of the black man without Fanon, who persistently claimed the archetypes of
history as the full measure of the black man’s condition in what he called a “network of
complexes” (Black Skin, White Masks xiv). Fanon speaks with the same urgency of history in
the invention of the black man as Schiller does in the fabrication of stamped-out ontologies
created by the State for humankind in the general sense. Fanon spends a great deal of time
making a case for the black man and his double as invention or his non-existence as fabrication.
Throughout Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon repudiates the shadows of history that have
defined the black man. This is also incontestable in other writings: In White Man, Listen, James
Baldwin rejects the degrading characterology of the black man in history by stating that “he was
none of the shadow, soft and unobtrusive, mysterious that we find in literature” (x). In William
Styron’s Nat Turner, Lerone Bennett, Jr. asserts that “the man Styron substitutes for Nat Turner
is not only the antithesis of Nat Turner; he is the antithesis of blackness . . . Hamlet-like white
intellectual in blackface” (5).50 And Sartre asserts in the Preface to Fanon’s Wretched of the
Earth in contesting white society's historical disposition of colonialism and subjugation that “we
exhaust them into a mindless state” (1). This exhausting and harassing method results in the
black man no longer having resistance and therefore yields to what has been identified as his
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character through invention. In his psychological fragility of being, he becomes the fulfillment of
the prophecy of characterology. Ralph Ellison describes in The Invisible Man an incident in his
youth where a white man pressed into him violently. Before moving into action against the man,
he realized the man did not see him. He was socially invisible; therefore, his metaphysical nonpresence was without dispute. Du Bois’s claim in the Souls of Black Folk of the veilness in
which the black man persists only allows a diffused glimpse of himself in the eyes of white
society. This seeing through notes reflection as a mere shadow.
The silhouette is no new phenomenon but belongs to its enigmatic occurrences that have
remained for some time shrouded in mystery. And it is this mystery that we hope to unravel here
to some degree as it regards its participation in what has become the discourse on philosophy as
the great divide of knowledge. Does the silhouette represent the soul, or spirit, or a ghostly
apparition? Is it the unconscious? In Tanke’s reading of Ranciere, he states that “the glance
fashioned by aesthetics…is as much a new veil that comes to shroud the world in mystery, as it
is a means of reshaping oneself through the elaboration of a deliberately decentered point of
view” (27). This statement postulates aesthetics as the black veil of freedom which I propose
participates in the philosophical endeavor alongside the silhouette. Not that this is Tanke’s
intention in his theorization. I am suggesting a parallel from this passage between aesthetics and
the silhouette. In Tanke’s usage of the term “glance,” there is an evocation of a particular
historical perception that the visual arts have sustained since the beginning of Western thought as
determined. We are aware of Socrates' detestation of mimesis and the campaign waged against
the poets who he claims embrace imitation as the framework of their character.
Throughout this study, I argue that the constructed gaze has invented the black man
through various modes of visual manipulation as perception. This idea of the manipulation of
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perception as perception is elucidated in greater scope in Chapter Two, where I cite perception as
the tool of invention in performativity as history. This new veil proposed by Tanke is dialectic in
that it shrouds the world in mystery, as mystery. Traditional art, by which I mean
representational art, holds no mystery in conventional narrative form. If the work's readability
fails through the narrative model, there is a galaxy of legends to guide one through its
interpretive value, courtesy of art critics, historians, and curators. The “deliberately decentered
point of view” (Tanke 27) refers to the image intentionally undetermined in its showing,
allowing its potential as a liberated perception.
When Plato discussed the poets and mimesis, the silhouette was present in his
theorization in the “allegory of the cave.” Lacan’s theory on reentering the unconscious in Four
Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis assigns the silhouette as a primary source of reference
analogous to the unconscious. Lacan’s statement can be seen as a direct response to Rene
Descartes’ modern theory of cogito in the upcoming statement and insists that the archeology of
the unconscious could not have been possible until the theory of the conscious emerged.
Although called by other names, Lacan insists that the unconscious was present since the
beginning. These variations signifying the unconscious were: the soul or apparition, but it was
none of these “which has been with us for so long, nor some shade, some double, some phantom
. . .” (Four Fundamentals 47). In this case, the shade is analogous to the shadow or silhouette. In
Plato's cave allegory, the term shadow is a discourse on the soul, and the unconscious is
subjugated to the conscious as unclear knowledge.
It seems in every possible unraveling of history are references to the silhouette,
metaphorically in one form or the other, which today’s archeologists of history, these scavengers
for truth, are excavating. Whether the silhouette is referenced by Kristeva’s abject, or Emmanuel
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Levinas’s call of the other,51 Henri Bergson’s52 unorganized matter, or Heidegger’s nothing,53 it
is a type of hiddenness. And it is in this hiddenness the excavation of the silhouette finds its
place. The title of this chapter echoes Leo Steinberg’s research in The Sexuality of Christ in
Renaissance Art and Modern Oblivion. His research identified hundreds of images associated
with the Virgin and Christ
throughout the Renaissance where
the “child’s sex . . . is the main
action” of the work emphasized
vis-à-vis exposing, pointing to,
examining, or presenting (e.g., see
fig. 10). And this phenomenon
Steinberg suggests had “been
tactfully overlooked for half a
millennium”54 (32).
I am proposing that the same
Figure 10. Michelangelo, Doni Madonna, 1507.

has occurred in the case of the
silhouette. Reason maintained

oversight of the intellectual development of the civilized creature through an aggressive
methodology, adhering to a mechanistic formula of an overwrought reason or an erroneous
interpretation of reason. In this action, the sensuous nature was rejected and regarded as inferior
knowledge, incapable of shaping the intellectual animal, humankind. In Heidegger’s examination
of Being, in his essay “Being and Time,” he rebuked the philosophers throughout the ages after
Plato and Aristotle for not furthering the cause of the interrogation of Being because they
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considered it resolved. “The question has today been forgotten--although our time considers
itself progressive in again affirming “metaphysics.” All the same we believe that we are spared
the exertion of rekindling a gigantomachia peri tes ousias” (41).
In Steinberg, these devotional works may have gone ignored or untouched to safeguard a
holy alliance or doctrinal narratives that insulate all mysticisms and religions. The silhouette in
similar fashion has had an enduring history in the West, reaching back to prehistory (e.g., see fig.
11). In the absence of serious scholarship, one must wonder whether there has been an
intentional suppression of the subject’s deeper philosophical importance in a pursuit to promote
reason, science, and technology as priority.
Vigarello steadfastly contends that any
currency of meaning of the silhouette “has
been all but ignored” (10). And I would
add that it appears that the silhouette has
instead been relegated to a more superficial
probing. Today’s emphasis on S.T.E.M. is
the contemporary projection being financed
on every level of society in keeping with
the traditional educational trajectory while
art is being erased from the primary minds

Figure 11. Figures on Cave Wall.

as not belonging to intellectual discourse, formless.
This study will discuss the silhouette in three seminal moments in the history of Western
thought and its correlation to Ranciere’s regimes of art. What is important is to understand the
relationship of the silhouette and the major themes in philosophy and how these, in general, are
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brought to bear in Plato, Lavater, and more recently in Walker. This understanding is critical and
fundamentally necessary in examining the depths of Walker’s work as emancipatory. How does
the silhouette usher in the doctrinal Other in Plato? How, then, are the racist tendencies of
eighteenth-century Enlightenment birthed in Plato’s dialogues? What do the silhouette and art
have in common with what Heidegger calls value-positing in constituting truth? How do
physiognomy and other agencies compose and concretize the black man? What does Plato,
Lavater, or Walker want with the silhouette? This chapter will examine two of the claims in the
invention of the black man, science and technology.
The term silhouette will be used in both its literal meaning as a portrait obtained by
tracing the outline of a profile, head, or figure, or by means of its shadow and figuratively as a
social symbol and type. Throughout history, the silhouette has been an ongoing discourse
belonging to the social body—the social body indicating a group or community, differing from
Ranciere’s theory of the political body—from the earliest record of human existence. Megroz
notes in Profile Art that “besides the sentimental value of a portrait or image…a philosophical
interest seems to cling to the shadowed profile” (1). I contend that not only does the silhouette
have the appearance of belonging to a philosophical discourse but is becoming philosophy as
discourse. It is not my position to imply that my study of the silhouette as a social phenomenon
today indicates that I alone seek to understand its influence. With so much scholarship
circulating on Walker and her use of the silhouette, there is a keen interest in exploring the
ground of its history.
Previous histories on the silhouette have been more artistic in measure than theoretical.
The history of the silhouette as the craze of Europe in the eighteenth-century names countless
participants works and styles extensively, and, as in the tradition of fine art, master silhouettists a
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more comprehensive account of their work is noted. These histories are recorded in E. Nevill
Jackson’s Silhouettes: A History and Dictionary of Artists and Alice Van Leer Carrick’s A
History of American Silhouettes: A Collector’s Guide, 1790-1840. A few other academic books
appear, such as Peggy Hickman’s A Living Art and David Piper’s Shades: An Essay on English
Portrait Silhouettes. Finally, there is a history of the silhouette in a treatise by Augustin-AmantConstant-Fide’ Le Edouart, A Treatise on Silhouette Likeness. Edouart was considered a master
cutter, having orchestrated thousands of portraits and scenes during his lifetime. One recent text
relevant for the silhouette's social and philosophical importance is Georges Vigarello’s, The
Silhouette, 2016, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. I cannot state enough the relevant
research performed by so many critics and theoreticians who have provided, and continue to
provide, essays and articles launching thought on the silhouette in general and Walker in
particular.
The Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil: The Silhouette in Plato’s Republic
I am careful to state to the letter Ranciere’s definition of the ethical regime to begin my
present discussion for three reasons. First, these regimes, defined in Ranciere’s theories, are
crucial to this project as written. Secondly, they are discussed throughout Ranciere’s texts and
Tanke shifting syntactically, section to section. Finally, the very nature of the agency of
translation is already questionable and is at stake in how truth is broached. For these reasons, I
want to avoid anything that the reader could lose in translation or interpretation. Heidegger’s
“Letter on Humanism” urges us to “free ourselves from the technical interpretation of thought.
Its beginnings reach back to Plato and Aristotle” (Basic Writing 217). So, we want to avoid this
dangerous but intentional precedence historically adopted. The art regimes are ways in which we
understand how artistic practices are marked out in various forms to apprehend the relationship
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of art to the community in assigning bodies and designations (Tanke 77). The ethical regime is
defined in Politics as:
The ethical regime of images characteristic of Platonism is primarily concerned with the
origin and telos of imagery in relationship to the ethos of the community. It establishes a
distribution of images—without, however, identifying ‘art’ in the singular—that
rigorously distinguishes between artistic simulacra and the ‘true arts’ used to educate the
citizenry concerning their role in the communal body. (4)
The term ‘true arts’ here establishes the role of philosophy and the philosopher in the
republic as the authority. I would like to begin with Heidegger’s remark on Plato in his essay
“Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” as it pertains to the “allegory of the cave.” In discussing Plato and
meaning and the inability to illustrate his thoughts—Heidegger, aware of Plato’s abundance of
works in his oeuvre, insists that another way to examine what Plato’s thoughts consisted of
would be to interrogate his unthought, or “what is left unsaid” (Barrett 251). Heidegger states,
“what remains unsaid in Plato is a shift in the definition of the essence of truth. An exposition of
the “allegory of the cave” would make it clear that this shift takes place, what this shift consists
in, and what this change of the essence of truth is the basis for” (Barrett 251). Heidegger moves
further in his explication and states what I believe to be significant to our understanding of the
relationship of the silhouette to this truth when he says, “the allegory” tells a story” (Barrett 251).
Then he uses the term “tale” to discuss its unfolding. Both the terms story and tale are
terminology approximating invention.
Plato’s concept of Otherwordliness frames his theoretical postulation regarding the
sensual world. In establishing the metaphysics of Otherworldliness, Plato guaranteed a fixed
system for matter, time, and space. This fixed entity is neither progressive nor realistic, but Plato
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is not interested in the tangible, sensible reality. Instead, he is interested in an alternate reality, an
absolute determinate founded on myths, allegories, and tales. One such allegory critical for this
examination of black masculinity and emancipation is the “allegory of the cave.” It is in this
allegory that Plato sets up the bipolarities of the senses and the intellect. This is the division of
the soul, and for Plato, the cave allegory defines the lowest realm of man locatable in the senses.
He represents the sensible world as shadows. These shadows are man’s lower state of
consciousness, barren of light, recessed in darkness. For Freudian psychoanalysis, it would be
the unconscious. For the black man, it would be the invention and coming to being of the Other.
Since the beginning of Western civilization, Being has been manufactured. Our
biological imprint is immediately altered, purified, designated in the programmatic birthing
process. The human species is not a natural descendant of Plato or Aristotle, as stated by Samuel
Taylor Coleridge and readdressed in Arthur Herman’s The Cave and the Light. Instead, Herman
would suggest a philosophical lineage asserting that “we are all part of Raphael’s School of
Athens, standing on one side or the other” (xxii). 55 Humankind is Being not propagated in its
natural origin but is a product of specific education. The object of clay on the potter’s wheel is
malleable; so too, individual wills are shaped through education into a form of humanity. The
beginning of education is the birth of civilized humanity reborn through the rigorous curriculum
of reason into the sons of the State.
In his founding of the republic, Plato, conceived as the father of Western thought, calls
into question all existing knowledge systems. Plato’s educational system answered the problem
of what he perceived as scattered doctrines and untenable speculations in his proposal of
education to train the will. Plato was less inclined to the misgivings of what he considered a
weak democratic society in Athens.56 The will of the State would overcome the will of the
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individual in the treatise of the republic. To educate the will is to bend the taste and character of
a nation. This is the creation of being from the start. Where then is the other of Being? It is the
lost subject lodged in the unconscious., though not named yet. When the very character of the
will is reformulated and replaced with the will of the State, then the natural will is exiled, hidden.
This hidden will then conceptually anticipates the Lacanian mirror image in the false ‘I.’57
Plato is synonymous with the birth of Western civilization. For thousands of years, his
dialogues served as a blueprint for societies interested in the order of State matters, ranging from
government, education, law, religion to art. These are instruments of and for Western thought.
Plato’s Republic is essential to this project and focuses on philosophy and art as forms of
education. What is paramount to this project regarding black masculinity and aesthetic education
must begin with Plato’s relationship with art as one of the cornerstones of how the role of the arts
evolved in philosophy. Plato’s position in the purging of art from the city and the soul of
humanity as the weak link of civilization is demonstrated in Republic.
For Plato, what is paramount then to the posterity of his republic is a palatable narrative,
the storyline, the intricate components in how it is told, and to whom it is told. Lyotard claims
that Plato’s dialogues are the very thing of narratives that function as science when stating, “the
new language game of science posed the problem of its own legitimation at the very beginning—
in Plato . . . in which the pragmatics of science is set in motion” (28) Elsewhere, Lyotard insists
that, “the legitimation effort, the Dialogues of Plato, gives ammunition to narrative by virtue of
its own form: each of the dialogues take the form of a narrative of a scientific discussion”
(Lyotard 29). Lyotard theorizes that the validation of science is central to scientific discovery. An
epic narrative is presented in many cases to support the hypothesis, which is simultaneously
presented and performed as science.
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Therefore, it is not unreasonable to trace the invention of the black man to Plato, at least
in its generic form as Other as the form of defected knowledge in the silhouette valorized
through the narrative. Suppose we deny this necessary return to Plato’s Garden of Eden (e.g., see

Figures 12-14. Masaccio, The Expulsion from the Garden of Eden, 1425. Durer, Expulsion from Eden, 1510.
Hubert and Jan van Eyck, The Ghent Altarpiece (detail) Adam and Eve, 142-1432.

figs. 12-14). In that case, the claim that all philosophical utterances are footnotes to Plato should
be counted as mere gossip. We would have to state the same thing of the many tracings left at
Plato’s door. This denial would include Christianity as one of the major religions in the West
whose doctrines hermeneutically bear witness to Plato.
It is well-argued and agreed by many, according to Herman, that Western civilization in
one form or the other owes its inspiration or destruction to Plato (xxii-xxiii). We are all Plato’s
children, including Aristotle, who rebelled against the father. The correlation may not be readily
recognizable of this claim of the black man to Plato. Yet, it is located in the sedimentation of
knowledge intravenously and shrewdly injected as history. The question for this study is, what
does Plato want? What does the silhouette have to do with his desire?
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One of the major problems of the black man in history in his struggle for freedom is the
assignment of lesser value to the black race within society. Fanon addresses this throughout
Black Skin, White Masks. He identifies this psychological virus as a social problem that had
turned inwardly producing neurosis in the black man on a grand scale. In his introduction, Fanon
posits the inferiority complex inscribed on the black man by a superiority of the white man as an
assignment of value. And even more importantly, Fanon is convinced that the black man has
been duped into believing that he is what he has been named. Fanon claims that for the black
man, the only destiny and, therefore, redemption from this state of neurosis is to be white in
every possible aspect. If the black man is not attempting to perform this desirable feat of being
white, according to Fanon, he is constantly judging his value against the white man to prove that
he can match the white man in intelligence (xiv). This frame of mind is impotent and cyclic. So,
the black man institutes this cycle of Being, never having true self-consciousness because of the
infringement of being locked in the fight of value, and ultimately assigned a non-value in the
case of the black man in society.
Here abides the perpetual master/slave narrative. The black man finds himself in a
dilemma where his education and socio-economic status hold no worth. Fanon would insist that
philosophy nor intelligence have saved anyone, nor are these useful for measuring equality.
Fanon would further insist that these same measures have been used for the “extermination of
man” (Black Skin, White Masks 12). Phillipe Vergne recalls a backroom, boardroom,
commonplace joke in his essay from the anthology Kara Walker: My Complement, My Enemy,
My Oppressor, My Love, in which the question is asked: “What do you call an African American
with a Ph.D.” (7)? Answer. “A nigger” (My Complement 7). So, it becomes not the question of
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altering behavior or the white gaze but changing our responses and self-perception, leading to
emancipation.
The true link to Plato abides in history and hermeneutics as value. And there is a great
divide in Western epistemological history that concerns itself with intellect or reason, and, on the
other hand, the sensible and imagination. Herein lies the discourse of the silhouette that we will
survey shortly. The modern dialectic of knowledge did not begin with Kant and Hegel, but Plato
and Aristotle as “twin fountainheads of Western reason, intellectual coequals . . .” (Herman xx)58
Plato’s desiring speech as the intended ethos of the community and the imitative arts are at
variance. The imitative arts are specific to the poets—as profane, and philosophy as the “true
arts” (Politics 4). He places philosophy as esoteric knowledge, and the philosopher-king charged
over this knowledge for proper dissemination.
So, desiring speech comes to mark this regime, at least I would argue in the valorization
of what counts as ethical and moral principles that dictate right or wrong conduct. Heidegger’s
“Letter on Humanism” makes this assertion, “language is the house of being” (Basic Writings
217). This statement gives credence to language as foundational in the formation of Being.
Having stated such, it is in this that Plato’s dialogues birth the telos of the republic. In his
dialogues, Plato warned against the poets whom he accuses of fabricating stories of gods as weak
and fragile in disposition. He admonished storytelling to be integrated on all levels of learning at
the early stages of life to guard against the corruption of these false reports (Republic 57).
In Book 2 of the Republic, after Adeimantus called the poets Homer and Hesiod
witnesses to history who provide knowledge of the gods and their “genealogies” (42), Plato
disagreed that these were truths and mandated a gag order against the poets. What Plato preferred
to be passed along, even if one had to manipulate the truth, twist history, distort the real, was to
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make the language or story fit according to the community's conventions. Plato stated that the
very first thing that should be done was “to supervise the storytellers” (Republic 57), task the
nurses and mothers alike to spend a great deal of time crafting the soul of the youth, even more
than handling their physical needs. He insisted that all those involved in the industry of
knowledge should be consistent in their stories, and the entire community should speak the same
thing: tales of strength, honor, and courage of the gods. Plato admonished that the gods should
represent stability and determined beings, unalterable (Republic 64). What is in place in
governing the speech of the poets is not what the poets traditionally relayed, but what is in
accord with the ethos of the city, states Plato. And the poets must abide accordingly, as thus
admonishes the law: “Then there is nothing of the lying poet in a god” (Republic 64).
Throughout the dialogues are examples of the censorship in the rejection of the poets and art as
imitation.
Along with the campaign against the poets as unethical and art as a lie, Plato established
Reason as primacy. What he desired was at once the assignment of value to what he deemed the
true arts, philosophy as good, and poetry as defamation. Plato’s desiring speech—his desire
spoken to establish what constitutes truth—in the ethical regime can be stated as the regime of
the philosopher. One of the most persuasive examples in which Plato illustrates his educational
agenda materializes in the form of the “allegory of the cave.” The silhouette will be assigned its
value. The silhouette will come to symbolize the defective soul and, much later, in Lavater’s
project, would come to represent the black man as an inferior human specimen. The cave as a
microcosm of the mind bereft of education encapsulates the whole of Plato’s epistemological
doctrine in this imagery. What I hope to uncover in examining Plato’s doctrine is that the subject
is invented here, identity forged, and the unconscious always already present. So, the question is:
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what became of that which was disregarded, silenced, oppressed, and exchanged in the
manufacturing of humankind into the will of the state? The dialogues, designed as such, are the
first documents of education for the determined subject of the state and what counts for value,
which the black man then inherits.
In Book 5 of Republic, Socrates contends that until the philosopher-king is put in place to
rule, evil will persist over cities and the whole of humanity (166). Plato desired the absolute, the
ideal, and, to execute this immense undertaking, he would undergird his philosophy in the
theories of determinism (fixed destiny), essentialism (essence, character predetermined), and
formalism (Theory of Forms), into a unified philosophy. This methodology ensured the absolute
on the one hand and stability in the sensible world on the other. C.D.C. Reeves introduction of
the Republic proposes that:
What the philosopher-kings do is construct a political system—including primarily a
system of socialization and education—that will distribute the benefits of their
specialized knowledge of the good among the citizens at large. The system they construct
relies on Plato’s theory of the soul or mind (psyche), the seat of consciousness, emotions,
desire, and decision-making. According to this theory, there are three fundamentally
different kinds of desires: appetitive ones for food, drink, sex, and the money with which
to acquire them; spirited ones for honor, victory, and good reputation; and rational ones
for knowledge and truth. Each of these types of desire “rules” in the soul of a different
type of person, determining his values. People most value what they most desire. (xiv)
It is not that desire is evil; desire is the natural course of humankind, understood by some
as the will (Kant), the drive (Freud) action (Hegel). This unfolding of desire in Hegel moves in
various states from eating the object59 in the bare sensuousness of humankind to contemplating

56
the object in rational Being as analogous to Plato’s desires but expressed differently. The
challenge for Plato is his insistence on the division of the soul into groups of desires, knowing
full well that, without the state’s control over individual desires, everyone would be free to
attend to the dictates of their own minds. Plato must create a doctrine that places desire in
question and a punishment and reward system accordingly. Next, he will educate desire. Here,
the introduction of education to the masses is essential for him. Plato used education to shape the
people's will, forming in them a new desire. In the formation of his republic, we become intimate
with Plato’s desire. Plato's desire is tripartite; first, it is to educate the will, which translates as a
usurpation of individual desire. Secondly, to limit the power of the citizens, he assigns
specializations, and finally, to have the sensible resemble the ideal principles that mirror
Otherworldliness.
Heidegger argued this premise in “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” that: “the false and the true
are not in the act (itself) . . . but in the understanding” (Barrett 266). Is there a truth that can be
returned to as a measuring rod or compass for truth, or is all speculation? What is the application
for authenticity, how is it understood? A more tenable doctrine replaces myth in understanding
the world. As we found with history, the problem is the idea of self-legitimation in procuring the
groundswell of authenticity. There is no external system of validation, no outside authority to
valorize these doctrines. Instead, for Plato, “truth becomes . . . correctness of the ability to
perceive and to declare something” (Barrett 265). For Saint Thomas Aquinas, Truth Truth is that
of human and divine understanding. For Descartes, understanding marks the major predicate for
truth (Barrett 267). For Nietzsche, truth is a type of falsification of the real, “the kind of error
without which a definite kind of living species would not be able to live” (Barrett 267).
Agamben offers truth as a “taking place,”60 that “truth cannot be shown except by showing the
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false, which is not, however, cut off and cast aside somewhere else” (The Coming Community
12). So, there appears to be no philosophical agreement of truth. Instead, truth rests with the
individual thinker’s conviction.
Heidegger concludes that “from now on the mold of the essence of truth becomes, as the
correctness of representing through an assertion, the standard for all of Western thinking”
(Barrett 266). Heidegger postulates this according to his analysis of Plato and the cave
allegory. Plato shapes the discourse of what counts for authentic and truth by redirecting the
glance toward what he counts as value. Heidegger argues:
The story told in the allegory of the cave gives the aspect of what is now and always will
be what really happens in the history of the humanity molded in the West: man thinks in
terms of the fact that the essence of truth is the correctness of the representing of all
beings according to “idea” and esteems everything real according to “values.” The
decisive point is not which ideas and which values are set, but that the real is expounded
according to “ideas” at all, that the “world” is weighed according to “values” at all.
(Barrett 267)
Heidegger explains the “allegory of the cave” and its shift of truth as the shift of
perception through education. These are two major components in Platonic discourse prevalent
throughout his dialogues, that of perception and education or, more correctly, educating
perception. The idea of educating the mind of the prisoners, having ascertained a certain
knowledge from birth as truth, has now been altered, not by inner enlightenment, but rather, this
shift of truth as an exterior persuasion, engineering that is didactically rendered. This is a lesson
that we have seen in society's perception and undertaking of the myth of the black man. Society
has been educated in a type of truth; authenticity related to the black man—a manipulation of
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seeing. And this regulatory perception, this adjustment of the lens of the authentic, this shift of
the truth of the black man is but an invention of white desire, a myth propagated through science
and technology.
Propaedeutic to Science and Technology in the Invention of the Black Man
Science is understood as a system of methods and theorizations searching for a more
tenable agreement in various modes of knowledge. As I have previously stated, Aristotle insisted
that humankind had passed from myths and superstition to philosophy in sophistication of
knowledge (Poetics x). From Plato on, science played a primary role in the exaltation of reason.
In the eighteenth century, however, the aesthetic paradigm belonging to the sphere of the
sensible changed the course of reason as the primacy of knowledge. But aesthetics as a
movement was short-lived and soon forgotten as humankind moved to reinstall reason as an
ever-greater move towards science and technology by the nineteenth century. But Lyotard’s
insistence is that “science is a type of discourse” (3). This statement will be my starting point in
introducing what has persisted in the West as science and how this agency has participated in the
invention and promotion of the myth of the black man in society through false reports, racist
untenable agendas, and contestable pseudo-sciences. Fanon would retort that “science should be
ashamed of itself” (Black Skin, White Masks 100). And in Wolin’s The Seduction of Unreason,
Foucault is noted for having identified reason as the “mechanism of oppression . . . since the time
of Plato, Western thought has displayed a systemic intolerance vis-à-vis difference, otherness,
and heterogeneity” (8). And, although the passing of time has corrected the error of many
scientific falsehoods as it regards the black man, these have not been eradicated from the
collective psyche.
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To state that the black man is a recent invention of science and technology can be no
clearer than what was illuminated in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Europe, during what is
known as the Enlightenment. But the Enlightenment could only refer to the white man because
the Negro was in chains. This study seeks to follow a similar path as Foucault in The Order of
Things, in which he proclaims that man was a recent invention through life, labor, and language.
Haraway also traces conceptually in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature,
the coming to being through the scientific methodology of technical apparatus. And prescience in
Friedrich A. Kittler’s Gramophone, Film, Typewriter is resonances of the evolution of Being
through various media types. Kittler states at one point, “once the technological differentiation of
optics, acoustics, and writing exploded Gutenberg’s writing monopoly around 1880, the
fabrication of so-called Man became possible” (16).
This coming to life as being born and coming to Being, as being born again, are two
distinct events. The latter generally occurs after the loss of the first. Let's clarify this statement.
First, there is the natural birth into the world, both physical, intellectual, and spiritual, though
nascent. The second birth is shaping one’s mind through a broad range of educational and
philosophical concepts. Schiller states this phenomenon quite distinctly in his third aesthetic
letter. “He comes to himself out of his sensuous slumber, recognizes himself as Man, looks
around and finds himself—in the State” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 28). While one is
the state of nature, the other is an exploitation of society. Schiller blames the State for the
ordering of the mechanism of being for its own usage. What is lost to humankind then is the
ability to become a free thinker.
This brief survey will not allow time to properly explore the countless inventions,
machinery, theories, practices, agencies, forces, and other unnamed entities involved in the
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massive undertaking of the invention of the black man, but I will discuss a few. This discussion
is essential for the silhouette’s role in physiognomy which spawned new interrogations of
scientific racism as foundational thought. It is also critical that we excavate other racist
tendencies guised as something else, including nationalism, fascism as well as other doctrines of
nature and art. I will primarily focus on technological inventions in their materiality. The
essential quiddity of technology is discussed in Chapter Two, the section “Media in the
Performance of Subjectivity.”
I am principally concerned with what counts for science and how science became a major
stakeholder in the invention of the black man through the industry of reason. Lyotard examines
several factors in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, in which his major
position is that of knowledge, its aggregation, legitimation, and dissemination as a play of power.
Why is the matter of knowledge important for this survey? Knowledge is critical because the
black man has been consigned to a certain post in history as inferior in characterology,
physiology, and intellect, according to the findings of certain historically accepted scientific
knowledge. I would even state that these findings remain the final word in some circles despite
new research disputing former treatises. However, we must abandon those false narratives
because we are finally cognitive that so much that has been handed down as science was mere
speculation.
Lyotard’s claim in The Postmodern Condition is the problem of narratives that have,
since the beginning, validated certain authoritarian postures in the transmission of knowledge
from sender to addressee. On the one hand, he indicates that science sees itself as antithetical to
the narrative because, for science, the narrative is not actual knowledge but falls under the rubric
of speculation, myth, and storytelling. But, on the other hand, science uses the narrative to
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validate, bolster, and legitimate its claim of supposedly credible scientific discoveries. In the
service of science, the narrative is used to validate discoveries with a grand story, an epic (27).61
The grand narratives and meta-narratives of history have been accepted as consensus by likeminded individuals in tautology. “For example,” states Lyotard, “the rule of consensus between
the sender and addressee of a statement with truth-value is deemed acceptable if it is cast in
terms of a possible unanimity between rational minds (xxiii). While narratives may be done
away with, language is not disposed of as primacy. In postmodernism, Lyotard contends, there
was an intentional distancing from traditional language modes to “language games” (xxiv).62
I will concentrate my efforts on several factors: the various agencies emerging with
eighteenth-century German schools of thought and other synthesizing movements, technological
inventions, the concept of physiognomy, the silhouette itself, and the role of the narrative in
science and history. The narrative is decried by scientists, considered by them as “backward and
primitive” (Lyotard 27) without validation and even “savage” (Lyotard 27). The scientific world
considered the narrative as belonging to “fables, myths, legends, suitable only for women and
children. At best, attempts are made to throw some rays of light into this obscurantism, to
civilize, educate, develop” (Lyotard 27). However, the narrative was still highly regarded in the
Age of Reason. I intend to primarily consider Lavater and physiognomy for its critical though
erroneous contribution to German thought during this era.
Richard T. Gray’s comprehensive examination of this period describes many theorists
working in various fields, institutions, agencies, models, forces, and schools of thought whose
work aligned with physiognomy. Gray argues that physiognomy “spawned by German Protestant
Pietist thought . . . gathered energy in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries” (xx). The
influences which vitalized physiognomic posturing included: the philosophy of nature, natural
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science, philosophy of life and dynamic vitalism, cultural pessimism, phenomenology,
psychoanalytic theory. Some of the theorists in this mammoth enterprise is Friedrich Wilhelm
Joseph Schelling, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Freud, Willian Dilthey, Oswald Spengler, Edmund
Husserl. Included in this roll call is the field of anthropology and biology in their pernicious
“racial-genetic turn” (Gray xx). Why did so many learned men gravitate towards the untenable
doctrine of physiognomy?
Gray surmised a correlative thread between physiognomy
and other agencies during this period. Gray insisted that “there
is . . . a direct intellectual-historical line that runs from this
theory through phrenology of Franz Josef Gall and the human
“symbolics” of Carl Gustav Carus, to the materialistically
oriented racial anthropologies of proto-fascist and fascist
thinkers such as Hans F. K. Gunter and Bruno K. Schultz”
(Gray 340). The Age of Reason brought about contested
Figure 15. Polykleitus
Doryphoros, 120-50 BCE

thought as it regarded the knowledge of the mind and the body.
This ambiguity of thought was the fertile ground in which

Lavater staked his industrious claim for physiognomy as the absolute in correlating the body and
soul. The silhouette was its incontestable proof. The gravitation towards physiognomy might be
as simple as this; Lavater and other theoreticians and aestheticians were in search of the absolute.
The attraction should come as no surprise, seeing that the West has always had an affinity
for the absolute predicated on the Greek ideal. When we consider Polykleitos’s treatise on
anatomy (e.g., see fig. 15),63 Winkelmann’s obsession with Greek sculpture (e.g., see figs.16-17),
the Renaissance, and Neoclassicism as reiterations of antiquity, it is no leap to conceive the
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affinity. In Winkelmann: Writings on Art, Winkelmann is noted as being deliberate about art that
was “created with a serious intent (36). He held the theory that “art had a double aim: to delight
and to instruct” (Winkelmann 36). What must be understood is: these theories during this
period, are not removed from the political probing of aesthetics in examining the sensible.

Figures 16-17. Agesander of Rhodes, Polydorus of Rhodes, Athenodoros of Rhodes, Athanadoros, Giovanni
Angelo Montorsoli, Laocoon and His Sons, 27 AD, Leochares
Apollo Belvedere, Circa AD 120-130.

It is reasonable to see how many scholars in the Enlightenment co-signed to
physiognomy. Physiognomy was not foreign to the concerns of the age but in concert on many
levels. As noted in earlier pages, similar agencies and doctrines worked simultaneously,
interrogating parallel schools of thought. In all fairness, physiognomy was the zeitgeist of the
age. According to Wolin in The Seduction of Reason, philosophical thought shifted to a less
aggressive approach to reason and a softening turn to the sensible.64 Gray stated that
physiognomy was “the perfect parasitic, it was able to feed off a significant number of robust
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and influential hosts endemic to the German intellectual historical tradition” (xx). Lavater’s
findings were considered a major intellectual highlight in the latter part of the eighteenth century
(Gray 1). This event alone relays in specificity a critical point regarding the congregation of
thought during the Enlightenment. Gray further states, “Lavater’s creations not only drew heavily
on the intellectual tendencies of the historical period in which he lived, they actively contributed
to the intellectual constitution of this epoch itself” (Gray 1). To state that physiognomy was no
small occurrence is no understatement.
The absolute is what I propose as the common denominator in these agencies. The
absolute is nothing less than a form of knowledge. Absolute in its usage is the attempt to solve
the riddle of the sphinx of humankind, the original scene of the nature of man. But one must ask
then, was the original scene civilization itself or Platonic doctrine, or are we to cast them as one
and the same? I propose to correlate the original scene of civilization with the primal scene that
indicates the fundamental place of trauma for humankind in which the split of nature occurred. In
one is the rise from the lower animal, and in the other, the rise to Platonic knowledge. But both
of these states are involved in knowledge on some level. Civilization has been in a conflicted
state of being from the beginning, and many thinkers throughout history have bemoaned what is
considered human development. Theoreticians have underwritten this assertion seeking the
traces of what once was among the ashes of a lost culture. Schiller, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and
Heidegger are among those who reflect on a modern rewrite of thought.65
What necessitated a more persuasive theory of physiognomy was the silhouette as its
most reliable “proof,” though it masked indelible marks of a faulty representation, an imperfect
theory, a trickster’s ploy. Gray proposes that “the silhouettes . . . are functionally deployed to
institutionalize just such a form of systematic seeing that highlights certain features while
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intentionally eclipsing others” (343). The highlight was the perfection of form and order
supposedly attested from the white man’s countenance. The eclipsing that could not be seen was
the imperfection of theory and the fallacious methodology validation. Lavater would come to
collect tens of thousands of silhouettes literally to populate his texts, of nobles and their families,
Dukes, princesses, militia, and kings, as well as other dignitaries. The invention of his silhouette
machine supported Lavater’s physiognomy theory (e.g., see fig. 18). As a technological

Figure 18. Lavater’s silhouette machine in three moments, c. 1780.

apparatus, the machine was perceived as a more concrete form of knowledge,66 stable, and
coupled with various components applied to the scientific method of measuring, graphing, and
counting. This technology, a necessary companion to theory, was useful under the weight of an
already vulnerable doctrine.
For Lavater, this mechanism would further prove physiognomy as a science through
careful and precise measuring. Measuring is a mathematical process as a scientific index across
the natural sciences. “The appeal to representations as the proper analytical object of
physiognomics is just one example of the way in which Lavater’s demand for scientific
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exactitude motivates his exploitation of technologies intended to make the individual more
visible and penetrable to the examining gaze of the physiognomist” (Gray 343). This mechanical
ingenuity gave a greater validity to physiognomy as a science and technology as a logical
methodology. Lavater was interested in several key outcomes from his physiognomic project. He
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sought validation through science and constantly argued the proof of nature according to the
doctrine of Positivism, as empirical and therefore logical. Secondly, Lavater wanted
physiognomy to valorize the Nordic, Aryan, white male as the chosen race.
And finally, he adopted the silhouette as the symbol, an archetype that would stand
proxy for the Germanic nation, for nationalism, racism, fascism, and white supremacy and at
once represent the black man as belonging to an inferior race of men. Gray emphasized that the
reason for Lavater’s adoption of the silhouette for his physiognomic project was that Lavater
believed the body was not in direct control as willed. Thereby his physiological responses would
be a genuine outgrowth of nature. Therefore, to state that the firm and constancy—which most
likely correlates to the required clear and distinct knowledge in Western philosophy—of the
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white male’s facial constitution in its exactness was proof that the constancy of the soul was
considered scientific for Lavater (340). And the deformed black physiognomy was consistent
with a corrupt moral disposition (e.g., see figs. 19-21). Lavater sought the individual's unique
structure, not for the individual, but as a universal principle, an archetype to represent the
German nation. According to the section on “Lavater’s own Remarks on National Physiognomy”
in Physiognomy, he stated, “for the silhouette, as a mode of
representation, systematically excludes all details of facial expression
and all manifestations of the passions to stress the stable and
unchanging outlines of the face and head” (341).
Plato’s epistemological agenda on the split of knowledge and
beauty and the chasm in its division is understood in condensation in
Republic with this challenge. Socrates: “if the fine habits in
someone’s soul and those in his physical form agree . . . wouldn’t

Figure 22-23. Charlotte von
Stein with bust of son, 1780,
Goethe and Fritz
von Stein, 1776.

that be the most beautiful sight for anyone capable of seeing it” (85). Plato posits a perception in
correlation to the intellect “for anyone capable of seeing it.” Schiller's proposal in aesthetic
education takes up Plato’s conjecture of duality. Schiller asserts that “from the interaction of two
opposing impulses, then, and from the association of two opposing principles we have seen the
origin of the Beautiful, whose highest ideal is, therefore, to be sought in the most perfect possible
union and equilibrium of reality and form” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 81).
Lavater turns Plato’s claim of the silhouette as a universal lack to satisfy his own agenda.
He accused those who could not or would not acknowledge the body as the sign for the soul in
physiognomy as uninformed as being blind to the truth (Physiognomy 2). Though his theory on
the silhouette problematizes Plato’s proposition, both persist tautologically as ethical valuation.
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In Plato, the silhouette is considered inferior, while Lavater raises the silhouette as nature’s gift
in defining the superior human being as differentiated from the inferior human. But this is not a
validation of Nature or an ideological assignment. The divergence is that Plato proposed reason
as a guide to humankind and knowledge, and Lavater focuses on the sensible aspect of Being
that had long been ignored, even vilified.
Lavater’s methodology of the silhouette as dialectic allows Walker’s entry. It is also
reflective of what Ranciere states of the error of Plato regarding writing and the theatre in
Politics.67 And, theologically speaking, if they had known that Christ was God in the flesh, they
would not have crucified him (1 Corinthians 2.8). Death gives way to rebirth. The shift in
Lavater distancing from reason is a shift that is the currency of this period. It is highly contagious
contained with the community of like thinkers. There is a great moving away from reason—
reason was understood by Counter-Enlightenment scholars in the rejection of nature—as the
singular answer to humankind’s political problems. Again, this shift occurred in light of the
devastating results of the French Revolution. Reason, which was primacy in humankind's
intellectual and moral advancement, was now seen as a political failure as an agency. Walker’s
images work to create a new community—self-education.68 But how is politics had in a mere
shadow?
According to Vigarello, the first “shadow” portraits executed in the 1790s were original
in their own way. They established a form of observation. The silhouettes were in vogue in
Europe, demonstrating the interest aroused by morphology. Morphology refers to the study of
different body types (e.g., see fig. 24). The interest in body types is political in nature because of
the shift of consciousness during this period. The individual had been formerly shaped in the
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feudal state and was identified only as part of a collective belonging to the state agenda. But the
new civil society no longer obligated the individual to an appearance that defined their station in
society.69 Morphology is part and parcel of the train of thought that guides this period in history.
It is a critical analysis of the body.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s draw to
Lavater was his keen interest in
physiognomy. He pursued this first through
his association with Lavater. However, after
splitting with him, he became a purveyor of
what he deemed a more judicious doctrine
predicated on morphology, which birthed
many adherents. 70 Goethe became
disillusioned with Lavater because Lavater’s
body/soul doctrine could not be scientifically
validated. Goethe did not want to be
Figure 24. Charles Motte, Eh bonjour, 1821.

associated with what he considered a pseudoscientific project. Although Goethe considered Lavater a friend and allowed his silhouette
likeness to appear in the third volume of Lavater’s Physiognomische Fragmente, Goethe refused
Lavater’s request to edit the second volume of Fragmente. But Goethe’s association with the
pseudo-science of physiognomy was cemented.71
The silhouette was used for much of what was the commodity of desire, which called for
a fashionable, tailored template geared toward advertising, travelogues, and other areas of human
interest. The silhouette was trendy, the new taste, the new norm. The silhouette became more
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than a cosmetic enterprise in its alliance with physiognomy. The portrait during the Renaissance
defined a particular class and its tenets, so the silhouette came to represent civil society.72
Thousands of artists hung their shingles displaying their occupation as a cutter of silhouettes, and
millions would sit to behold at last their double, their ideal self. The reductionist method
delineated the individual to portray the universal type. “Wrinkles and signs of age are unseen,”
as well as the double chin and thick neck, which disappear in the talented handling of the
profilist (Hickman 20).
Lavater gained support in his physiognomic project from theoreticians, religious,
academic, and civic organizations. However, others disdained Lavater’s assertions because they
recognized them as possessing no sustainable or feasible basis of truth. Lavater was viewed as a
charlatan, and in many circles, the silhouette was considered a black art and kitsch. Chief among
those who rejected Lavater’s postulates was Hegel, who argued against the doctrine as a negation
of the body. Gray surmises some aspect of Hegel from an excerpt from The Phenomenology of
the Spirit. Gray: “Hegel puts his finger on one of the major problems underlying physiognomic
practice: namely, its tendency to interpret away the body, to declare its corporeal reality
meaningless by means of his hypostatization as sign” (93).73 Not only in the delineation of the
body, but as a sign, it no longer is the body in which is referenced, but a political symbol.
The hypothesis singularly as proof was key in Lavater as he declares that what he
proposes regarding this correlation of body and soul was blatantly obvious. I find appalling his
position of the doctrine as noble and godly. Many theoreticians during this era undertook the
stance of a godly mission to authenticate and guarantee their racist concepts, including Horace
Mann on Phrenology, who states the following in his “Letter to a Young Lawyer.” Phrenology,
he states, “vindicates the way of God to man” (Tomlinson ix). And he heralded George Combe’s
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Constitution of Man to be “better than any polemical treatise I have ever read” (Tomlinson ix).74
Mann refers to what he believes to be God’s and nature’s way of scientifically identifying the
master race through this pseudo-science (e.g., see figs. 25-26).

Figure 25. Portrayal of the facial angle
ascending from apes to Negroes to
Europeans, from Petrus Camper, 1791.
Europeans,
from
In Lavater’s

Figure 26. Nott and Gliddon
Types of Mankind, 1854.

Essays on Physiognomy, Lecture III, “On Physiognomy Considered as a

Science,” he seeks physiognomy’s worthiness as science by comparing it to theology, math, and
aesthetics. Comparing physiognomy to other sciences is a bold move for Lavater, yet he
proposes it as overarching other disciplines considered science. He states his case for science by
comparing it to natural philosophy in biology, physics, medicine, even theology for its
contribution to the conceptual frame of “divine ethic” (58). He further argues that the schematic
of measuring and calculations links physiognomics to math. As for aesthetics, he claims, “with
the Belles Lettres, it is comprehended under that department of literature, that unfolds and
determines the idea of the beautiful and the sublime” (Physiognomy 58). And he declares that the
ability of the readability of physiognomy is left for the capable genius.
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Lavater continues with his argument by stating, “according to this, one or two positions
must be granted, all other sciences must be stripped of that appellation, or, physiognomy must be
admitted to the same rank in the scale of human knowledge” (Lavater Essays 58). The
repudiation by some in academia and science did not prevent this cultural phenomenon from
becoming the toast of Germany and other countries and provinces throughout Europe by the late
nineteenth century. Physiognomy was taught in schools and institutions with the same rigor as
other established disciplines. Charts, graphs, models were created, valorizing it as tenable and its
doctrines as scientific. Social clubs were established as men and women came together to learn
the art of recognition and analysis of the perfect form and the inferior. The silhouette was
exchanged in the marketplace of the masses as gifts and keepsakes. This popularizing of
physiognomy would launch the beginning of a movement that would endure for a century.
Gray asserts that “physiognomics found substantial support among the chief “enthusiasts”
of the so-called “genius” generation: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), Johann
Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), and Johann Michael Reinhold Lenz (1751-1792), all of whom
defended Lavaterian physiognomics and even contributed actively to the composition of the
Physiognomische Fragmente” (xxxvi). Goethe is highlighted in About Face because of his
influence on many theoreticians in the turn to scientific racism. As stated previously, Goethe had
moved away from Lavater because of the sensationalism surrounding his approach to
physiognomy and directed his attention towards the intention and methodology in morphology
for the substantiation of his theories of physiognomy. “Goethe channels German physiognomic
theory into new directions” (Gray 175). He influenced many racist thinkers and theorists who
used the concepts to propose a racist agenda, such as seen in Carl Gustav Carus and
Symbolism.75 And Ludwig Klages, Oswald Spengler, Rudolph Kassner’s will revive the lagging
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doctrine during the “middle of the nineteenth century up through the 1930’s” (Gray 138) to a
fever pitch, all in thanks to Goethe and his physiognomic project, which these thinkers
appropriated. Physiognomy extended in other disciplines such as “racial anthropology” in
Gunther, silent film studies in Bela Balazs, racial psychology in Ferdinand Clauss, a student of
Husserl who eventually influenced the young Nietzsche (Gray 178). “Indeed, physiognomics
takes on the character of a super-discipline. It is hypostatized as a universal theory of knowledge,
perception, and instinctual understanding that presents a powerful counter-model to the
Enlightenment narrative of a rationally endowed, historically progressive humanity” (Gray 181).
The affiliation of the silhouette and physiognomy was viewed not as individual projects
but were unified by association for a higher calling. “The body became the vehicle for
projections of and about that individual private core that constituted communal identity beyond
all individual differences” (Gray xl). The shift in the governance from the heavy hand of a
hegemonic authority to individuality allowed for an emancipating doctrine that fulfilled the
affective sensibilities. Gray proposed that “given this collapse of the previously valid system of
visibility, physiognomics emerges as an attempt to ordain a new system of visibility in line with
the ideological mechanisms underpinning the new order of civil society” (xxxvii). The doctrine
of physiognomy was adopted by civil society because of uncertainty and loss experienced during
this period and the desire for national coalition.
What was paramount for Lavater’s project of physiognomy was the ascension of the
concept of the moral correlation of the body and soul to that of science. As with Plato's
dialogues, Lavater’s superfluous writings were fundamental to buoy his unscientific theories.
Lavater insisted on allegiance and universal agreement. In Physiognomy he stated the following:
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The question will stand simply thus: whether it be possible to explain the undeniable
striking differences which exist between human faces and forms, not by obscure and
confused conceptions, but by certain characters, signs, and expressions? Whether these
signs can communicate the strength and weakness, health and sickness of the body; the
folly and wisdom, the magnanimity and meanness, the virtue and vice of the mind? This
is the only thing to be decided; and he who, instead of investigating the question, should
continue to declaim against it, must either be deficient in the love of truth, or in logical
reasoning. (2)
Lavater spends a great deal of time on examples in which physiognomy could be useful.
From selecting a piece of fruit to the choosing of a servant, Lavater makes the point that
physiognomy is already in use in our daily lives in our observational correlation of form and
judgment. He contends that this type of observation alone should give credence to the exactness
of his methodology as science in that all things are judged by appearance according to our innate
ability through the first act of intuition gifted to us by nature. Lavater refuses to accept that fruit
selection for ripeness and judgment of moral standing is not the same exercise. In the example of
fruit, it is true that one can connote whether the object is spoiled by its appearance. The outward
appearance signifies the appearance and the judgment of ripeness, not an inner idea of the fruit’s
essence brought to bear in light of its appearance or the soil in which it took root. Lavater
equivocates from the universal agreement of the object in appearance to judgment based on a
correlation of appearance to essence, making this theory null and void. Many theorists would
side with Lavater and attest to the outward appearance of a thing and its readability but refused
the injunction of assigning a moral judgment.
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Some examples of these correlations are astonishing as Lavater asserts that the color,
shape, and size of noses, lips, chins, mouths, foreheads, ears and eyes, are proof of an ethically
sound constitution that qualifies the individual as superior in thought. Foreheads are examined in
Physiognomy Chapter VII, “On the Forehead,” in which Lavater notes that the forehead is the
most important in all of the examinations of the body as it regards the expression of character.
He divides the types into three, which are “the retreating, the perpendicular, and the projecting”
(56). He describes various classes that fall under these categories. At some point, Lavater reveals
the perfect embodied forehead and mind. “The following are the most indubitable signs of an
excellent, a perfectly beautiful and significant, intelligent, and noble forehead. In breadth, it must
either be oval at the top (like the foreheads of most of the great men of England) or nearly
square” (Physiognomy 60). This oblique supposition will eventually lend itself to devastating
consequences. This period of physiognomics is a precursor to the Weimar regime’s efforts to
purge non-Germanic peoples from Germany. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg76 would suggest that
so many acts of atrocity and explorations of purging—eugenics is also examined during this
period—have been performed on less proof and in the name of religious causes (Gray 9).
Chapter VIII states that the eyes should be blue or black, and they are, for the most part,
the organ of the soul (Physiognomy 63-64). In Chapter IX, “Of the Nose,” Lavater contends that
“I have never yet seen a nose with a broad back, whether arched or rectilinear, that did not
pertain to an extraordinary man … these noses were possessed, more or less, by Raynal, Faustus
Socinus, Swift, Caesar Borgia, Clepzecker, Anthony Pagi, John Charles von Enkenberg (a man
of Herculean strength) . . . Titian . . . the Tartars generally have flat indented noses, the negroes
broad, and the Jews hawk noses” (70). There is a legend of sorts about the nose of the Great
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Sphinx of Giza (e.g., see fig. 27) regarding the decapitation of its nose. One of the legends
implies that the nose was removed to disguise the African features exemplified by Egyptians.
The Egyptians were known for the monuments and constructions as witnesses of a culture of
ingenuity mystifying the scientific community to this day. The nose had the physiognomy of
belonging to a black man, a Pharaoh.
Though Lichtenberg refused the seduction of
Lavater’s speculative doctrine, Gray indicates that he
“could not stop short of admitting his own proclivity to
interpret character out of people’s faces . . . while he denied
the validity of Lavater’s physiognomic readings, he refused

Figure 27. Great Sphinx of Giza
defaced.

to question the essential readability of physical creation” (Gray xxxvi). Lichtenberg was aware
that Lavater moved in the realm of speculative knowledge once he crossed over from observation
to judgment. Not only physiognomy but countless agencies, forces, theories, and technological
apparatuses emerged during this period to stake their scientific claim and do so under the rubric
of scientific racism. And though I will not speak to all of these, I will discuss a few contributors
who coordinate the construction and the invention of the black man. These are phrenology,
anthropology, and Darwinian evolution, which thrived in this pseudo-scientific and thinly veiled
racist moment of what poses as the Enlightenment.
Head Masters: Phrenology, Secular Education, and Nineteenth-Century Social Thought
is a critical read for an understanding of the pseudo-science that survived for decades and is
believed to have spawned many agencies with the same pursuit of determining intelligence
through physical attributes. Tomlinson lays out the nascent beginning of the pseudoscience
through its propagation in institutions in Europe to its spread to America in major institutions:
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education, prison, and mental asylums. According to John P. Jackson and Nadine M. Weidman,
in Race, Racism, and Science, “phrenology, the ‘reading’ of head-shape . . . supported the idea
that mental activity could be interpreted in terms of the size and function of parts of the brain.
This idea outlasted the popular fad of phrenology itself (e.g., see figs. 28-32). Comparative
anatomy, physiology, histology, and paleontology all experienced tremendous growth during the
first half of the nineteenth century” (34). These human sciences during this period and became
emerged in scientific racism exploration of the body in the examination of race. What is
important is that scientific theories and untenable doctrines and the technical assignments as
instruments of validation go on to shape the black man in his intellectual, psychological,
sociological, and spiritual disposition and, most certainly, his relationship with the social body.
According to Stephen Tomlinson’s Head Masters, Phrenology had three fundamental
turns, a physiological theory in Gall, a progressive moral philosophy in Johann Gasper
Spurzheim, and finally, in Combe as a philosophy of “practical Christianity and self-help” (xii).
These examinations, as such, are not necessarily separate in their interrogation and may have
influenced each other. One example of this is Johann Gottfried Herder’s philosophy of nature on
Gall which is well documented (Head Masters 51).77
Phrenology’s original intent “was an experimental science with the a priori assumption
that mental phenomena have natural causes that can be determined. In modern
terms, it represented the union of a theory of localized brain functions with a primitive
behavioristic psychology . . . its true foundation was the theory that anatomical and physiological
characteristics have a direct influence upon mental behavior” (Davies 3). Its doctrines will
transmigrate to many social agencies and affairs, including religion and education. Horace
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Mann’s educational enterprise affected in no small way the American system of education in the
matters of moral reform conceived in phrenology. Stephen Tomlinson suggests that
phrenology existed as the framework for many institutions such as “the Normal school; the
asylum; the prison; the reformation of the Freedman’s Bureau and the American welfare system”
phrenology existed as the framework for many institutions such as “the Normal school; the
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asylum; the prison; the reformation of the Freedman’s Bureau and the American welfare system”
(Tomlinson xiii). It would appear that phrenology used as a means of reformation in the
fashioning of the freed slaves is paradoxical. It acts as a continuum of mitigation of the same
outcome characteristic of slavery, the master/slave narrative. Phrenology was the launching pad
to extinguish various undesirable groups of individuals in the forging of a perfect specimen. In
this category were the “mad, the deaf, the blind, the mentally retarded, the deviant, the criminal,
and the mulatto” (Tomlinson xv). Creating a scientific doctrine that divides and classifies Being
is a return to Plato’s hierarchy of Being as theorized in Republic in which individuals were
categorized and numbered and divided camps.
Morphology was not simply a science of observation for observation’s sake but was one
of the key indicators of the shift in the history of thought in the West. Involved in the emergence
of scientific racism was the theory of monogenism that postulates humankind as belonging to
one genus. Polygenism argues that several different genus types are characteristically intrinsic to
their kind. In monogenism and polygenism, the black man is at ground zero on the human scale
in these systems consigned to the lowest human species. In the theory of observations,
phrenology will find its lodging and make its claim. Like Lavater’s physiognomic project,
phrenology’s goal sought to correlate the body and soul as reflection. “Metaphysical speculation
had to be replaced by an anthropological “science of man” that explained the mind through the
vital property of sensibility” (Tomlinson 1). What was the point of this measuring and exacting
of the skull? Pierre Cabinis—one of the leaders of the French school of physiology—would
insist that “it is time . . . to practice upon ourselves what we have practiced with such success
upon man of our fellow creatures, to get nearer to a perfect type of human” (Tomlinson 10).
Practiced—the term is operative.
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Tomlinson argues that the physiological approach in phrenology and anthropology
provided the groundwork to persuade all interested parties that nature would prevail in black and
white co-existence. This statement refers to whites fearing that the freed slaves would multiply
exponentially and dominate white society.78 In other words, whites would be their dominant,
intellectual, rational selves, while blacks would be docile and accommodating. These race
disparity conclusions comforted white society. From Thomas Jefferson to President Johnson,
there was the belief of the degenerative black man due to the persuasion of the adherents and
proponents of phrenology and other theories engrained in physiology. This statement is from the
Secretary of War in the final report of the American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission in 1864.
Now by utterly rooting out slavery, and by that means alone, shall we remove these
disturbing forces and allow fair play to natural laws, by the operation of which, it seems
to me, the colored population will disappear from the Northern and Middle States, if not
from the continent, before the more vigorous and productive white race. It will be the
duty of the statesmen to favor by wise measures, the operation of the laws, and the
purification and elevation of the national blood. (Tomlinson 346)
The black man is not recognized as human. Instead, he is called a disturbance, his
freedom an inconvenience. Purification of the race must persist by any means necessary. And of
course, again, a law does not make for judiciousness, just discourse of white men concretized. It
is by law that purification of the defective race should be met. The same argument of natural law
and physiology prevailed in the racist tone of Samuel Gridley Howe’s report for his work on a
commission for Reconstruction.79 His pretext for a mutual understanding of community was
riddled with stereotypical statements that set the races in distinctly different intellectual and
social camps. In a data driven report of African communities regarding blacks' spiritual,
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intellectual, and physical disposition in Canada West, he proposed that while the blacks were a
knowing race, the whites were a thinking race (Tomlinson 350). Howe further stated that
“drawing upon the laws of descent established by the American School of Anthropology,
suitably adapted to phrenological theory, reported the inherent aversion of the races and
predicted the emergence of a purer African population” (Tomlinson 350). He concluded his

Figures 33. Instruments used in anthropology and invented by Paul Broca, the caliper,
pelvimeter, and craniostat, c. 1856.

report by stating that the African race was weak because of slavery, but nature would right this
inadequacy with a godly education. This infectious thought authorized and affirmed by a just and
righteous God prevailed even with those who advocated for the abolition of slavery.80 While
believing that slavery was ungodly, many believed that the blacks were inferior to the whites.
Though free, they should remain separate.81
Thus, anthropology, as a leading science, was invested heavily in racist politics as a
science of categorization of being. Anthropology and other sciences such as taxonomy formed
“important building blocks for scientific racial ideology” (Jackson, Jr., Weidman 12). Paul Broca
created numerous instruments for measuring the anatomy. Some of these included “calipers (e.g.,
see fig 33), pelvimeters, craniostats, and torsiometers” (Jackson, Jr., Weidman 72). Science
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during this period was interested in identifying through physical means, measurements, data
collecting, the distinction in races, and the correlations of those differences in a taxonomy of
Being. Broca was heavily invested in the anthropological work of identifying racial heredity as
superior or inferior vis-à-vis his instruments. Other anthropologists adopted the same measures
for similar purposes.82 Broca and others were interested in identifying a pure race and believed
adamantly that there was no common race, rather a racial hierarchy in which the Europeans
reigned superior (Jackson, Jr., Weidman 45). And, in the case of the mixing of races in whatever
the circumstance, Broca would declare that “the essential racial character would remain
recognizable enough to be extracted by the anthropologist’s calipers” (Jackson, Jr., Weidman
73). As a result of scientific methodologies and mechanical invention that the black man
emerges.83
Such racist dispositions were widespread, epidemic, as evidenced in a letter from Louis
Agassiz, a naturalist, and lecturer at Harvard University. In the letter addressed to his wife, he
expressed how he was appalled by the presence of the black man serving him at a hotel and how
that it could not be humanly possible for the Negro and he to belong to the same human species.
In this short excerpt, Agassiz speaks of the Negro as a disease stating, “and when they advance
their hideous hand towards my plate to serve me, I wished I were able to depart in order to eat a
piece of bread elsewhere” (Jackson, Jr., Weidman 50). The phrenological chart introduced earlier
(e.g., see figs. 28-32) illustrates racist bias across all social spectrums. On the right-hand side, the
second image is the head of Christ, with the caption stating the ideal head of Christ. Christ’s
physiognomy resembles in kind the description which Lavater employs of the perfect Aryan
specimen. Christ is depicted as the ideal head and fulfills the Anglo-Saxon criteria and the
Christian model of perfection. In the center of the chart is an illustration of the brain and the
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areas that provide specific characteristics. There are subsets and derivatives of the normative
order, including the mentally ill, deviant, and criminal. Along with the title of the individual are a
head shape and brain analysis.
During this period which emphasized scientific critique and validation, there were not
many theories, agencies, or institutions untouched by racist ideology. Charles Darwin began his
exploration of natural sciences with his 1859 publication of The Origin of Species without
focusing on the human race. He would spend the entire enterprise on animal and plant species in
explaining their various origins and genealogies. There was only a minute notation in his last
pages, which stated that the future of the specificity of the “origins of man” would be brought to
light (477). By the time of the publication of The Descent of Man in 1871, Darwin was
convinced—though he claimed to be a staunch abolitionist—that the Negro was a different racial
variation. Darwin was not a polygenist nor a monogenist but believed that human species
variation could influence moral and intellectual distinction (Jackson and Weidman 69).
Darwin’s racist views were concretized in his gradualist postulation. This meant no break
in human development; however, there were racial hierarchies. He ranked human development
from the lower animal to the higher animal, then barbarians and savages, and finally, civilized
man. He looked to what he considered the “lower races to fill in [the] . . . gap of undeveloped
man” (Jackson, Jr., Weidman 69). Darwin exclaimed in astonishment on one of his journeys,
“such were our ancestors” (Jackson, Jr., Weidman 69). This statement by Darwin archeologizes
the black man as barbarian and the white as the civilized superior. Speaking of the Negroes he
encountered in his voyage on the Beagle, at Tierra del Fuego, he describes them as spectacles
with tangled hair and frothy mouths, “wild, startled, distrustful” (Jackson, Jr., Weidman 71).
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This correlation of the physical to character reeks of Lavater’s influence. Darwin
observed the following and noted it in his diary, “I could not have believed how wide was the
difference, between savage and civilized man. It is wider than between a wild and domesticated
animal, insomuch as in man there is a greater power of improvement (Jackson 71). And in the
conclusion of The Descent of Man, he states that “since he attained to the rank of manhood, he
has diverged into distinct races, or as they may be more fitly called, sub-species. Some of these,
such as the Negro and European, are so distinct that, if specimens had been brought to a
naturalist without any further information, they would undoubtedly have been considered by him
as good and true species” (678). This racist permeation during this period cannot be ignored but
instead traced for its ignorant, prejudicial invention of the black man.
Tracing Racism in the Age of Reason
As we have witnessed, Lavater does not reside in this scientific racist field alone in the
postulation or propagation of theories adhering to the superiority and inferiority of race. It is
widespread and is understood as foundational to Enlightenment’s tenor. Long before Benjamin
Disraeli—Disraeli was an English statesman—pronounced the dictum, “all is race”—quoted in
Gray (104), the germination of the racist seed had already populated in Germany. Gray
maintained that “already in the theories of Lavater this deterministic materialism is married to a
Eurocentric, chauvinistic attitude that valorizes the ‘enlightened’ intelligence of certain European
peoples as the pinnacle of human evolution and juxtaposes it with select other races or
nationalities that are taken to be ‘naturally’ inferior “(104). Deterministic materialism is the
doctrine of heredity of race and the proposal that all races are determined beforehand either by
nature or by the Christian God. And in this determinism, there is neither alteration in form nor
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function of the material subject. But this is not new to Western thought. Instead, it is the
foundation of its thought conceived by Plato.
I would argue that racism has been involved in a much wider calling for the division of
humankind on many levels of society, including the debauchery of Being through religion which
has participated in this racist enterprise vis-à-vis its fundamental doctrinal framework. This
reference is specific to Christianity’s theological doctrine embedded in the master/slave narrative
and Biblical stories of peoples of color, including the story of Noah’s son and the curse of the
black race that has perpetuated from its telling through centuries indoctrination. In the essay
“Bones, Bodies, Behavior,” from the Journal History of Anthropology, Vol 5, George W.
Stocking, Jr. proposes that what was considered part of the intellectual debate on race was
predicated largely on Biblical narratives such as the story of Cain and Abel, and the new world
vision in Noah that imbues a hierarchy of race in its telling. Stocking stated that “inheriting the
assumption of the underlying unity of humankind from Greek and Hebrew thought, Western
culture has developed in recurrent confrontation with "others" -stereotyped as Asiatic despots,
barbarian invaders, Muslim infidels, American savages, African slaves, and unconverted
heathen” (3).
Earlier I accused Plato of being the proprietor of racist thought in his division and
imperialistic stance of the Other. Not only is it his value positing in the division of knowledge
that bears on this period in the reconstitution of form, but in his use of the term barbarian and
golden race (161). Stocking also argues that the core of the fixture of taxonomy of race is
Biblically based and has been for centuries. We can trace these doctrines in tandem to some of
the provocations in Plato. Consider herewith the Myth of the Metals located in Book III.
Stocking posited that, within the underlying biblical paradigm, the original categories of human
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taxonomy were "tribes" or "nations" whose primary differentia was linguistic, and whose
relationships could be reconstructed historically in a genealogical tree with three main branches
the descendants of Shem, Ham, and Japheth” (4). So, we see here that though these legions of
races were identified as tribes and nations, the rubric in which their lot would be substantiated
still falls under the sons of Noah, and the Negro would be the curse of Ham.
In this same theological sphere of classification, Lavater and others would persist in this
racially charged period of the Enlightenment. Religious fervency and natural order ordained by
God would be the prevailing narrative even in the midst of the clarion call of the critique of pure
reason. I state this in the congruency of adherents to Biblical claims of the hierarchy of race
abiding in Lavater, whose writings were explicit regarding his legitimizing source for his
theories. Passage after passage, from discourse to description, Lavater discloses a prejudicial
God who perpetrated the division of race in primordial as divine providence in the election of the
white race and the defamation of the Negro. Is this not Plato’s claim in Meno of those things that
manifest themselves in the sensible world as predetermined in the Otherworldliness?84
Mirroring the image of God does is not reflective in the defective form posited as
belonging to Black man. 85 Though the Enlightenment is historicized as the pinnacle of Western
thought and ingenuity, Chris Hedges’s American Fascists will insist that “the Enlightenment, the
Age of Reason, is seen as the beginning of modern depravity” (Front matter). Cornell West
would protest this so-called enlighten period, which was also Americanesque, by stating that
“these Dantesque journeys were the ignoble origins of Western modernity and the criminal
foundations of American democracy. They constituted the night side of the Age of
Enlightenment, the reality left unlit by the torch of natural reason. African slavery sits at the
center of the grand epoch of equality, liberty, and fraternity” (51). Tracing racism in the Age of
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Reason is possible by examining this night side of this age in all of its variants through its
provocateur, Lavater, and his physiognomic project.
Peter Sloterdijk, a German critical philosopher, would declaim the influence of
physiognomy on the Enlightenment, stating that the period was completely silent on the matter
(Gray xix). Gray maintains that not only did physiognomy gain energy vis-a-vis “German
Protestant Pietist thought” (Gray xx) but that many notable scholars during this period were
either sympathetic to Counter-Enlightenment or echoed its tenets in-kind. The publication of
Lavater’s four-volume magnus opus, Physiognomische Fragmente, zur Beforderung der
Menschenkenntnis und Menschenliebemagnus (Physiognomic fragments for the promotion of
human understand and human love; 1775-1778) is evident of access and attribution of and for
physiognomy.86 Physiognomy was taught in schools, practiced by reading societies, and studied
by other physiognomists as well as silhouettists. Countless scholars contributed silhouettes for
Lavater’s physiognomic texts, including Goethe, Hamann, and Herder (Gray 337). Lavater’s use
of silhouettes as artistic proof of his theory and the print technology of copper etchings
reproduced works by prominent artists of this period in the names of Johann Heinrich Lips,
Daniel Chodowiecki, as well as William Blake to be included in his text. Gray argued the
following:
From the eighteenth century onward, physiognomics was instrumental in the process of
creating a public sphere of like-minded—or like-emotioned, like gened, like-countried—
subjects whose sense of community was largely grounded in the exclusion of those
Others who were determined not to fit the moral, intellectual, racial, or other paradigm to
which these judging subjects themselves subscribed. (Gray xxii)
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This section is concerned with identifying racism among what is otherwise not called by
that name, hidden under the veil of something else, claiming its agenda as seeking the high road
of humanity. Although not all theoretical concepts during this period are identified overtly as
belonging to the practice of racism, nevertheless, in some, their characteristics betray them.
Furthermore, the racist agenda is practiced simultaneously as theorists make revolutionary claims
of enlightenment, marking the period as the age of freedom and subjectivity. How can one claim
freedom for the white man yet brand the black man as determined for all time? According to
Gray, physiognomics is a parasite to a plethora of hosts “endemic to the German intellectualhistorical tradition” (Gray xx). As a parasite, physiognomy of taking full advantage of the gestalt
of the age evidential in the many forces and agencies emerging during this time. Some of these
are anthropology, morphology, phrenology, fascism, Darwinian, structuralism, positivism,
nationalism, and the Counter-Enlightenment. Most, if not all, of these agencies were involved in
ascertaining the superior position of the white race. Arthur Herman quotes Aristotle’s Politics in
which Aristotle asserts that “Men who are utterly superior are a law unto themselves” (Herman
74). This law unto themselves is what is widespread during this period by consensus. It is not
necessary to attribute this statement by Alexander the Great to racism, but it is applicable
because the terms men and law did not apply to the black man. It also reiterates the intellectual
temperament of cyclical validation of scholars in tandem during this period.
These various agencies were quite familiar with the agenda of the day, which is evident
in the fascist elite group encountered in Wolin’s The Seduction of Unreason.87 It is necessary to
trace racism to this period because the silhouette representing physiognomy has relegated the
black man’s subjectivity to an empty signifier. We will see in later pages that the silhouette has
come to represent the black man in all forms of performing race in America in theatre,

89
marketing, film, and other forms of visibility, including literature. One of the most disturbing and
prolific usages of racist physiognomy in America persists in the political sphere of racial
profiling.88 Beyond having the effect of trauma or terror incited against the black man, racial
profiling is what Ranciere terms policing. It is peremptory to mass incarceration, expanded today
to astronomical heights, and assigns the task of being a black man in America an unpredictable
exercise.
In The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, Michelle
Alexander notes disturbing legal precedence for racial profiling that causes such prejudices in
black communities. She points to two major problems at the very onset of racial profiling
program, which is “discretion and authorization” (128) . . . The discretion is left up to the police,
whose time and workforce are limited; in other words, he/she cannot control everything at once.
Instead, they make the “discretionary” decision for the where, when, and how of street justice.
Alexander also reveals that “Unbeknownst to the general public, the Supreme Court has
authorized race discrimination in policing, rather than adopting legal rules banning it”
(Alexander 123). Alexander cites racial biases case after case that set a precedent for lower
courts in their decision-making on cases involving blacks.
In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld “that police officers are free to use
minor traffic violations as an excuse to stop motorists for drug investigations—even when there
is no evidence whatsoever that the motorist has engaged in drug crime” (Alexander 108). In
McCleskey v Kemp, in challenging racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court ruled that such claim of racial bias under the rubric of the Fourteenth Amendment was not
applicable, even if strong statistics of such bias was evident (Alexander 109).89Alexander’s text
on modern-day racism seems to reflect the very age of the Enlightenment as the condition of
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deception. Finally, it is necessary to excavate physiognomy as form, as myth, as invention. Then
we can begin the discussion of Walker’s work as liberating in her commitment to the
emancipation of the black man. I hope this revisit of this period will create a clearer path for
coming to terms with Walker’s work for what it is, a complete disavowal of the stereotypes of
history.
Gray, in his examination of physiognomy in About Face: Physiognomic Thought from
Lavater to Auschwitz, provides a historical trace of racism throughout this period that is invested
heavily in physiognomy, the silhouette, and many of the forces at work. Gray reveals that
physiognomy did not make its first appearance in eighteenth-century Europe but was a factor in
antiquity and history in the West. Physiognomy was of interest to Aristotle, who was an avid
naturalist. Lavater dismisses Aristotle by stating that “the writings of the great Aristotle on
physiognomy appear to me very superficial, useless, and often self-contradictory, especially his
general reasoning” (Physiognomy 254). Although Lavater quotes Aristotle on some general
correlations of the body and function, this state of mind allows us to see where he has placed
himself, outside of the history of thought concerning this matter.
As a naturalist, Aristotle insisted that observation was the prerequisite for knowledge. As
the son of a physician, it would have coincided with his nature to leave the metaphysical world
that Plato had created to enter the sensible realm, removed from shadows. Aristotle was
considered “the true father of science and the scientific method, by which we still mean a
methodical process of observation, classification, and discovery” (Herman 45). Furthermore,
according to Herman, “Aristotle invented and wrote the pioneering treatises of all the following
fields: biology, zoology, gerontology, physics, astronomy, meteorology . . .” (Herman 45).
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The ancient text on physiognomy accredited to Aristotle, The History of Animals of
Aristotle, and the Treatise on Physiognomy, would not come to resemble Lavater’s invention. In
short, Aristotle indicates the following in his treatise on physiognomy occurring in the footnote
cited by Thomas Taylor, but which gives a reasonable synopsis of Aristotle’s thoughts on the
subject: “From the possession of those opinions and sciences by which man becomes a physician
or a harper, it is not possible to know that he is a physician or a harper, because this possession
produces no change in physiognomic signs” (Aristotle The History of Animals 254). Lavater’s
ambitious physiognomic project would diverge from what is
reasonably assumed in Aristotle. It is unreasonable because, as
Aristotle infers, it is impossible.
Neither Giambattista della Porta in the sixteenth
century nor Charles LeBrun in the seventeenth century framed
their projects as ethical in the assignment of value in the
correlation of body and soul. Rather they were interested in
analyzing the passions and how these come to be expressed in
the countenance, such as undertaken in LeBrun’s, A Method to

Figure 35. Hyacinthe Rigaud
King Louis XIV, 1701.

Learn to Design the Passions (e.g., see fig. 34). Lebrun’s method does not assume an ethical
value posture as far as to identify the manifested passions as moral indictments of the soul but
serves only as an analysis of the work of art’s ability to represent the affective order in various
manipulations of the body, i.e., happiness, sadness, anger. Psychological and emotional
depictions did not depict aristocratic and bourgeoise representation's refined and dignified
posturing (e.g., see fig. 35).
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Gray insists that “Lavater also sought to dissociate physiognomics from such prophetic
avocations as chiromancy, the guise it took in the ancient tradition carried on by Antonio Polemo
. . . and Adamantius” (Gray xxix). Chiromancy, by definition, is a form of palm reading which
wrecks unscrupulous characters, and occultist affiliation is far removed from the epistemological

Figure 34. Charles Lebrun, A Method to Learn to Design the Passions, 1734.

and scientific ambitions of Lavater’s physiognomy. Lavater distances physiognomy from the
sphere of the occult and palmistry in physical and intellectual space, establishing it anew.
Lavater’s physiognomy distinction is his claim of “positivistic objectivity and scientific
exactitude” (2). At the same time, it is the mere spewing of a fanatic whose rhetoric is
emotionally charged (Gray 2). Positivistic objectivity is an observational method in which form
singularly is its own proof. In Lavater, the silhouette has a dual assignment of meaning to
illustrate the perfection of form in some and the distinction of the inferior species according to
which nature has assigned in others. An example of this is given in the Negro. Lavater’s
intelligible silhouette is traced out and belongs to its own domain as self-referential.
Walker suspends Plato’s and Lavater’s proposition of the silhouette to cut out of history a
dialectic image. Walker plays off the historical name calling of the black man stereotypically as
belonging to the genus of the apes in I’ll be a Monkey’s Uncle (e.g., see fig. 36). Why many will
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take offense at this work is blatantly obvious, as we have heard the whispers of history.
However, can perception be lodged in understanding this offense, this perception shaped by
education that yielded certain hermeneutics? I contend
that this myth has been scientifically hierarchized (e.g.,
see fig. 37). And Fanon retorts that “nobody dreams of
challenging” (Black Skin, White Masks 1) this lie of
history inspired by colonialism. Yet, we see that Walker
does emphatically in her polemical silhouettes.
Lavater’s profiles showcase a certain superiority
of race. According to form, they are assigned a particular

Figure 36. Kara Walker, I’ll be a
Monkey’s Uncle, 1996.

character; correlations are deemed scientific proof of superiority (e.g., see fig. 38). An example
of this is surmised as: “the ‘delicate
outline of the forehead’ seen on the
individual at the top on the left was
a sign of ‘moderation in desires’,
while the ‘short distance between
the nose and the lip . . . the
harmony of the whole’ displayed by
Figure 37. Chart of evolutionary stage of Humankind.

the character at bottom on the right, indicated a ‘judicious man, one among ten thousand . . .”
(Vigarello 17). He moves in the same circle of evincing as Plato does in self-legitimation, Plato
through living speech and Lavater’s through a type of visual formalism which is already
problematic.
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I do not deny a correlation of the body as a type of knowledge source. If I did, then I
would have to refute the whole of modern aesthetics, which is involved in the same course of
study. Notably, Schopenhauer, whose doctrine of the thing itself is invested in the body as the
portal whereby the limitation of reason does not obfuscate that the object is complete in the
relationship between the body and soul. He further
implies that when the form is presented to the
viewer, it is the thing itself of the absolute and can
be no less because it must first enter the body to
get to the mind. Schopenhauer stated of
physiognomy, “as a rule a man’s face says more of
interest does his tongue . . . it is the monogram of
all his thoughts and aspirations” (Zebrowitz 14).
Walker’s correlation to Schopenhauer is that
Walker’s work embodies the suspension of both
Figure 38. Lavater, physiognomic study.

impulses (knowledge) and at once redeems them

both in the dialectic image as the thing itself, which is properly aesthetics. Again, there is no
demarcation in Walker’s Monkey’s Uncle that signifies the division of man from monkey and
monkey from man, but a morphing that understandably belongs to myth, for there is no such
hybrid animal. This conflation, which happens before the viewer’s eyes, is amid its own
orchestration as Walker and the myth (represented by the unsignifiable monkey-type) spin a
configuration that belongs to all myths. A conundrum.
In The Henry Gates, Jr. Reader in the essay “The Signifying Monkey and the Language
of Signifyin(g)” Gates posited: “If the signifier stands disrupted by the shift in concepts denoted
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and connoted, then we are engaged at the level of meaning itself, at the semantic level. Black
people vacated this signifier, then—incredibly—substituted as its concept . . . rhetorical
strategies peculiar to their own vernacular tradition” (238).90 Walker has confused the language
of the signifier. Indeed, she had dislodged it in this complex labyrinthine of thought. She has
invented new ways of relating to the image in its place.
Yasmil Raymond provides a glimpse into this new system of signifiers for Walker’s
images in the anthology Kara Walker: My Complement, My Enemy, My Oppressor, My Love. It
is not that Walker’s work no longer signifies; it can no longer be leveled with the Saussure
linguistic model. So, as the enlarged penis in Gone, the monkey is signifying something else. I
say that something else is the readability of emancipation. You
cannot read the monkey as monkey because he assumes the
physiognomy of a human. You cannot read the monkey as a man
because he has some attributes of a monkey. You cannot signal him
as an entertainment monkey who travels with his owner with a
music box from city to city, circus to circus, because he is engaging
on a human intellectual level. We can gauge this from his interaction

Figure 39. Gericault
Insane Woman, 1822.

in the process of creation, his ability to communicate. So, he has
moved from the realm of limited knowledge assigned to this species to a level beyond this. What
Ranciere has named doing and making. You can also look at it this way, the little girl is no
longer playing the role of human, and the monkey, the role of a monkey. What are we to
understand that is being constructed then? The inability to read Walker’s work is the readability
of Walker’s work.
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In return to the discussion of the passions regarding Lebrun’s physiognomic explorations,
we are aware of the Romantics who, for all practical purposes, ushered in the aesthetic regime by
expressing the passions of the soul in various forms of art. Jean-Louis André Théodore Géricault
painted Insane Woman (e.g., see fig. 39) from his Portraits of the Insane in the visual arts.
Gericault made no pretension about knowing the heart, the soul, and the virtue of this woman.
He copied only what the truth of her physiology was without a judgment of her essence. What is
evident is the woman is disheveled, and she appears to be disoriented by the inability to focus her

Figure 40. Guernsey and Alden, Harper’s Pictorial History of the Civil War 1866.

eyes, which are staring into the glare of the night. She does not appear to be an individual who
has experienced joy, inferred by the deep lines on her face. But to tell whether she has a black
soul, or virtuous, or honorable is the work of a sorcerer.
While Lavater made much effort to prevent the association with palmistry, his
methodology eventually made that affinity real. Lavater’s speculative doctrine could not stand
the interrogation of science as science. But for over a century, Lavater’s physiognomic would
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stand as true science for many scholars and in popular culture. So, art was assigned to rewrite the
damage that art and science had left behind, strewn across all portals of human existence. Mark

Figure 41. Kara Walker, Harper’s Pictorial History of the Civil War, Annotated 2005.

Twain’s protest novel The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, illuminates physiognomy as having
fallen from scientific grace by placing it along with other carnival or sideshow attractions. Twain
introduces in the novel two tricksters who are escaping a mob of angry people in pursuit of them
for their cunning devices and sleek tongues. Neither of the men is acquainted and are only
associative by their occupation as hustlers. Twain exposes physiognomy and phrenology as
scientific illusions by returning them to carnivals and side shows. In conversation with Huck and
Big Jim, both men reveal their schemes involving physiognomy and phrenology.91
To further the case for Walker regarding her association with the silhouette, and therefore
physiognomy, I would like to analyze how these differences are evident in an exercise of history.
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In her attempt to restage history, Walker reproduced images from the two-volume Harper’s
Pictorial History of the Civil War 1866 by Alfred H. Guernsey and Henry M. Alden for her
series called Harper’s Pictorial History of the Civil War, Annotated 2005. She intentionally
copied the original illustrations (e.g., see fig. 40) to recast history as imitation by placing an
additional narrative juxtaposed over the original (e.g., see fig. 41), mirroring its exactness so that
in its fidelity, the spectator could experience both histories as a dialectic image. This
juxtaposition is not an erasure of history in the modernist terms. Instead, it gives way to a
liberated perception in the installation of another history. Zizek posits in his text Organs Without
Bodies: “at a more radical level . . . one can only truly betray an author by way of repeating him,
by way of remaining faithful to the core of his thought” (13).
The doctrine of physiognomy was so entrenched in society during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries it would display what Gray identified as social surveillance.92 Lavater’s
physiognomy would maintain a tremendous influence over the Age of Reason as a social
phenomenon. Leslie Zebrowitz notes the popularity and success of physiognomy in Reading
Faces: Window to the Soul. Zebrowitz cites an account of physiognomy as epidemic at the time,
in which people refused to go into the streets without a mask, fearing their physical features
would give way to a negative reading of them (3). Then there is the anecdote of the influential
naturalist Darwin whose entire fate was charted by physiognomy’s popularity. He was scheduled
to accompany the captain of the Beagle on a voyage as his traveling companion. The captain, a
friend of Lavater, who practiced physiognomy devoutly, considered refusing Darwin based on
his looks which read as dishonest (Zebrowitz 1). On the Beagle, Darwin would come into his
own as a naturalist, and the research during his voyage would prove to be the foundation used in
his seminal work in the science of evolution. Lavater’s “Essays on Physiognomy, first published
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in 1772, was regularly reprinted for a hundred years in German, French, English, and Dutch, and
two modern versions were published in Lavater’s home country of Switzerland as late as 1940,
bringing the total to 151 editions in various languages” (Zebrowitz 3).
Lavater’s physiognomic project emerged
during a transition in Germany that set the stage
for its reception. As mentioned previously,
Morphology was one of the theories that ushered
in the era of body politics. What began as a
contentious shift in the governing body in the
abandonment of social stations and the identifying
mark of that station, which was attire, quickly
moved to greater attention to the body itself, no
longer subjugated by the social distinction
Figure 42. Daumier, Silhouette,1841.

branded by fashion. This attention to the body is

the beginning of body politics and precedes psychoanalysis. Vigarello states, “this highly
specific, renewed interest in physical types and morphology occurring in the early 19th century
is rooted in a very particular set of circumstances.93 These explain how the word ‘silhouette,’ in
its widest interpretation, rose to dominance” (64). The silhouette in the early nineteenth century
was based on the impression of body types, lines, gestures, “the perspective of the body”
(Vigarello 62) as is seen in Honore Daumier’s 1840’s Silhouette series (e.g., see fig. 42) in which
the “pared-down, expressive lines” (Vigarello 62) defined the figure. In no way does this type of
rendering or interpretation of the silhouette suggest a moral disposition as such. This is not to
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state that other scholars or artists did not perceive the silhouette as illustrating a political and
moral position.94
As one of the theories emerging during the Enlightenment, Morphology is the study of
body types belonging to various social classifications. Vigarello asserts that the “study of
‘physiologies’ was an entirely novel approach and was integrated here into the analysis of a
‘social’ being, as a range of professions, social positions, habits, and activities were presented in
a series of separate physical profiles” (Vigarello 66). These were often called silhouettes, and
they produced not an image of a particular individual but a social type. “In our society [states
Balzac], differences have
disappeared; there are only
nuances left” (Vigarello 64). The
new science of morphology was
extremely important, but its
expression could be quite
comical at times. William
Hogarth’s etching, The Stage
Coach or The Country Inn Yard

Figure 43. Hogarth, The Stage Coach or Country Inn Yard, 1747.

(e.g., see fig. 43), can be viewed as a comical study of body types, and is in actuality, a satirical
critique of the new political perspective of the body as a designation of individuality and types. 95
The scene on the right of the image depicts what appears to be the old regime being removed,
illustrated by the group of soldiers moving out of the picture frame. There is a detailed scene of
individuals as types on the left: the dwarf, the stout official, the unruly boys, the heavy-set older
woman being helped onboard the carriage. Moving into an era of individualism, with the
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removal of the old guard of the set social strata, Lavater would capitalize on the silhouette's
popularity and the new interest in body types.
It is easy to see how various components would reflect each other during this period.
While I will not address all of the concepts that shaped this flourishing of racism during this
period, I will speak to two of these: nationalism and fascism. Nationalism refers to a type of
separatism, whether it be of a group of people, or a particular culture, or a collective doctrine,
that favors a certain group or nation of peoples over another. Nationalism is an ideology that is
separatist in nature and isolationist in intent. In other words, when a cultural group believes it is
the superior group or nation, all actions are filtered through this ideology, and those doctrines
and actions are believed to be justified. Fascism is not always identified because it hides under
the guise of more subtle ideas and moves in the doctrinal modes as nationalist thought and
projection. According to Hedges, American Fascists: The Christian Right and the War on
America, Fascism enters in the most clandestine ways from the sense of a loss of culture,
instability, or a desire for a sense of self at any cost. He quotes Fritz Stern from The Politics of
Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic, in which Stern surmises that fascism is
the ideology of tradition, stability, and disregard for the disruption of cultural norms of religion,
rituals. Common groups are aggregated that hold common beliefs, as national identity (37).
Whether various Enlightenment ideas are directly called nationalism or fascism, the actions of
agencies and doctrines concretize them as such by the pernicious discourse designed to place one
race over the other. Physiognomy, phrenology, anthropology, Darwinism, and other theories are
inherently nationalist and fascist thought.
Lavater’s Physiognomy reads like a Who’s Who of racist scholars who are at once
humans and monsters. Lavater states in a section in Physiognomy his own sentiments on national
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physiognomy along with Kant, Henry Fuseli, and other notables as testimonies of white
intellectual superiority as dictated by physical characteristics. Lavater asserts, “it is undeniable,
that there is national physiognomy, as well as national character. Whoever doubts of this can
never have observed men of different nations . . . compare a Negro and Englishman . . . examine
their forms, countenances, characters, and minds” (106). In the anthology “Race,” Writing and
Difference, Henry Louis Gates posits that “the urge toward the systematization of all human
knowledge (by which we characterize the Enlightenment) led directly to the relegation of black
people to a lower place in the great chain of being . . .” (8). According to Jackson and Weidman,
the chain of being first examined the lower animal species. Later it included humankind at the
top of the hierarchical chain, the European at the top, and the black man at the bottom (13-14).
Throughout Physiognomy, Lavater claims the merits of physiognomy by raising a specter
of intimidation for those who defy him. He calls out the individuals as infidels without pride of
race and lacks intellectual and spiritual insight. Lavater insists that the only question of import is
whether the variance in form and character can be detected. He further states that if these
individuals, “instead of investigating the question, should continue to declaim against it, must
either be deficient in the love of truth, or in local reasoning” (2). Lavater challenges the skeptic
to examine the form of the silhouette as authentication to measured science. What outcome does
Lavater expect from this examination? This is no test regarding the black slave body except that
in slavery, the slave could not walk upright because his physiognomy had to mirror his
subjugation. That proves nothing scientifically. His eyes lowered to the ground; his back bent,
his lips quivering in the exactness of his station, nothing more. As for other features of the black
man, the regions of the world’s natural environment equip the vessel for survival. The thick lips,
for example, or the thick skin, ward off the heat from the sun in Africa. Dark skin is a protection
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from the harshness of the extended sunlight in many regions of the world. Geography and
environment are acknowledged by theoreticians as reasons for differentiation of the races
physically, but only to extend the rhetoric to validate racism. Lavater adds a passage from
Winckelmann, who indicates that in overbearing climates of heat and cold, nature deals with the
physiognomy of the people in harsh ways. He asserts that the Greeks are perfectly ordered as it
relates to their physiology because of their mild climate geographically. He states, “Nature forms
with greater regularity the more she approaches her centre . . . hence the Grecian, and our own
idea of beauty, being derived from more perfect symmetry” (Physiognomy 123). As for the
Negroes, he implies that their features resemble their “monkies,” in particular, he notes the
excessively large swollen mouth. (Physiognomy 123).
Then there are the testimonies for validation from various societal sectors, from artists
and philosophers, such as Johann Joachim Winkelmann, Kant, Fuseli, and others. Winkelmann,
in History of Art, states that “with respect to the form of man, our eyes convince us, that the
character of nation, as well as of mind, is visible in the countenance . . . the formation of the
countenance is as various as language, nay, indeed, as dialects . . .” (Physiognomy 121). Fuseli
states, “from the carriage of the body . . . we shall be able to distinguish the Hungarian, the
Sclavonian, the Illyrian, The Wallachian: and to obtain a full and clear conception of the actual,
and, in general, the prominent characteristics of this or that nation” (Physiognomy 127). In
Fuseli's two key phrases, we must consider here to distinguish the racist undertones. To correlate
body and carriage is to indicate first of all form and the way in which it is informed, in the term
carriage. Secondly, “characteristics of that nation” is the thing in which Lavater mostly
concerned himself, which was that the individual really, not the collective, represents the
national physiognomy. This is continued in Fuseli.
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Lavater wrote extensively on race, referencing various Enlightenment figures in
Physiognomy. He discusses the writings of Kant, author of the Critique of Judgment, professor at
the University of Konigsberg. Lavater states that “some of the most remarkable Passages from an
excellent Essay on National Physiognomy, [are] by Professor Kant of Konigsberg”
(Physiognomy 117). Near the end of his statement on physiognomy, when discussing the various
climates, Kant mentions that the moist climates were good for breeding animals which is where
the Negro derived. This is a direct correlation of the Negro to animals. We know this is his intent
because his next statements infer that the worth of the negro is his body, that he is physically
strong, attesting to the Negro’s essence as abiding in his body only as production. Kant further
insults the black man’s dignity and humanity by claiming that “he is “dirty, indolent, and
trifling” (Physiognomy 117). In “Extracts from the Manuscript of a Man of Literature,” Lavater
includes this passage: “All tribes of people, who live in uncultivated countries, and consequently
are pastoral, not assimilated in towns, would never be capable of an equal degree of cultivation
with European . . . were the shackles of slavery taken off, still their minds would eternally
slumber . . .” (Physiognomy 129). These racist writings should come as no surprise and appear to
reflect the Enlightenment doctrine of the time. Kant and Lavater lay out theories of race,
succinctly expressing hierarchies where the white man reigns supreme, and the Negro is said to
be the lowest human form.
Other writings from Kant, Hegel, and David Hume are replete with derogatory remarks
on the black man. Hume, in his 1753 essay entitled “Of National Character,” stated, “I am apt to
suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five
different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites (Gates, Race, Writing and Difference 10).
Kant, following Hume, in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 1764,
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claims that “so fundamental is the difference between [the black and white] races of man…it
appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color” (Gates, Race, Writing and
Difference 10). Hegel’s proposition is contained in the fact that he states that the black man has
no memory. He proposes that language, particularly writing and the development, constitutes a
culture. Without memory, there is no history or cultural history. Without writing, there is no
memory, without memory, no history, without history, no humanity. He thus infers that the black
peoples are inhuman (Gates, Race, Writing and Difference 11). I will expand on this in Chapter
Two in the discussion on the representative regime.
Nationalism, fascism, physiognomy, racism have their makings in the Enlightenment. In
About Face, Gray notes that Peter Sloterdijk, a German critical philosopher, insists that the
Enlightenment was not promoting or supporting physiognomy and implies that they were silent
on the matter (xix). Gray asserts otherwise. He claims, not only was the Enlightenment not
silent, but many of the most notable scholars during this period took positions on one side or the
other regarding physiognomy. Chris Hedges’s American Fascists insist that “The Enlightenment
. . . is seen as the beginning of modern depravity” (2). Unfortunately, the period which should
have experienced the most elevated actualization of the ideas of humanism were instead the
perpetrators of the opposite. The clarion call of Kant was not realized because a majority of
scholars were seduced by unreason. These collective adjectives are descriptive of the
singlemindedness of individuals during this period that led to devastating consequences, but not
before it marked the black man in perpetuity. There was a need to form a new myth of identity
for Germany. The criteria would be that of agreement and the sense of belonging in the
substantiation of each other while disqualifying those who were not similar, who did not and
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could not think the same, feel the same, perform in the same way. This likemindedness is the
holocaust understood as the death of the Other.
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Chapter Two
The Souls of Black Folk:
Performing Race in 19th and 20th Century Representation

The longer it persisted, the more believable the image became, and the more
easily it was transmitted to succeeding generations.
—Joseph Boskin, Sambo: The Rise & Demise of An American Jester
The history of cinema is the history of a power of making history.
—Jacques Ranciere, Future of the Image
Real wars are not fought for people or fatherlands, but take place between
different media, information technologies, data flows.
—Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter
The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather, it is a social relationship
between people that is mediated by images.
— Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle
In his 1992 film Malcolm X, played by Denzel Washington, Spike Lee posed the problem
of black representation in some respect as Nietzsche did regarding the value system in Western
culture and the need to annihilate and reestablish anew. Nihilism for Nietzsche is not a singular
event, but a systemic and necessary purging of values that he contended was pathological. For
Nietzsche, this stemmed from Christian ideology and dogma in its challenge to aristocratic
posturing.96 Lee’s nihilistic—if one would call it as such—exposition is made evident in the
film’s prison library scene. Lee raises the question of knowledge, its legitimacy, and the role in
the assignment of value of the black man. We may surmise Lee’s posture from how he localizes
this disclosure in the place identified as the storehouse of knowledge and, therefore, truth as a
symbol. History as fabrication and the potential for emancipation is dialectic in this scene.
The character Bates, a Black Muslim prisoner who is interested in converting
Malcolm to the faith reads from the dictionary the definition for black. I state the dictionary
instead of a dictionary for all branches of naming and inscriptions that support and cross
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reference all hegemonic systems from Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon’s thirty-six volume,
Histoire Naturelle to Noah Webster’s Webster’s Dictionary. Bates reads, “Black: hostile,
forbidden, as a black day, foully or outrageously wicked as black cruelty, indicating disgrace,
dishonor or culpability” (Malcolm X 1:1:20-1:13:21). Bates prompts Malcolm to turn to the
definition for white. Malcolm reads, “White: of the color of pure snow, reflecting all the rays of
the spectrum, the opposite of black, free from spot or blemish, innocent, pure, without evil intent,
harmless, honest, square dealing, and honorable” (Malcolm X 1:12:51-1:13:35). In the final
analysis of this exercise, Malcolm asks Bates, why are they reading from the white man’s book?
Bates replies profoundly, “because the truth is lying there if you read behind the words”
(Malcolm X 1:14:04). The readability behind history will be the task of this study in the
emancipation of the black man.
One of the problems that prevailed in nineteenth and twentieth-century America was the
construction of black male identity as soulless. This fabricated campaign was perpetuated
through all forms of media. The black man as soulless was not a difficult concept to envision in
America, as the treatment of the black man as a product had long been in vogue. Fanon invokes
Sartre in Black Skin, White Masks in which he states, “Sartre has shown that the past, along the
lines of an inauthentic mode, catches on and “takes” en masse, and once solidly structured, then
gives form to the individual. It is the past transmuted into a thing of value” (202). The phrase “en
masse” is indicative of aggregation, and “past transmuted” can be read as the gathering of
disparate parts to a whole in the invention of the black man. This taking form begins as formless
and through time, and the assignment of value becomes the thing itself. The problem is that
media versions of the black man are inventions of society performed in history as historical truth
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of being. The many variegated constructions of black male invention proliferated over time have
marked the institutionalization of the black man as product and non-being.
Though the Emancipation Proclamation issued by President Lincoln designated the
abolishment of slavery in 1863 during the Civil War, the passing of the Thirteenth Amendment
with the annotation, except for punishment of a crime, would reinstall slavery that would
eventually morph into the proliferation of confinement of the black man in mass incarceration.
Thus, the peculiar institution does not end; instead, it mutated, altered its appearance, and
continued business as usual as a renewed distribution of the sensible. The shadow is now
attributed to the black man in media through myriad forms. The black man is characterized by
white representation as morally profane, psychologically inadequate, politically inept, and
ontologically faulty, evident through these visible concocted forms. The black man is a
performed subject in history vis-à-vis the representative regime of art. Foucault belongs here for
his report on the penal system in Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, in which he
argues that the penal system no longer uses the body only for recompense of a crime but the soul
(16).97
The influential and racially motivated eighteenth-century concept of physiognomy
proffered the theory of what Gray asserts as Lavater’s hypothesized soul. The persistent threat of
fascism in the West, the Slave Trade under an enlightened Europe—not to mention the myths,
anecdotes, fairy tales perpetuated in texts, novels, films, stage, and images—can be understood
as performativity that fabricated the black man’s subjectivity. History as the primal scene of
black male subjectivity whose méconnaissance derives from the mirror of the archetypes of said
history is examined in this study. These forces set the stage, the literal and figurative for what I
argue as the invention of the black man. But it is the legislation of so-called freedom pursuant in
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the Thirteenth Amendment that sealed the fate of the black man as an archetypal criminal in our
present age. His true crime, the color black, which he will wear as a crucifix as he is
systematically erased from society into the holding cells of the disenfranchised.
In this brief study, I will not recite a complete historical record of white or black
representation in performing the black man. The collection would be an ambitious feat for the
most prolific scholar and would take volumes and a vast expenditure of time. I propose to
highlight major factions of construction as far as the black man and subjectivity are concerned,
which are primarily advanced by white America but are at times employed, unfortunately by
black America who bought into this hoax of Being through brainwashing. Constructions are
evident in advertising, stage, production, film, literature, novels, documents, manifestos,
treatises, television, music, and the plastic arts. The contributors to the fabrication of the black
man are diverse from presidents, politicians, religious leaders, corporations, the music industry,
the publishing industry, to educators and other social agencies. Responses intended to refute the
claims of racist representation and reverse the gaze of history against the black man is included.
This enterprise for constructing black masculinity is vast because the wager at stake in the battle
for the soul of the black man is exceedingly high.
The principle governing Plato’s metaphysical enterprise is the soul as the framework of
all facets of his philosophy. The dialogues are a unique way in which Plato introduces and
explicates the doctrine of the soul. He makes a case for its immutability in the community's life
as a universal ought and in its particularity as the designation of the individual will towards the
good of the state through the assignment of desire. Plato ultimately connects the hierarchy of
desire and appetite to the consignment of the soul. It is Plato who concretizes truth for Western
thought. Thus, it is necessary, to begin with, Plato to discuss the black man's soul. Plato’s
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doctrines are predicated on performance, performed narrative, performed speech, becoming of
performed truth, which Plato orchestrates.
The term performativity in specificity, noted earlier, is subscribed by Judith Butler in
Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex. Performativity is the methodology Butler
argues, which is the very structure in which the feminine gender is fashioned. Butler states the
following:
Performativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability, a regularized and
constrained repetition of norms. And this repetition is not performed by a subject; this
repetition is what enables a subject and constitutes the temporal condition for the subject.
This iterability implies that 'performance' is not a singular 'act' or event, but a ritualized
production, a ritual reiterated under and through constraint, under and through the force
of prohibition and taboo, with the threat of ostracism and even death controlling and
compelling the shape of the production, but not, I will insist, determining it fully in
advance. (95)
Butler’s term performativity can be seen as methodology versus an agency because it is
not working under a particular branch or force in history. Performativity can effortlessly
occasion the manufacturing of the black man through inexhaustible historical gymnastics. Butler
suggests that the question is not whether performativity can be used in terms of race, but how the
theory can be actualized in effect regarding the subject of race (Gender Troubles xvi). I would
offer that performing the subject is the same in race and for all individuals deemed as Other.
When Butler states in the quote above that “this repetition is not performed by a subject,” one
must ask: who is performing? In Black Like You, John Strausbaugh suggests that the blackface
performances were brought to America by the English colonists as early as 1751 and that they
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were performed long before the official “minstrel-show troupes in 1843” emerged (63).98 Before
the emergence of the minstrel troupes 20, 000 minstrel shows had been performed in theatres
throughout America (Strausbaugh 63). Billy Van, a white man, is shown here in a marketing
poster for his successful run performing the black man (e.g., see fig. 44).
The ‘who’ or ‘what’ of the performed, as stated by Butler, is established by the norms of
society. Those norms refer to agencies, forces, and entities that create, regulate, and distribute

Figure 44. Billy Vann
Advertisement poster, 1900.

Figure 45. Advertisement poster for
Al.G. Field Minstrels, 1884.

knowledge. This epistemological base and methodology, i.e., legislation, documents, language,
and arts in various forms, dictate this knowledge as normative. Not only is performativity made
possible through these agencies, but the performance is carried out in the physical body (e.g., see
fig. 45). Ranciere insists that “political statements and literary locutions produce effects in
reality . . . they draft maps of the visible . . .” (Politics 39). These performances were the black
man. Ranciere further notes that these speech acts “define variations of sensible intensities,
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perceptions, and the abilities of bodies” (Politics 39). Ranciere posits that these are the power
centers of language that further define certain spaces, times, and the ability of bodies.
Returning to Butler and performativity: this reiteration is not an occasional recurrence but
is a continuation and a perpetuation, which causes that which would otherwise pass over as an
anomaly to become commonplace in duration. (e.g., see figs.46-51) Everywhere possible, the

Figures 46-51. Top left, Al Jolson in the Jazz Singer, middle, Gorton’s Minstrel poster, top right, George
Thatcher’s Minstrel poster, Judy Garland, bottom, left in blackface in film, Everybody Sings, middle, Amos and
Andy marketing poster for radio performance in blackface, bottom right, Bing Crosby in blackface.

black man is performed. Not only is he performed in blackface as imitation, but in speech acts,
dialect, musical performances, lyrics, rhythm, body contortions to mimic an unintelligible form
for the appearance of the black man as ontologically faculty. Butler also maintains that this
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perpetual activity creates and sustains the subject in this fashion until there is no differentiation
between the performance as subject and the subject as performance. And Fanon would state that
“the colonist and the colonized are old acquaintances. And consequently, the colonist is right

Figures 52. Virginia Governor, Ralph Northam in blackface.

when he says he “knows” them. It is the colonist who fabricated and continues to fabricate the
colonized subject. The colonist derives his validity, i.e., his wealth, from the colonial system”
(Fanon Wretched 2). The colonial system should not be thought of in terms of being lost to
history but is the state of oppression waged
against a certain lot of humanity in perpetuity.
This continuity in fabricating the black man
cannot be more evident than the recurrences of
blackface in our present age (e.g., see figs. 5253).

Figures 53. Ted Danson in blackface, 1993.

These ritualistic acts repetitively exercised do not necessarily fasten as permanent forms
initially. But under duress and ‘threat’ of life and being, death and exile, one accepts his fate and
succumbs. These performances become the evolution of the subject as it takes form accordingly.
Ranciere states in The Emancipated Spectator, “to miss the fantasies of the word made flesh and
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the spectator rendered active, to know that words are merely words and spectacles merely
spectacles, can help us arrive at a better understanding of how words and images, stories and
performances, can change something of the world we live in” (23). Whether in speech acts,
bodily performances, or media, formless matter crystallizes before our eyes as form.
Media in the Performance of Subjectivity
Media is interrogated everywhere in this age of technological excess in which it creates
myth out of nothing. I recently viewed scenes from a seven-part series on the career of Roger
Ailes and Fox News entitled The Loudest Voice. In one episode, there was an exchange between
Ailes and the White House on how the War on Terror would be approached and billed in the
media, much like the War on Drugs and the Law-and-Order rhetoric used during Nixon’s
administration99 that caused a nation to divide in the racially motivated coded injunctions.
Whether a television series or a campaign against drugs, the major component of these initiatives
involves the storyline, the narrative.100 The storyline, or plot, is a critical component in
Aristotelian tragedy and remains important today. Poetics stitches together the method that all
forms are constructed and acted out on the world stage. So, we should not ponder Poetics as
mere theatre but as uniquely tied to a socio-political dimension arranged to dictate the ethos of a
community and its actions. Aristotle’s Poetics constructs the arrangement of actions on and off
the stage—theatrical assemblage. And what Aristotle performs is the concept of universal value
and validity. I dare not imply that it is truth because truth, as so many other concepts, is relative.
In the introduction to Poetics, Malcolm Heath states the following, “while philosophy is
concerned with universal truths, what lies behind an effective poetic plot may be the
universalization of a conventional falsehood” (xxviii). It is astonishing that one need only speak
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or write an idea for it to be believed. Even more bewildering is that to precipitate that
believability to the level of concrete knowledge, one needs only to repeat it excessively.
The narrative has always involved the socialization of knowledge from, science, to
science fiction. In The Loudest Voice, there is a protagonist, an antagonist, and a love interest, as
in any successful story. Everyone loves a good story; it is part of the human genetic disposition,
associative on many levels. And the addition of a convincing love interest in the story has ways
of assuaging even the adamantine critic, whether it concerns romantic love or patriotism.
Speeches are well crafted; nothing is left unturned as the storyline is created to serve several
audiences. As Jean Baudrillard proposed of art, I must consider whether in its excess media
hasn’t become something resembling perversion.101
In Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, Kittler asserts emphatically from the beginning of his
discourse on media that “media determines our situation” (xxxix). This declaration has the ring
of causality. His claim seems to implicate media as a modifier of our behavior in the becoming
of our subjectivity. Kittler proposes that these mechanisms perform subjectivity in various ways.
It is not difficult to understand media as subjectivity as humankind embarks upon new
knowledges and discoveries that alter how we actuate life on the many socio-political platforms.
Foucault makes the claim in The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences that
man is a recent invention through labour, life, and language. Heidegger expounds on the
examination of Being and the revisitation to the historical archives of its nascent beginning to
uncover its abandonment in the careful examination of the becoming of Being in the expose of
formlessness, of nothing.102 And Kittler proposes that media has a stake in subjectivity to a large
degree. I take a cue from these for what I postulate in the invention of the black man. Kittler:
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Once the technological differentiation of optics, acoustics, and writing exploded
Gutenberg's writing monopoly around 1880, the fabrication of so-called Man became
possible. His essence escapes into apparatuses. Machines take over functions of the
central nervous system, and no longer, as in times past, merely those of muscles. And
with this differentiation-and not with steam engines and railroads-a clear division occurs
between matter and information, the real and the symbolic. When it comes to inventing
phonography and cinema, the age-old dreams of humankind are no longer sufficient. The
physiology of eyes, ears, and brains have to become objects of scientific research. For
mechanized writing to be optimized, one can no longer dream of writing as the
expression of individuals or the trace of bodies. The very forms, differences, and
frequencies of its letters have to be reduced to formulas. So-called Man is split up into
physiology and information technology. (16)
Involved in this labyrinthine enterprise is the very essence of the so-called man up to this
point. But what is humankind created of, at any point in time? How is the coming of humankind
different in, for example, the prehistoric era? Every claim is one of creation and recreation. But it
is most likely that subjectivity is being performed incessantly by those agencies and actions that
are in operation at any given time. Does that mean that this is not true subjectivity? I would state
this in a question: what is the true subjectivity of any man or woman? What Kittler proposes in
his writing is that the mechanisms in which are extended from humankind involve a kind of
reorganization of not only our physical bodies but our inner organs and our intellectual abilities.
Our bodies move differently from before by introducing machines such as the typewriter (e.g.,
see fig. 54), film, and gramophone. Parts of our body inactive before these inventions or not used
in certain ways are now active and operable. This can also apply to the intellectual capacity
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where certain areas lay dormant, stored away until called upon by technologies to access the task
at hand. It is not possible to deny that these changes are altering our thinking, our physiology,
and our being as a whole, whether infinitesimal or considerably. True subjectivity is always in
constant struggle with Lacan’s mirror image of the false ‘I.’ The false subject of the black man is
removed doubly through the testimony of performances and spectacles.
A good starting place for a discussion of media as performing the subject is to establish a
working definition and at once examine some of the theories and problems arising from the
subject of media. In this exposition, we hope to validate our claim of the role of media in
performing the black man’s subjectivity. This
study has no intention of creating a history of
media or even its hermeneutics. Kittler is
interested, as I am, in understanding the
“changing links between body and medium”
(xiv). And this changing link which Kittler
refers to is from the antiquated models of
media to the modern ones and new effects on

Figure 54. Underwood Typewriter, 1900–1915

the biological.103 The term antiquated is in use not because these are resigned to history. Rather
they are the predecessors of new communication models emptied into more contemporary
models that may or may not resemble the older ones. In Chapter One, we discussed the
specificity of science and technology in the invention of the black man through multitudinous
processes, apparatuses, and agencies, and we seek to develop the discourse further in media.
The problem with media is its definition which is sequestered in modern terms of
conventional modes of representing thought or embodied ideas. When I speak of media, I do so
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by suggesting it as an art form, any mechanical or technical apparatus that embodies thought. In
other words: is media autonomous, or is it an instrument of mediation? Secondly, is it an object
of disinterest? This study will use medium and media as language belonging to the same mode of
appearance. It is important to understand the correlation between media and medium because this
project discusses the traditional medium of writing, speech, the plastic arts, theatre, graphic arts,
advertising, print, film, and other technological communication devices.
This project will not answer the concerns of media types and definitions conclusively.
Questions of art and aesthetics have persisted throughout history since its beginnings. Rosalind
Krauss spends an exorbitant amount of time and energy in Under Blue Cup, making the case for
media and its restoration to the object of art as a necessity to reestablish certain traditional norms
of what constitutes art. She adamantly denies medium and media as belonging to the same family
and contends that to indicate otherwise is deceptive. Krauss proposes the following regarding the
concatenation of media and medium to support her antithetical position in the conjugation:
“Medium and media are what the French would call “false friends”—French look-alikes for
English words that are strictly not synonymous. Deception is an example; in French it has
nothing to do with trickery or deceit but . . . disappointment” (33). What is important to Krauss is
what she believes is a certain loss and what she refers to as a washing away of the medium in the
advent of post-modernism.
Krauss would have us completely reject the idea of technology as a type of thinking
instrument, an epistemological apparatus that in its very presence performs the subject. Krauss
insists that not only is the medium, not the message—she is taking the phrase “media is the
message” from Marshall McLuhan,104 whose dictum is used by many theorists of media—but
she insists that McLuhan and Kittler are the Cassandras105 of medium. By Krauss identifying
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these theorists as Cassandras, she intends to state that they are not to be believed. She surmises
the following: “With the advent of modernism, this insistence on specific mediums—as the
recursive source of the object’s meaning—became absolute” (35).106 Krauss’s concept of
medium is a return to the modern forms of medium before what she deems the loss of medium in
post-modern and performance art. Krauss only recognizes the medium in modernism that are
traditional in their materiality. As far as she’s concerned, the postmodern ideas of performance
and other non-traditional mediums have exploited these new ideas of medium to make the claim
of creating something new.
Further, that media used in Kittler is a different animal altogether and should not be
compared to that of conventional forms of medium. We may be familiar with Krauss’s position
on some aspects of the absolute in modernism from The Originality of the Avant-Garde and
Other Modernist Myths when speaking of the grid as having “pure relationships” (9) in its
ordering where she again accuses the modernist that in their attempt to create something new,
they created the absolute as obsolete. And here it regards the medium where she continues,
“Absolute then became obsolete . . . for the former, media are modern communications vehicles,
while they are technical storage, translation, and transmission systems for the latter” (Krauss
Under Blue Cup 35). Absolute as obsolete speaks to a type of erasure and failure in these modern
attempts.
Kittler declares in shorthand that media is a form of communication. What is important
here in this brief exegesis of media is to have some idea of how media performs subjectivity. I
am closer to Kittler’s examination of media in performance than Krauss’s denial of the necessary
correlativeness from the terms. I am interested in both the physicality of the mechanical
apparatus in its performance and philosophical and social indicators. I am profoundly in pursuant
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of the media as autonomous in the sense of an evocation, not a mediation of another agency and
not as support, but the thing itself. Whether the medium, media is one of conventional notions of
discourse, dialogues, letters, writing, paint, sculpture, it speaks, it acts, it performs. The
performance is already inherent in the media. One example in Kittler of the media performing
subjectivity is the typewriter's case, which changed the social dynamics of gender roles during
war.107 The women left their homes to take up the positions as typewriters—this is the title of the
individual whose primary work was the typing of documents on the typewriter—when the man
was withdrawn from the workplace in the time of war. This shifted the dynamics and gender
roles at home and in the workplace, which resides today.
Heidegger’s inclusion here states that “the typewriter veils the essence of writing and
script. It withdraws from man the essential rank of the hand, without man’s experiencing this
withdrawal appropriately and recognizing that it has transformed the relation of Being to his
essence” (Kittler 199). Another proposition is the liberation of the woman, who is no longer a
handmaiden to the man, but the machine allowed for a role reversal. In other words, the
typewriter was not just a vacuous apparatus that entered society but a monumental shift, I would
argue, in physiology, psychology, and the social order regarding gender roles.
Media in the Performance of Subjectivity will examine what Butler refers to as
performativity that crafts the subject through time. It seems logical that performing an act is the
very nature of what the representative regime is pursuing in Ranciere’s postulation. The
representative regime’s interest is not located in what is necessarily replicating the actual actions,
but desire, Aristotelean “probability or necessity” (Aristotle Poetics 16).108 I would state that the
desire of the Other is performed. Representation, having no model, created its own and its own
rules (Politics 4) Again, Butler would assert that “in other words, acts, gestures, and desire
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produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this on the surface of the body”
(Gender Troubles 185). There is no real reason for the action that can be traced back to a cause
of the effect or action now regarded as natural. Such are the acts of “fabrications manufactured
and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means” (Gender Troubles 186). Other
than these fabrications, there is no scientifically proven link to the black body as ontological
reality except through “various acts which constitute its reality” (Gender Troubles 186). What is
relevant here is that we may argue all subjectivity as performance, including gender and race.
Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology allows for an exegesis of both art and
technology or art as technology. Heidegger on technology states, “the word stems from the
Greek. Technikon means that which belongs techne . . . One is that techne is the name not only
for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts”
(12-13). So, we see here the link in Heidegger of technology, media and art. Techne belongs to
bringing-forth, to poiesis; it is something poetic” (Question 13). We may come somewhat closer
to understanding the performance of media in Heidegger from the statement, “the essence of
technology is by no means anything technological” (Question 4). And I think that perhaps this is
the postulation of McLuhan’s media as message which draws on whatever agency or vehicle
transporting a certain knowledge moves beyond its mere physical presence and appearance and
speaks to the essence of the thing that bears witness. Heidegger continues, “but we are delivered
over to it in the worse possible way when we regard it as something neutral” (Question 4). There
can be no such neutrality in any matters as it concerns a transport of communicable postulation.
Rather—and this is vital, and to the point of performing subjectivity in my reading of
Heidegger—“the current conception of technology, according to which it is a means and a
human activity, can therefore be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of
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technology” (Question 5). Anthropological is always already ontological. At another place, he
indicates that “technology itself is a contrivance, or, in Latin, an instrumentum” (Question 5). In
the footnote for discussing the full contextual notion of instrumentum, Heidegger asserts,
“instrumentum signifies that which functions to heap or build up or to arrange. Heidegger here
equates it with the noun Einrichtung, translated “contrivance,” which can also mean
arrangement, adjustment, furnishing, or equipment” (Question 5). These statements from
Heidegger of technology and art cannot be said to be one of neutrality or vacuous in their
presencing. Instead, these are critical as instruments in the matter of Being.
Kittler proposes that the specific mechanisms in his study of the gramophone, film, and
the typewriter are indeed extensions of our being, our evolution, or as Nietzsche states of the
typewriter that, “our writing tools are also working on our thoughts” (xxix). This idea has a
familiarity identified in Foucault in his discussion of the docile bodies for state control as an
obsession in the eighteenth century (Discipline & Punish 136). There is no denying what
Heidegger posits. He is making a case for technology as a bringing forth, an unconcealing, a
presencing. He furthers his position by stating that “technology is a way of revealing” (Question
12). Techne as a form of knowledge is paramount for informing and forming. Kittler quotes
Nietzsche as making the conjunction by asking, “Are these humans . . . or perhaps only thinking,
writing, and speaking machines” (17).
Benjamin addresses the aura and essence of a work of art as technological in his essay
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” This essay is essential to this project
as it concerns the black man and media because, in essence, reproduction as performing the
black man is stripped of aura, of originality of essence, and in its place is a convenient
signification vis-à-vis the representative regime of art. The aura in which Benjamin speaks is
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mentioned earlier in Chapter One in Lavater, who is advantaged by the loss for his project
because he is only interested in the mechanization which comes in the loss of the orignary, while
the black man is disadvantaged in the loss of his original self. Whether the representation is that
of blackface on stage or film or Sambo in book form, or other forms of reiteration, the black man
is a myth of the Saussurean model. The Saussurean Model founded by Ferdinand de Saussure
has as its framework the signifier, signified, and sign to connote certain concatenations. The
signifier is the term, the signified, the image, and the sign follow this relationship as unitary in
meaning perpetually. To state that the black man is a myth of this model is simply that the black
man has been conjoined by a false signifier in characterology and no longer needing a
conjunction has become a sign singularly by racist default.
Because aura cannot be replicated in reproduction, according to Benjamin, I argue that
the black man as construction, having been stripped of essence in his characterology, is left as a
mere puppeteering act in the performing of the media in which he is given life. Speaking of newage media and technology in Brainwashed, Tom Burrell notes that the speed in which images
and messages travel is unprecedented in the war of representation, which still rages on. Burrell
states that “Now a click of a mouse, a push of a button, or a finger slide across the screen of a
portable media device defines . . . what’s valuable and what’s worthless” (xiv). The assignment
of value and the inscribed materiality is still in vogue today.
In his essay, “Constituents of a Theory of the Media,” Hans Magnus Enzensberger argues
for media as a socialist agenda in Marxian terms. He calls for a shift in ownership of the
producer and worker of these instruments that he believes have the capability of either corruption
or emancipation. He is convinced that the shift of these instruments of media in the hands of the
workers will produce a substantial political and economic yield. Enzensberger posits that “with
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the development of the electronic media, the industry that shapes consciousness has become the
pacemaker for the social and economic development of societies in the late industrial age”
(Enzensberger). As with so many others in the history of thought, this proposal has much to do
with the exchange of power and not the leveling of emancipation. Enzensberger makes a critical
acknowledgement in support of our argument of media as subjectivity. He states under the
heading “Democratic Manipulation,” that, “Manipulation—etymologically, “handling”—means
technical treatment of a given material with a particular goal in mind. When the technical
intervention is of immediate social relevance, then manipulation is a political act”
(Enzensberger). Enzensberger’s concept is aligned with Ranciere’s aesthetic regime in which he
insists that these manipulations, changes, alterations are political in their actualization. The
aesthetic regime restages history, redistributes the sensible arranged previously in keeping with
hegemonic order to redesignate as acts of democracy. And as Ranciere would claim, this
redistribution is always political.
In Bauldrillard’s essay “Requiem for the Media,” he responds to Enzenberger by stating
that media is not conscious in the sense of usage and is therefore not assigned the task of social
differentiation. Instead, Baudrillard states that “media are neutral technological systems whose
social impact depended upon who uses them to say what; rather, it was “in their form and very
operation” that they inducted social relations. In other words, media are “not coefficients but
effectors of ideology” (Baudriillard). In Kittler, neither of these positions is entirely incorrect.
Media as an instrument is not a personification and therefore is not replete with a will but do in
its very existence, qualify as an object which directs certain alterations, such as a spoon and fork
alters the experience of eating. Further, as stated by Baudrillard, “the medium is the message’
operates a transfer of meaning onto the medium itself qua technological structure” (Baudrillard).
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In this stance as transfer of meaning, neutrality is nil because it is inherently embodied always
already.
Walker’s Eight Possible Beginnings is a critique of what I believe extends this
discussion of media as performing subjectivity (e.g., see fig. 55). In her 16 mm film, she exposes
the power of the media (film) to create in manipulation the setting forth of history in the
arrangement of various scripted narratives. Therefore, the film performs as the instrument in its
compositional structure of sound,
movement, and mirroring human
actions. Enzenberger asserted that
“thus every use of the media
presupposes manipulation…the
question is therefore not whether the
media are manipulated, but who
Figure 55. Kara Walker, 8 Possible Beginnings
film still, 2005.

manipulates them” (Enzenberger). This

view of media aligns with Ranciere’s regimes of art in the restaging of ordered history.
These distortions are no mere accentuation for distortion’s sake but are linked to the soul
in their appearance, as illustrated in this scene from the highly successful 1939 Civil War epic
Gone With the Wind. The black man is shown stereotypically with a gaping mouth and wide
grinning smile (e.g., see fig. 56), which produces a look of befuddlement and imbecility. The
bodies are confined to an inexactness and imperfection of form—the perfection of form and
mathematical accuracy noted in antiquity as beauty and order. The question of the soul is a
prominent theme that runs throughout the history of thought in the West. Fanon’s scathing
indictment of colonialism and the colonized in Black Skin, White Masks asserts: “what is called
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the black soul is a construction by white folk” (xviii). With this postulation, Fanon attempts to
dislodge the historical assignments that delivered the black man to an ill-gotten fate and history as
its progenitor by stating that the black man must beware of not becoming obeisant to the
archetypes. Fanon implied that the accepted projection of the black man of his stereotypical self
becomes the truth in most circles. “His body is black; his tongue is black; his soul must be black
too. The white man practices this logic daily. The black man is the symbol of evil and ugliness”

Figure 56. Film still from Gone with the Wind, 1939.

(Black Skin, White Masks 157). Racism is not genetically inherent but is socially taught and
reiterated through social rituals. Rebecca Peabody calls out these social reiterations as fiction in
the undertaking of a form as “nation-making” (2) in her highly anticipated work on Kara Walker
and the narrative. The discussion of science, technology, and art should not be lost because these
forms are embodied narratives of desire—desire of the Other.
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White Desire and Black Reinvention: Memory and Erasure in Film, Art, and Literature
We now return to the subject of desire which began our discussion of the black man and
emancipation in terms of the transposition of the gaze and Plato’s desire. In Hegelian terms, the
desire of the Other is understood as the recognition that should be borne out from the Other and
is satisfied only in the subjugation of the Other. The themes of desire, memory, and erasure are
part of the tripartite of the invention of the black man in nineteenth and twentieth-century white
America representation. The black man as a recent invention in history was introduced in this
study as having emerged during the zenith of the black slave trade under an enlightened Europe
vis-à-vis science and technology through manifold theories, agencies, forces, and hypotheses in
tandem, validating each other for the propagation of capital and race mastery.
In “Race,” Writing and Difference, edited by Henry Louis Gates, Jr, and Kwame
Anthony Appiah, we discover how certain untruths were established and sanctioned by likeminded scholars as its own authentication. These supposedly superior voices affirmed the other
in succession, birthing legitimization by consensus qua the printed word. Gates indicates the
following:
Hegel, echoing Hume and Kant, claimed that the Africans had no history, because they
had developed no systems of writing and had not mastered the art of writing in European
languages. In judging civilizations, Hegel’s strictures with respect to the absence of
written history presume a crucial role for memory, a collective, cultural memory.
Metaphors of the childlike nature of the slaves, of the masked, puppetlike
personality of the black, all explore the claim about the absence of memory. Mary
Langdon, in her novel Ida May: A Story of Things Actual and Possible (1854), writes that
“they are mere children . . . You seldom hear them say much about anything that’s past if
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they only get enough to eat and drink at the present moment.” Without writing, no
repeatable sign of the workings of reason, of mind, could exist. Without memory or
mind, no history could exist. Without history, no humanity, as defined consistently from
Vico to Hegel, could exist. (11)
This approach by these scholars of denominating black male essence to the ground zero
of Being strips him of cogito that constitutes the human qualifier in Descartes. He is viewed in
the lowest state of human development as sensuous being, fulfilled only by fleshy inordinate
desire in the Hegelian state as non-thinker relegated to his animalistic self, unable to contemplate
the world.109 Not only do these writings posit the black man as sensuous, assigning him to an
animalistic nature, but the use of the terms “childlike” and “puppetlike” further demarcates the
black man as intellectually diminished mindless, save he be directed by a master coordinating his
every move. The black man in these estimations have absolutely no range of Being in the
evolutionary process of becoming, and therefore is destined as determined in his essence. And so
continues the master/slave dialectic. Without the fundamental attributes that define being human,
the black man can never attain competence on the same level as the white man. The inability to
level the black man as equal in his human qualities allows white dominance over and above the
black man as supreme. If these learned men and women did not find in the black man a historical
belonging, it is perhaps because, as Fanon argues, the black man has no history because he is an
invention of white desire.110 The question begs, how is it possible for these intelligent scholars to
rationalize their theory of the black man as ahistorical and therefore not human, when in fact,
they are the proprietors of his condition? Whose memory is in question?
Guy C. McElroy’s Facing History: The Black Image in America Art 1710-1940 asserts
that “Freedom was embodied in literary precisely because the ability to create forms through
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language use was one of the critical mainstays of the Enlightenment and well beyond. To many,
it was the most visible embodiment of reason itself, and if one were “reasonable,” then one’s
humanity could not easily be denied” (xxxi). This statement reiterates the importance of
scholarship during the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment was an intellectual movement in
which articles were written, journals, treatises, manifestos drafted, letters penned, and
presentations of various research topics were common
occurrences. And this intellectual milieu is noted to have
been supported by astute reading societies Gray (xxxiii).
It is in this setting that Lavater’s physiognomic writings
prevailed.
Consequently, literature allowed the black man to
denounce the indictment of ignorance railed against him
by white society and Enlightenment thinkers through
Figure 57. Advertisement for
Cream of Wheat, c. 1901

writing. Louis Henry Gates, Jr.’s Life Upon These Shores:
Looking at African American History 1513-2008, asserts

that literature gave credence to the black scholars that they were the intellectual equals to whites
by demonstrating “their innate abilities and remarkable talent” (42). These black men, even
before it was lawful to write, and when it was punishable by death to teach a slave to read, made
their mark: James Albert Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, Ignatius Sancho, John Marrant, Ottobah
Cugoano, Olaudah Eqiano, Benjamin Banneker, and countless others (Upon These Shores 42).111
Their work was powerful testimonies of their place in the ranks of humanity.
It is of significance that we requalify what is meant by representation, even though we
have already, to a large degree, disclosed its significance in previous pages. In examining the
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black man as representation in multitudinous depictions, we must revisit Ranicere’s theory of the
representative regime, which weighs heavily in America's nineteenth and twentieth-century black
male construction. And it is no small matter that European Enlightenment had high stakes in the
enterprise that fabricated black masculine subjectivity. Therefore, it is for this reason that we
return to Ranciere. If you recall, one of the ways Ranciere frames the representative regime is to
state that it is of “Aristotelian heritage” (Politics 4). In this model, all things necessarily desired
are simply constructed and performed. Again, Ranciere explains the representative model
further.
This is what I evoked earlier concerning the logic of representation, which enters into a
relationship of global analogy with an overall hierarchy of political and social
occupations. The representative primacy of action over characters or of narration over
description, the hierarchy of genres according to the dignity of their subject matter, and
the very primacy of the art of speaking, of speech in actuality, all of these elements figure
into an analogy with a fully hierarchical vision of the community. (Politics 22)
So, Plato is not alone in his acquisition of the community as contrived form. Plato’s
doctrine calls for censorship of art, while Aristotle accepts art as belonging to the community but
in a controlled fashion. Aristotle’s methodology categorizes art into a hierarchical system in
which each genre evokes a certain ethical regard. In the Aristotelian model, art seeks ethical
valuation through the hierarchy of art forms categorically as history painting, portraiture, still
life, and various others. Representation or mimesis is the way in which we see ourselves or are
seen. The representative regime of visibilities dictates how individuals, groups, sects,
organizations are viewed in relationship to the community at large or are marginalized and
obfuscated. Let me restate: black male subjectivity is manufactured in literature, music, film,
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advertisements, magazines, and the plastic arts (e.g., see fig. 57). Because the invention of the
black man through media is so encompassing, I will identify four key forms mentioned in my
introduction, in which the black man is molded, with a focus on film, literature, and the visual
arts. I will touch on music and other representational forms, though annotated, their inclusion

Figures 58-61. The Stump Speaker mechanical bank, Man with wheelbarrow, Golliwog, table lamp.

is necessary and has no lesser value. Gates also contends that “the complex relationship between
race and representation in American art created between 1710 and 1940 can be thought of as an

Figure 62. D.W. Griffith, Film still from The Birth of a Nation, 1915
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society to fabricate a set of images of the African-Americans that objectified her or his status”
(McElroy xxix). Gates further states that the introduction of the black man to white society was
through these optics, these imitations. They emerged in the graphic arts in the form of toys, dolls,
and collectables available to concretize the image of the black man in white society as an object,
a product (e.g., see figs.58-61).
These representations of the black man by white society were intent on showing him as
morally profane. The images explored the black man as demonstrating no sense of right or good,
only evil (e.g., see fig. 62); his propensity for violence reflects no conscience or judgment, and
he was ill-informed regarding beauty, justice, and virtue. The black man was portrayed as a
criminal, a gangster, or a murderer. One of the most provocative films in American cinema
history depicting the black man as a ravenous monster was D.W. Griffith’s 1915, The Birth of a

Figures 63-65. Still of Stepin Fetchit in the 1936 film Dimples, Buckwheat character in Lil Rascals, c. 1936.

Nation. The black man is shown ravaging homes, looting and destroying property, raping white
women, and pillaging throughout. Secondly, he is defined as psychologically inadequate. “The
“public Negro mind,” as the black historian Carter G. Woodson put it, for white Americans was
a thing vacuous and animalistic, subhuman and sterile” (McElroy xxix).
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As psychologically inadequate, the black man is marked as child-like, unable to
communicate on an adult level, stuttering, stammering, fearful, buffoonish, with no memory, and
capable of nothing besides unintelligible discourse (e.g., see figs. 63-65). Thirdly, the black man
is pronounced as politically inept, incapable of discussing or interpreting the law, clueless in the
court of law, unable to discern, judge, read or write legislation (e.g., see figs.66-67). And finally,
the black man is portrayed as ontologically faulty, the missing link of the monkey or ape,
anatomically defective, distorted as it pertains to the canons of beauty, illustrated as possessing
protruding lips, bulging eyes, and other bodily contortions (e.g., see fig.68). This faulty
physiognomy will stand as a testament of the black man as a distortion of nature and a
verification for other pseudo-scientific witnesses. These were easily illustrated in the Sambo
figure. The Enlightenment laid the foundation in the sciences and technology for black
characterology. It would be this period in American history that would sustain this myth through
the arts and letters.
Joseph Boskin in Sambo: The Rise and Demise of an American Jester asserts that
performing the black man is as old as slavery itself. Emerging in seventeen-century Europe and
then migrating to the American colonies, Sambo, considered by Walter Lippman, was the
“perfect stereotype” (4). It was the umbrella signifier for many forms—blackface, minstrelsy,
Jim Crow—and may well have been the first authentic “indigenous American humor character
throughout the culture, transcending region and ethnicity” (Sambo 8). In The Birth of Tragedy,
Nietzsche asserts that “the Greeks knew and felt the terrors and horrors of existence; to live at
all, they had to place in front of these things the resplendent dream-born figures of the
Olympians” (23). What does representational entertainment of any kind do? It replaces life. For
the white race that entertainment that removed existence was found in the performed image of
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Figures 66-67. Still from D.W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation, Cartoon illustrating the black man as politically.
.inadequate.

the black man. Ralph Ellison has a similar reading of the blackface as a mask in which the true
humanness of the black man could be disregarded and “reduced to a sign, and to repress the
white audience’s awareness of its moral identification with its own
acts and with the human ambiguities pushed behind the mask”
(McElroy xxix). And to Paul Lawrence Dunbar, it is the mask that
hides our fears and our tears while we wear the painted face of a
smile. In Images in Black: 150 Years of Black Collectables, Douglas
Condon-Martin asserts that “until the very recent past the image of
black people has been largely cast by white culture. Whether in fine
art, literature, drama, or the graphic arts, that image has been shaped

Figure 68. 1907 postcard
portraying blacks as
monkeys.

and reshaped (e.g., see figs. 69-70) to meet the political, social, economic, and psychological
concerns of the moment” (4). It would be the task of educating these new creatures, as
representing the black man, through acts, not of who they are, but what and who the larger
culture would shape them.
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In Lacan’s essay “The Mirror-Phase as Formative of the Function of the ‘I,’” he cites an
example of both the gonad and the migratory locust as mimicking the acts of like species to
reach their full maturity. What is interesting is that the mimicked animal did not have to be the

Figures 69-70. Top left, photograph of Ernest Hogan, musician. Top, right, musical sheet for Hogan’s All
Coons Like Alike to Me, 1895, Bottom, 1950’s advertisement for Maxwell House.

actual organism itself but could well be represented in a mirror image. Of the locust, he states,
“similarly, in the case of the migratory locust, the transition within a generation from the solitary
to the gregarious form, can be obtained by the exposure of the individual, at a certain stage, to
the exclusively visual action of a similar image, provided it is animated by movements of a style
sufficiently close to the characteristics of the species” (Lacan, Art in Theory 1900-2000 62). And

137
so it was with the various representatives that stood proxy for the black man in blackface, in
advertisements as product; in music as a buffoon; and coon; in film as sexually deviant, and in
the entirety of his characterology created and concretized vis-à-vis the representative regime of
art. The black man transferred this concoction as his subjectivity, for he had no other measuring
rod but slavery (e.g., see fig. 71). All other former positive models
had been abolished or forgotten in the hundreds of years of
captivity.
Sambo as the perfect stereotype was disseminated in
various media forms and was performed incessantly. These
performances, these myths, and tall tales of the black man were,
to a large degree, the only means whereby society became
acquainted with the black man. Fanon states that “when a story
survives in folklore, it expresses in some way a region of the
“local soul” (Black Skin, White Mask 46). The local soul
references the ethos of a community in ideology, belief, likemindedness. The black man is known not in the same social
interactive way in which the white man is known. He is known
through stories, legends, anecdotes which is the becoming of his

Figure 71.
Bert Williams
in blackface, c. 1905.

being. Boskin posits the following to indicate the myriad examples of media performing black
male characterology:
“As the American jester, Sambo was found everywhere . . . in popular culture (e.g., see
figs. 72-74) In journals, weeklies, newspapers, magazines, travel reports, diaries,
brochures, and broadsides . . . novels, short stories, children tales, dime novels, essays,
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pamphlets, and leaflets. Visually, Sambo appeared in posters, on sheet music covers,
postcards . . . electronic media . . . movies, television. On stages, in skits . . . (11)
The list is extensive but not exhaustive here. But certainly, it demonstrates the extent to
which this character was performed and permeated popular culture. Sambo was a household
name, easily identified, recognized, and interpreted as any lasting symbol in popular culture.

Figures 72-74. Banjo figure, Children’s book, Yellow Niggerhair tobacco.
children

This performed character became, over time to appear as “a biological fact” (Boskin 12). Boskin
states this in reference to the child-like aspect of this character, “the entertaining grin was just
one aspect of a large notion, the presumption that Sambo was an overgrown child at heart”
(Boskin 3). But to be sure, he was to be taken as actual. What was seen on stage was understood
as the black man’s true character. Boskin furthers his discourse and proposes that “to make the
black man into an object of laughter, and, conversely, to force him to devise laughter, was to
strip him of masculinity, dignity, and self-possession” (Boskin 14). Again, as we stated, the areas
in which the concentration of imprinting the black man’s characterology—psychologically inept.
Paraphrasing John Blassingame’s argument in The Slave Community, Boskin states that
“a consequence of this action was to make it appear that Sambo was, in effect, the essence of the
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black male” (Boskin 15). According to Nietzsche, in the Ancient Greek Attic plays, the
characters were not thought of as friends or acquaintances. For the effectiveness of the
performance, they were perceived as the actual characters they portrayed (The Birth of Tragedy
37).112 “The history of the Afro-American as Sambo—and Sambo as the national jester bespeaks
the compelling function of imagery” (Boskin 16). These strategic images would prove to be what
is understood as the black man and function as black masculinity. Any revision of such
assumptions was and are hard fought in America. Why were these images lasting emblems in
America? These forms symbolized a black man in his place, in control, and harmless for white
society.
During the nineteenth and twentieth century, many white artists and writers begin to
dignify black representation in art and literature. It is the form in which one is poured into that
dictates your essential selves, as possessing empathy, spirituality, introspection, passion. These
are the attributes of the soul. Works such as Thomas Eakin’s Negress, 1900, though the title may
not indicate, it is a work of astonishing dignity and humanity. This depiction of black beauty
would come a decade before the emergence of the Harlem Renaissance. Horace Bonhan’s 1878
Nearing the Issue at the Cockpit, points at a type of egalitarian perspective in this work where
black and white men are joined together shoulder to shoulder by a love of entertainment, bodies
touching, in the same space before the revocation of this human openness in segregation, Jim
Crow expansion, and other marginalized tactics. Then there is Richard Norris Brooke’s 1881, A
Pastoral Visit, John George Brown’s, the 1880s The Card Trick, Edward Lawson Henry’s, 1888
Kept In, which tell a humanistic story traceable in all men. These works allowed the black man
to see himself in a more human light, as the gaze of the Other was redirected.
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Literature is involved in image-making, as depicted in Williams Styron’s 1967 The
Confession of Nat Turner. Confession has a history of controversy and has been the topic of
contentious debate in the African American community since its release. It was banned in many
African American schools following its critical success. At the beginning of the book, in the
author’s notes, Styron indicates the following, “I have allowed myself the utmost freedom of
imagination in reconstructing this event—yet I trust remaining within the bounds of what meager
enlightenment history has left us about the institution of slavery” (author’s notes). So, Styron
begins his narrative of Turner with the admittance of fabrication. He does so by his own
confession that he has reconstructed the telling. Reconstruction always already belongs to the
category of re-building, re-designing which allows certain liberties in the attainment of a likeness
of an event or personality and can easily lead to falsehood in its retelling. We are privy to
Styron’s true thoughts of Turner through the supposed dialogues with Turner in the purported
confession.
Styron’s novel postulates Turner as morally profane, psychologically inadequate,
politically inept, and ontologically faulty in specificity. Styron constantly reaffirms that Turner
seemingly can no longer make a connection with God, that God has withdrawn himself. This is
important here for several reasons. It is important for Styron that he strip Turner of his faith,
conscience, morality, and goodness and leave him dark, godless, profane, and without hope for
eternal life. In this state, Turner has no freedom in this life nor in the one to come.
Styron depicts Turner as morally profane. From this, it is easy to see him as lawless,
sensuous, criminal in all acts against nature, God, and society. To state time and time again that
Turner was bereft of God is to note that Turner is without a soul. However, Turner, by all
accounts, stood on the testimony that it was God who gave him a vision of what he must do to
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fight for freedom, not just for himself but for others. So, without God or a soul, the reader has the
freedom to form an assumption that Turner is being led by a darker force. Turner supposedly
states, that “it might have been some consolation, at least, had I known the reason why this
power had deserted me; but I was denied even this knowledge, and there seems no way at all to
bridge the gulf between myself and God” (Styron 8).
In the Platonic sense, the black man has no recourse without the soul and has no chance
whatsoever to behold the presence of the pure Forms, which can also be interpreted as God.
Styron intended to paint the black man as the slave he was, the property of the white man, and to
at once decimate the effect of “Nat Turner’s Rebellion,” also known as the “Southampton
Insurrection” and to discredit all those involved as savages, to castrate them. Every page of
Confessions is replete with the stereotypical performances of the black man. Styron’s Turner
states that the black man has no will “or choice against all desire” (Styron 27). This statement
posits the black man as sensuous without reason and purpose. At once, Styron equates the black
man with a fly and states that it is Turner who postulates this by stating that “it seemed rather
that my black shit-eating people were surely like flies, God’s mindless outcast” (Styron 27).
In claiming the voice of Turner, Styron performs in blackface. Blackface is the white man
performing the black man in all his supposed essence. These instances confirm through tales and
pseudo-science the gaze of the white man. Again, presumably, this is Turner speaking of his
friend Hark as to assert, “I realized that it wasn’t the man himself who annoyed me so much as it
was Hark’s manner in his presence—the unspeakable bootlicking Sambo, all giggles and smirks
and oily, sniveling servility” (Styron 55). And at another place, Turner calls him a “glistening
black face” (Styron 55), according to Styron. Simultaneously Hark is described as an “African
chieftain” in the facial constitution, whose eyes betray him with a “dull, malleable docility”
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(Styron 56.) This is Styron’s attempt to discredit both Hark’s present state and that of his former
as belonging to the same ontological reproach by associating Hark and the chieftain as one,
defective and weak.
In William Styron’s Nat Turner, which refutes Styron’s testimony of the confession of
Turner, ten black male writers insist that Styron’s depiction of Turner is not only the rendering of
falsehood but the annihilation of the man of history. Therefore, it is not Turner’s confession but
Styron’s. In John Oliver Killens’ essay “The Confessions of William Styron,” he had this to say
after reading the glowing reviews in the New York Times as the novel reached the status of a
bestseller: “Americans lived this fake illusion of reality because it legitimized all of their myths
and prejudices about the American black man, and further because it cut yet another great
American black man down to the size of a boy” (Styron 34) Killens further reiterates, “Nat
Turner, in the tradition of most black Americans, was a man of tragedy, a giant, but William
Styron has depicted him as a child of pathos” (Styron). One of the things that is not talked about
much is the slave revolts, the resistances, the insurrections lodged against enslavement. This
would surely fly in the face of the white society’s claim of the black man as a non-thinking being
and the lie of his acceptance of his state of a slave as natural.
In stating the fictitious Negro is only allowed a certain range of emotions in which he
performs, either humor or pity, Gates is paraphrasing a comment by Woodson (McElroy xxix).
This limited reach, much like Plato’s prisoners in the cave, creates the black man as flat and
without substance. He remains either the jester or the victim in these positions but never the
master of his fate. Vincent Harding’s writing “You’ve Taken My Nat and Gone,” wrote that
“Styron’s novel . . . [was] an exercise in domestication, assimilation, and finally destruction”
(Styron 25). Finally, Lerone Bennett, Jr., in his “Nat’s Last White Man,” emphatically declares
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that the confession, the images, and the voice of the confession attributed to Turner belong to
William Styron (Styron 4). He further argues that the Nat Turner Styron invented was the
opposite of the Nat Turner of history and “blackness” (Styron 5). He accuses Styron of
deliberately and intentionally, with no regard, stealing the “meaning of a man’s life” (Styron 5).
We see here in these passages the reiteration of performance of the black man, Nat Turner, who
fought for what is right in any man, his freedom. And Styron would inverse his right to fight, and
his decision to die in the face of such resistance—because surely, Turner must have known this
to be the outcome—making him a hero and a powerful example for others. Instead, Styron
castrated him.
So, to pillage the black man’s life which is a double
castration—the life as an African which is no longer, and now
the bare life of the black invention—was executed without any
thought or guilt. It had become an accepted truth that the black
man was inferior, and therefore the black man need not give
permission to be mistreated. “At every point, this education
Figure 75. Wedgwood, Am I Not
a Man and a Brother? Design of
the medallion, 1787.

was built on the belief in white superiority and black
inferiority” (Burrell 11).

The abolitionist movement sought to reverse this racist rhetoric through rigorous
campaigns depicting the black slave as human and promoted as a brother and sister (e.g., see fig.
75). One of the first “pamphlets in North America to argue against slavery” (Upon These Shores
17) was Joseph Sewall’s The Selling of Joseph, 1700, and would represent the larger discourse
on slavery and ethical responsibilities in religious accountability. When one considers so much
resistance for social change from various sectors in society, it is somewhat difficult to imagine
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that there persisted a vigorous, inexhaustible, and tireless fighting machine for the cause of the
abolition of slavery.
Countless nameless people worked indefatigably to end slavery, to convince or pressure
the government to abolish this unholy alliance
of the master/slave. Pamphlets, newspapers,
journals cropped up everywhere: Benjamin
Lundy’s Genius of Universal Emancipation
founded in 1821 “helped organize and
connect scattered antislavery forces, giving
voice to a wide variety of antislavery tactics.
It was also the first antislavery paper to
publish the views of African Americans”
(Upon These Shores 62). The Liberator
emerged in 1831, and then the first African
American newspaper, Freedom’s Journal, had

Figure 76. David Walker’s Appeal, title page, 1830.

its voice heard. And even though it would last only two years, it would plead its own case instead
of the misconception by others. (Upon These Shores 62). Samuel E. Cornish founded in 1829
Rights of All with the closing of Freedom’s Journal. And The Colored American, which is said
to be “one of the most successful and aggressive of the early black newspapers,” began
publication in 1937 (Upon These Shores 63).
David Walker’s 1930 pamphlet titled Appeal (e.g., see fig. 76) spoke out aggressively
against American policy and urged blacks to rise up and fight for their rights. An excerpt: “Now,
I ask you, had you not rather be killed than to be a slave to a tyrant. Who takes the life of your
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mother, wife, and dear little children? Look upon your mother, wife and children, and answer
God Almighty; and believe this, that it is no more harm for you to kill a man, who is trying to
kill you, than it is for you to take a drink of water when thirsty” (Upon These Shores 63). By the
year 1851, there were nearly 30 newspapers operated and voiced by African Americans devoted
to the cause of abolishing slavery (Cairns).
The Reconstruction Era’s estimated dates spanned from 1865-1877 could be viewed in its
bipolarity. On the one hand, there were many strides for the black man politically, “laws passed
during Reconstruction, especially the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, significantly
expanded the scope of American citizenship and extended political rights to millions of black
Americans. In 1868, South Carolina had the first state legislature with a black majority”
(Sigward 4). This period was a time of virulent acts by those who were not interested in change
and extreme opposition from those who desired change. “To those accustomed to absolute
control, even the smallest exercise of personal freedom by a former slave, no matter how
innocently intended, could have an unsettling effect” (Sigward 4). Throughout this era and for
many decades after, white supremacists attempted, through laws, intimidation, and violence, to
reestablish control over the black laboring class in the South, reasserting severe restrictions on
their ability to exercise the rights established through laws listed above (Sigward 36). These
types of actions can only be described as an extension of the Civil War, unsettled. Between the
end of the physical battle in 1963 and beyond, hundreds of Civil War films were created, of
which many glorified the Confederate South and its way of life.
The Reconstruction Era was also identified as the era of the Klu Klux Klan, which was
founded around 1866. Many of the members were ex-confederate soldiers in their desire to
extend the project of the Civil War (Upon These Shores 151). Gates asserts that “what began as a
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relatively harmless social club quickly became intricately involved in the bitter and violent
struggles of the Reconstruction era” (Upon These Shores 151). The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was
created mainly because of the activities of the KKK against citizens in their attempt to
discourage justice and freedom. The legislation is “more commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan
Act” (Upon These Shores 151). The legislative act gave the federal government the right to
prosecute anyone attempting to prevent individuals in pursuit of their rights and freedom by law.
The KKK’s “main goal was to prevent blacks from voting and disrupt Republican political
activity” (Upon These Shores 151) through intimidation and sometimes destruction. The white
Southerners and many Northerners believed that slavery was the only system that allowed for the
control and civilization of an otherwise uncivilized group of people.
In Melvin Stokes’s text, D. W. Griffith The Birth of a Nation, Dixon—Dixon wrote
several novels uplifting white supremacy, including The Clansman, adopted as the film Birth—
believed that African blacks had not built a civilization and that slavery would redeem the black
slave. Dixon asserted that “slavery, however blameworthy in moral terms, had succeeded in
civilizing them to some limited degree. With slavery gone, blacks had swiftly regressed to their
earlier primitive state” (42). The more the black man advanced, the more the white society
pushed back with negative images and fear campaigns, annihilating what progress had been met.
In the Strange Life of Jim Crow is this declaration: “the new Southern system was
regarded as the ‘final settlement,’ the ‘return to sanity’ the ‘permanent system’” (7). Others
stated support of legitimation of separatism. “The Richmond Times in 1900 demanded that a
rigid principle of segregation be ‘applied in every relation of Southern life’ on the ground that
‘God Almighty drew the color line and it cannot be obliterated’” (Burrell 96). The legislation
that allowed legal segregation and the enforcement of Jim Crow laws was Plessy vs. Ferguson of
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1896, with the concept of separate but equal, which was enforced for a half century with all
facets of society divided in the cold war of the races referred to by C. Vann Woodard as “total
war” (9). The lynching and burning of the black body were an American pastime (e.g., see
figs.77-78) and served to signify the black soul as non-existent in this spectacle of

Figure 77. Postcard of the 1920 Duluth, Minnesota lynching.

dehumanization intent on desensitizing the spectator’s perception of the soulless black man
worthy of death. Lynching films were sources of entertainment, and lynching postcards were
produced for mass distribution. In Phillip Dray’s At the Hands of Person’s Unknown: The
Lynching of Black America, he quotes James E. Cutler, lynching as “America’s national crime”
(17). Dray states that lynching was absolutely as American as other rituals such as baseball and
as pleasurable as down-home cooking shared with family and friends. It was appalling and
reprehensible, and the advocate Ida B. Wells reported that thousands of blacks had been lynched
since the Civil War.113 Nonetheless, “men brought their wives and children along to the events,
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posed for commemorative photographs, and purchased souvenirs of the occasion as if they had
been at a company picnic” (Dray 18).
One of the most compelling works in support of the abolitionist movement was the 1852
protest novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin by
Harriet Beecher Stowe. Though much
controversy surrounded it and the rejection
of Stowe’s novel by many critics in the
African American community, it was still
considered to have opened up the
floodgates for reimagining the soul of the
black man. Legend has it that, upon
meeting Stowe, President Abraham
Lincoln commented that she was the little
lady who had started the war. In its
inception and popularity over the course of
Figure 78. The Dogwood Tree postcard, Texas, 1908.

fifty years or so, Uncle helped to create the
“master narrative that had succeeded in demonizing the white South and privileging the
sufferings of black slaves” (Stokes 37). Dixon wrote the novel that he believed was antithetical
to Beecher’s. The title was The Leopard’s Spots: A Romance of the White Man’s Burden. But it
would be the novel The Clansman adapted as film and retitled as The Birth of a Nation that
would rekindle the white supremacist organization, the Klu Klux Klan, and set in place the racist
agenda for generations to come.
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The film’s cinematographic success in Birth and the theme of white supremacy secured it
a place in film history and top billing in racist propaganda. Woodrow Wilson, the President

Figure 79-82. Upper left, sheet music cover for The Perfect Song-The Love Strain from D.W. Griffith’s 1915
film The Birth of a Nation. Images from Birth depicting slaves from African, dancing to entertain the white
owners and guests, and the KKK in the act of lynching the blackface performing the black man.

of the United States and a personal friend of Dixon’s would state that it was like writing with
lightning, and he premiered the film at the White House. The stereotypes of the black man were
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burned into the consciousness of white society as frame after frame performed the black man
(e.g., see figs.79-82). Griffith had successfully transferred the desire of Dixon for
“a master narrative of Southern history and race that would challenge and replace that associated
with Harriet Beecher’s Stowe’s novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin” (Stokes 54).
When Ranciere posited in The Future of the Image that “The history of cinema is the
history of a power of making history” (55), he is on some level affirming McLuhan’s medium as
message. Because every medium reflects and signifies in its activation a certain outcome and
image-making. As for understanding cinema as a power, not the power may indicate that
Ranciere refers to the medium itself as a power center or apparatus. He correlates what he
references as sentence images located in The Future of the Image (45). This methodology
involves the cut and paste connection that makes an otherwise disconnection to connect.
Foucault discusses something similar in his section on representing entities that had no
relationship and were worlds apart in the ability to signify except through a type of construction
belonging to language.
The example used in Foucault’s The Order of Things is the umbrella and sewing machine
on an operating table in which Ranciere adopts for his discussion. These proximities Foucault
states would be found only on the page of alphabetical or syntactical arrangements and nothing
more (xvi). And in Ranciere, “it is the black and white cinema that project on to the image of the
ghetto the power of history that it derives from great German cameramen like Karl Freund who .
. . invented in advance the lightning effects of Nuremberg” (Future 54). In other words, it is not
so much what is coupled but what is stated of its correlation. Film’s effect of the clash, the
fragmentation is dialectic in that while it creates the “absolute reality of desires and dreams”
(Future 56) it exposes the other world of hegemonic power. Or another way of stating this is:
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“the spectacle within the spectacle will force the hypocrite into the open” (Ranciere Film Fables
34).
The response of the African American community to the derogatory images of the black
man in society was imperative for a reversal of social marginalization and stigmatization. These
depictions were not benign as they purported the black man as non-being, as criminal, which
caused greater tension and warring between races as riots persisted and race relations worsened.
African Americans were projecting their own voices, securing their own representation long
before the birth of the Harlem Renaissance. Gates posited in his essay in McElroy’s Facing
History that “precisely because American visual art forms were so concerned with depicting
blacks as devoid of reason, some of the greatest nineteenth-century figures . . . metaphorically
wrote themselves to freedom . . .” (xxxi). In the newspaper, The Colored American, the
following excerpt from the prospectus to announce Volume II in 1841, declared “This is the only
paper in the United States, published and edited by a colored man, and expressly for the colored
people. Its objects are, more directly, the moral, social, and political elevation . . . of the free
colored people; and the peaceful emancipation of the enslaved” (Penn 38). Elsewhere he stated
that he was a man; however, the term was qualified and interested in the shared humanity, which
the paper intended to address (Penn 38).
Race films of the early 20th century attempted to change the perceptions of blacks.
Surprisingly, as early as 1918, The Birth of a Race was lost to history, having been created solely
as a direct response to D.W. Griffth’s 1915 Birth. And, although it failed both at the box office
and critically, it addressed many successes of the African Americans and was meant to discredit
the racist propaganda of Griffith’s film. During this most pivotal period, the film would be mute
for almost six decades and would not resurface until the 1980s. Curiously, a 2016 film, The Birth
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of a Nation, depicting Nat Turner’s life and revolt, had a shadow cast over it after the director
Nat Parker and co-writer Jean McGianni Celestin’s real life rape accusation during their college
days came to haunt them. This report surfaced in the glaring spotlight of an Oscar nomination.
According to Geltzer in Race Films: 50 Years of Independent African-American Cinema,
the rise of race films emerged as an alternative to Hollywood-produced films, which generally
featured blacks as servants and other subjugated
roles. “Mostly overlooked, the work of black
filmmakers also saw a Golden Age [of the film]
during the 1920s. Around the country, race film
producers made movies aimed at empowering
their audiences, offering positive images of
successful and upwardly mobile black heroes”
(29). This was the Jazz Age and the era of the
New Negro, a coming of age of the Negro. Black
films were made available in the African
American neighborhoods for black entertainment.
Figure 83. Tanner, The Banjo Lesson, 1893.

As with the Black press, the African Americans

wanted to cast their own images, tell their own stories. This period lasted two decades after the
silent film period but could not be sustained in the transition to sound because of the expense of
this new technology.
Emerging from nineteenth and twentieth-century representation would be images of
strong, resilient black men reversing their pronouncement as savages, dumb animals, child-like,
bereft of all humanness. The minstrel blackface of the entertainer for white society would be
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replaced with the spiritual contemplation of the dignity of song and a rhythm that endowed the
black man with a soul as can be potentially derived from Henry Tanner’s 1893 The Banjo Lesson
(e.g., see fig. 83). Du Bois stated in Souls that what has happened in history is that African
American heroes made their appearance
fleetingly then disappeared “before the
world has rightly gauged their
brightness” (3). Though challenged by
white society, the heroic representation
had more permanency, a duration. The
Figure 84. Marcus Garvey in Harlem, 1922.

silent movement, the Great Migration,

would be understood by many scholars as the impetus to the astounding era of the New Negro.
Organic in nature, the migration was a protest of the daunting racial stifling of the Southern rope
and absence of hope. Isabel Wilkerson noted that “over the course of six decades, some six
million black southerners left the land of
their forefathers and fanned out across the
country for an uncertain existence in
nearly every other corner of America” (9).
Many of these black souls would populate
Harlem.

Figure 85. Archibald Motley, Blues, 1929.

The Harlem Renaissance or the New Negro movement, like other significant movements,
was political. The redistribution of the sensible is evident from the Great Migration to the black
real estate moguls buying up Harlem and moving the blacks in and the whites out, to Marcus
Garvey’s Back to Africa project (e.g., see fig. 84); to Locke’s essay “The Talented Tenth.” All of
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this, from the music of jazz to the Cotton Club and images of Van Der Zee and Carl Van
Vechten of the life and upward mobility of middle-class blacks. Archibald Motley’s Blues (e.g.,
see figure 85) highlighted the shift from the cotton fields and plantation entertainment to that
reminiscent of individual freedom and
leisure now enjoyed by blacks
previously available to whites (e.g., see
figure 86). The politics of nationalism,
socialism, and communism were
adopted by many along with various
modes of religious freedom.
Figure 86. Renoir, Moulin de la galette, 1876.

These images of black America

were not without political and social protestation and demands of being moved from the
marginalized place of the Other. The Harlem Renaissance, The Black Power Movement and the
Black Arts Movement, as well as the Civil Rights Movement, supplanted the black
characterology of the black man performed in previous eras. These artists sought a place of pride
in their African heritage and their present state of being. It was evident in poetry, music,
literature, and the visual arts.
The slave work songs which had a certain rhythm to keep the body apt for meeting the
demands of the fields and the control of the master were replaced with the jubilation of Louis
Armstrong or Dizzy Gillespie’s trumpet, Duke Ellington, Count Bassie’s piano, Charlie Parker’s
saxophone, that created sounds which liberated the body and the soul simultaneously. The
somber negro spirituals stemming from the hopelessness of the slave’s lot and a golden day of
redemption shifted to the expression of freedom from the toil of labor and monotony of the fields
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with Billie Holiday and Bessie Smith. Music was important in Plato’s republic as a tool to
facilitate the functioning of the community. Plato approved monophonic instruments. The Black
man’s physiognomy was redrawn by his acts of intelligence and his mode of freedom.
In Burrell’s Brainwashed: Challenging the Myth of Black Inferiority, he proclaims the
idea of resilience when stating that the black race has survived “terror, humiliation, vilification,
and deprivation” (ix). We are still here, not just barely existing,
but “constantly rebirthing American art and cultural” (Burrell
ix). Some question the Harlem Renaissance as an era of rebirth.
What is this rebirth? My answer is simple, the black man is
being rebirthed out of the invention of the black male through
history’s undertaking in dominant social institutions and
Figure 87. Charles White
Native Son #2, 1942.

birthed into a new subjectivity of his own making.
In the Harlem Renaissance, there was the rise of the

intellectual black man of poetry and letters. “The new
man, who worked and lived increasingly in the cities,
voted, perhaps had served and fought in the war, was
known as the New Negro, and belonged to a
movement that had its most vivid expression in the
artistry of the Harlem Renaissance” (Dray 299). This
new man would not only be portrayed in letters and

Figure 88. William Johnson
Going to Church, 1940.

writings but in images of the collective progressive community showcasing a breadth and depth
of character and range of people who had shed their former selves and put on a new identity in
the New Negro. And “art, the essence of the civilized man, would be the final proof that the New
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Negro not only had something positive to contribute to American life but had, indeed, ascended
to new cultural heights” (Dray 16). The images tell the story of dignity, spirituality, of
community. James Van Der Zee would showcase the many black organizations in upward

Figure 89. Memphis Sanitation Strike, 1968.

Figure 90. Malcolm X delivering a
speech on Lenox Avenue, NY, 1960’s.

mobility. The visual artists illustrated the black nation rising as victors among loss and
exploitation.
And though support was limited by white society,114 black folk would not be silenced and
were heard in the continued legacy of writing. Periodicals such as The Crisis, The Opportunity,
Fire were just a few avenues of telling their story, creating their narratives, and rewriting their
history. Whether short-lived or a more lasting monument, these publications were a way in
which the New Negro would demonstrate worthiness as human beings. It was impossible not to
recognize the black man as human with so much proof of life (e.g., see fig. 87-88). Decades of
Jim Crow laws and segregation would cause the rallying cry of the Civil Rights Movement. This
was a nation at war, divided by the color line incessantly. There would be no recognition or
yielding but a palpable resistance to death.
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The Civil Rights Movement would yield Martin Luther King, Jr, as well as Garvey,
Malcolm X, the Black Panthers (e.g., see fig. 89-91), and the demands in the intelligible
language of a black man whose becoming was a result of the admixture of the fire of racism. The
Ten-Point Program, The Letter from a Birmingham Jail, the speeches, the marches, the sit-ins
were demonstrations of a collective attempt for
freedom. These acts of protest by strong black figures
were monitored and policed by the highest order of
hegemonic power, the FBI, CIA, and the National
Guard. This set off a warning to society by authorities
Figure 91. Black Panthers protest outside
California's Capitol building against a
gun control law aimed at them.

that these men should not be seen as heroic in their
stance but perverse and a danger to a peaceful nation.

Many acts of racial profiling resulted in death by the hate and venom of a society bent on
destroying the black man and executing his progeny.
The Black Power movement carried a singular code that the black man no longer
languished under the weight of being black. The black man would declare as James Brown did in
his song, Say it Loud, I’m Black, and I’m Proud. This is not what the white man wanted. He
preferred the sniveling, slithering, bowing black man whose dialect reflected his subjugation to
the so-called superior race. But this would not be the case. Black men had died on the cross in
order for others to be resurrected. The Black Panther organization was one of the radical voices
of the black community bent on justice. Donned in black berets and black leather jackets, they
took to the street and demanded that they be heard and be afforded fair treatment according to
the law. In discussing image and marketing, Burrell stated that it would take more than these
political power images of the black race to change the landscape of our country (xiv).

158
I state instead that it will take just these insurmountable numbers, for images have
informed our constructed worlds. Fanon insists that it is about transforming the world. The
forming of worlds has always been the project of art. Paul Virilio posits that “if we remove the
image, not only Christ but the whole universe disappears” (17). This statement proposes as
Nietzsche that Christian theological assumptions inform the world as visibility. Understanding
how images shape our world is the first step in emancipation. It is our perception. We should not
sell these images short as Ranciere contends monuments, vibrations of revolution are the things
of politics. And the Panthers, black, bold, courageous,
beautiful, were feared in their liberated form. And as such,
so began the campaign to destroy these young soldiers.
Scattered they were, cut down in their youth, and all
that remained were their sighting.
Blacks have had to deal with the many misrecognitions throughout the ages of blackface and minstrelsy
Figure 92. Film Poster
for Superfly 2018

as legions of films produced throughout the United States,

sponsored and directed not only by whites but also by black Americans who found an
opportunity to ride the wave of black popularity. While others languish in the lie of history. In
Black Like You, Strausbaugh indicated that “the greatest Black minstrel of them all, Bert
Williams, sang his share of coon songs, enjoying a long career in minstrelsy and vaudeville, on
Broadway and in silent films” (135).
In order to retain even a semblance of the way of life that white America had become
accustomed to, there had to be an agreement on all levels that the black male inferiority. This
war of black male representation would ensue and is present to this day. A prime example of this
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is the release of the derogatory pronouncement of the black man as a destroyer of his own
community in the re-release of the Blaxploitation film Superfly (e.g., see fig. 92). Ron O’Neal’s
character as the original pimp in the 70’s film possesses fine cars, exploits women, deals drugs in
his own community, and suffers from greed and narcissism. The new version of the film is
stylish, mod, urban, hip-hop, but sows the same seeds of death and destruction and paints the
black man as amoral, with no ethical accountability for his community and no spiritual grasp of
the soul. The film would come on the heels
of the critically acclaimed and
intellectually interrogating 2018 film Black
Panther (e.g., see fig. 93). What is
disturbing in the new version of Superfly is
that the white man is targeting our young
men, and depending on the popularity of
Figure 93. Film still from Black Panther, 2018.

these accruements, none of which counts
for emancipation, only capitalization. It is the same bandwagon the film production industries
boarded in the seventies. It is never about the soul for the corporate industry, just capital. As for
the forms into which the black man was emptied, let us speak to these.
While Black Panther was critiqued for its revolutionary tenor, Superfly glorified power
and greed. Black Panther raised the elevation of expectation for our boys and young men to
believe in themselves and the possibilities in a type of visibility that restored the dream of
potential, whereas Superfly pandered to the lie of the ghetto narrative and “coming up” at any
cost. We don’t understand the power of images fully. Snoop Dogg and Martha Stewart welded
together meant more than an advertisement for their show.115 It is a symbol. This link
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symbolized two things at the fundamental level: their collective greed and the domestication of
the revolution of Hip Hop. Hip Hop has become, unfortunately in many respects, a minstrel show
of blackface entertainment for the white folk even though it began as a revolution of critical
social and political relevance. Art in any form is political, and politics become art.
The Emancipation Approximation: Mass Incarceration as the New Slavery
The 2015 New York Times carried a disturbing headline, “1.5 Million Black Men,
Missing from Daily Life.” The article revealed what had been obvious for a while in America,
that blacks were being eliminated from society at an alarming rate. I’m no mathematician, but
the numbers are more staggering than those reported over the centuries of black slavery. The
count for the slaves is 12.4, according to Marcus Rediker’s text The Slave Ship. These black men
were taken, not in secret by some clandestine operation, but in the open by a blind system of
justice whose uneven scales mark the fate of America’s black sons. Alexander’s The New Jim
Crow outlines a harrowing nightmare of the system that has populated the prisons in mass
incarceration of the black male bodies. She refers to it as the new Jim Crow because of the
disparity that divides justice by racial lines. I do not argue against this analysis but only add to
the voices of many who argue mass incarceration as the new slavery. I do so because it is the
penultimate distribution of the sensible, which Ranciere has noted as dividing up the world and
counting.
I would like to discuss here what was previously mentioned in the introduction of the new
slavery in the form of mass incarceration in what I refer to as the triangulation of corruption in
the tripartite system of the educational, justice, and the prison systems which entrap and, on a
more quantitative scale, map the movement of the black men in America. It is impossible for any
one of the three to be eliminated or replaced with some other apparatus, for they are in sync with
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one another in the educating, policing, and imprisonment of our black men in America. What is
disturbing is the singular power that each of these entities has in either creating positive change
and outcome or perverting the system in the furthering of power.
The New York Times article reported the age range of 24-54 for the missing men. This
age range is the prime age for these men to participate in family life, politics, and community
building. Instead, by all accounts, they have been represented as criminals, tagged, branded, and
their use value directed towards the hegemonic state to do as they will, the new masters and the
prisons, the new plantations, the big house. Justin Wolfers et al. noted in the article:
In New York, almost 120,000 black men between the ages of 25 and 54 are missing from
everyday life. In Chicago, 45,000 are, and more than 30,000 are missing in Philadelphia.
Across the South — from North Charleston, S.C., through Georgia, Alabama, and
Mississippi and up into Ferguson, Mo. — hundreds of thousands more are missing. They
are missing, largely because of early deaths or because they are behind bars . . . Perhaps
the starkest description of the situation is this: More than one out of every six black men
who today should be between 25 and 54 years old have disappeared from daily life.
(Wolfers)
The numbers are staggering and unimaginable that such an undertaking is being
systematically rendered right before us, with the name of justice or law and order. The problem
is that the same document of freedom, The Emancipation Proclamation, in its construction gave
way to the re-enslavement of the black man in perpetuity through the criminality clause. The
black man has been meticulously crafted and identified as “criminal” and casted as a super
predator on a national forum.116 We can easily cite cases where the black man was identified as
the perpetrator and tracked down like an animal, when in fact, it was the white accuser
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themselves that had committed the crime. Can you identify who the perpetrator was? The answer
comes back time and time again, the black man: Susan Smith of South Carolina, in 1994,
accused the black man of hijacking her car and taking her children, who killed her own children.
It was Charles Stuart of Boston in 1989 who accused a black man of hijacking him and his wife
and robbing them and murdering his pregnant wife. When it was, he alone, with the attending
brother who later took his own life for the overwhelming guilt he lived with. And the list is
extensive and perpetual.117
The original handwritten document, The Emancipation Proclamation of September 22,
1862, penned by Lincoln and issued by presidential executive order to be carried out on January
1, 1863, is housed in the National Archives in Washington, DC. Thousands stood in long lines
for hours at this national monument to commemorate the document’s 130th anniversary to behold
what John Franklin Hope regards as a “great American document of freedom” (x).118 There is no
doubt that it seemed important and was critical as a document that, for all intents and purpose,
sought to bring together two very strenuous and opposing issues in pursuit of a resolution: that of
slavery and the saving of the Union. In this necessity to save the Union, Lincoln would embark
upon the idea of delivering the slaves from their assigned places in America. Although he was
not opposed to slavery, he was unsure whether he had the right to impose his convictions in an
official capacity. Lincoln also questioned how the Negro would survive and whether
colonization was a solution to the problem. He proposed his viewpoint emphatically in response
to Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune after Greely had openly reproached Lincoln
in an editorial in 1862 entitled, “The Prayer of Twenty Million” (Hope 24). Lincoln’s position:
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union and is not either to save or to
destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I
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could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some
and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored
race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear because I do not
believe it would help save the Union…I have here stated my purpose according to my
view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that
all men every where could be free. (Hope 25)
So, we see here not so much as what counts for justice but convenience and a type of
psychoanalytic slip119 which reveals the true nature of this rendering. Lincoln appears to be
seeking a way in which he can satisfy both ends, the freeing of the slaves as a political move to
appease the ever pressure from abolitionists and his own cabinet, and at once secure what he may
fear, that of letting loose a creature, a possible monster, an “uncivilized being” into what he
deems a civilized society. And so, the criminality clause is birthed. To read it any different may
be to insinuate that this document not only freed the slaves but admitted to the wrongdoings of
the white masters in the despot reach of God as judge and juror. It seems reasonable to assert that
the white man has believed his own lie and projected his own desire on the black man while
throughout these centuries have maimed, killed, and destroyed in kind. So, it appears that the
ideology of freed black men has never been the intention, rather a dehumanization of being, “a
superior ape in order to justify the colonist’s treatment of them as beasts of burden” (Fanon
Wretched of the Earth l).
I suggest that Walker’s 2000 series Emancipation Approximation is a serious indictment
against the failure of the legislative document of 1864—a presidential proclamation that
symbolically freed the black slaves is understood as underwriting mass incarceration. And
though Walker’s intentions address the entirety of the black slaves and the atrocities associated
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with slavery and a failed government, the weight of the faulty legislation falls on the black man.
I am particularly drawn to her images in this series of the legend of Leda and the Swan (e.g., see
fig. 94) of a Greek mythological tale of deception and rape by the powerful despot, Zeus. A
vicissitude of interpretations, whether visual or literary in circulation of Leda and the Swan
illustrate this act as a thing of beauty instead of exposing it for what it was, a violation, as is the
Proclamation at once a double act of
seduction and betrayal.
Yeats’ poem bearing the same title of the
myth chose not to romanticize the act or treat
it as a loving act but places the power and
the deception of Zeus as evil instead of
beautiful. Yeats understood this to be not
about love but violent molestation, a rape.
Evan Puschak’s analysis of the poem
indicates that the very structure in which
Yeats writes is a reiteration of such violence
Figure 94. Kara Walker
The Emancipation Approximation, 1999.

in the brokenness of form, intentionally

fragmented stanzas.120 He states that violence and rape are evident in lines such as “a sudden
blow: the great wings beating still” (Yeats, line 1), and “how can those terrified vague fingers
push/the feathered glory from her loosening thighs” (Yeats, lines 5-6). But the line, “did she put
on his knowledge with his power” (Yeats, line 14) is its most revealing. This power forced upon
Leda was only consumed in its dark intent not for its full vestige of knowledge, rather an
extraction, not an addition. Consequently, what does this mean as it pertains to Walker’s use of
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Leda and the Swan? What else except the citing of the Emancipation Proclamation as
molestation, violation, rape even. It is difficult to recognize rape when it is subtle, commonplace,
even when it is occurring right before your eyes.
In the educational system, which marks the first leg of the triangulation of corruption, our
young black males are sifted out according to class, rank, and file, identified as early as Pre-K
and marked, hand-picked by teachers, principals, counselors, and even hall monitors. These
naming of attention-deficient disorders, special education imprinted on them branded as retarded,
useless. But education as the first leg of any system should not be surprising. Plato created the
template for secondary education that is used presently in our society. The Republic is the
blueprint on the models of education according to the ordered classifications. An interesting
statement caught my attention in The History of Western Education by William Boyd that stated
in no uncertain terms that education could no longer be considered just a personal avocation or
desire. “It is also a business of politics and economics. Education is now a social service—
socially secured, state-guaranteed, professionally provided, and responsibly accepted” (451).
Acknowledging that education is a business but at once should be a responsible act is somewhat
paradoxical and does not coincide with the scenario of inclusion. Mandates such as No Child
Left Behind and educational voucher programs are all attempts to right the wrong of the
indifference of the educational system. Instead, these have irrevocably elevated the academic
elitism and widened the chasm.
This enterprise involves corporate and political organizations that plan and implement
laws guaranteeing the system’s longevity. We need only turn to Ava Duvernay’s 2016
documentary 13th to understand these conventions of accounting, these auctioning and
bargaining of black lives where she clearly defines the role of the state and corporate giants in
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the perpetuation of mass incarceration that has no intentions of rescinding. Do Black Lives
Matter? You tell me, those of you who sit in your chambers of authority both black and white?
You tell me, those who trade elitism and success for the lives of the poor and the tragic black
male who are caught up in the stranglehold of a system that you are partaking of every day,
knowing full well that it is evil. The Central Park Five121 is a prime example of a system that
runs without a soul offering no apology worth repeating.
A major initiative has emerged over the last few years to take up the cause of our black
sons in their adolescent years. The school-to-prison pipeline or pre-k-to-prison pipeline and other
derivatives is an initiative to educate parents and supporters of justice to the educational system
as part of the state apparatus. These various entities are subsets of a greater system which is the
state. Black males are targeted at an age when they are most defenseless. And who will defend
them? They are the generation coming after their fathers who, in many instances, are
permanently secured in the last order, the prison system, the new Antebellum South. These
prisons are everywhere, and every corporation is partaking of the pillaging of the villages.
Jeffrey Toobin, in his article “The Milwaukee Experiment,” reveals that President Barack Obama
stated, “if we are serious about solving this problem, then we’re going to make sure that we’re
reforming our criminal-justice system, so it’s not just a pipeline from schools to prisons”
(Toobin). The rebellious, the defiant, not just the slow learner, and the isolated are the target of
this audacious enterprise. Those deemed a problem to the hegemonic order, just as Foucault
reported of the asylums in the days following the lepers, are the targeted victims of society. In
Madness & Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, he notes, “as the madman
had replaced the leper, the mentally ill person was now a subhuman and beastly scapegoat” (vii).
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And now the prison with black men as state property, numbered and branded, available to be
farmed out.
But these black bodies must first be marked as a problem, inscribed, and imprinted by the
larger society. Foucauldian in nature, these inscriptions belong to the theory of docile bodies as a
“political anatomy” (Discipline & Punish 136). The political anatomy, having been for the most
part in Foucault fashioned to move and to perform as necessary in all things without even
knowing that these movements are not our movements but are part of a systemic programmatic.
One of the ways in which power is dispersed is in the acts of exposure and resistance by
inverting the way in which the narrative is recounted as power. Therefore, the work of Walker is
so critical to this project. She has refused the traditional narrative of slavery and opts for the
exposure of the trauma of the American psyche that exists in all of us. We are all victims of this
infestation of race.
In Agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, he furthers the discourse of
absolute power in the ordering of bodies, invoking Foucault by stating that “according to
Foucault, a society’s threshold of biological modernity is situated at the point at which the
species and the individual as a simple living body become what is at stake in a society’s political
strategies” (3). The turn towards the citizen’s health and wellbeing moves the state into the
biological life of the citizen. He further reiterates Foucault as to state, “what follows is a kind of
bestialization of man . . . at once it becomes possible both to protect life and to authorize a
holocaust” (Agamben Homo 3). Is the monstrosity visible, not of the black man, but the system
that created him? This program of state manipulation in this new order in the human sciences
was one in which “the human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it
down and rearranges it. A ‘political anatomy,’ which was also a ‘mechanics of power’” . . .
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(Foucault Discipline 138). Power over the body allows for an ordering of not only what is
desired but how it is desired as it relates to speeds and trajectories. The invention of this new
political body was created from a combination of methodologies and was “at work in secondary
education at a very early date, later in primary schools” (Foucault Discipline 138). All of this is
in the name of capitalism and its success, in which all must be sacrificed (Agamben Homo 3).
So, these are the young rebels who refuse to line up against the wall, write in the lines or
color in the prescribed areas, or they just belong to the right zip code on the wrong side of town.
In a sense, they are snuffed out before they are born. Policing the Black Man, edited by Angela
Davis, in the section, “Black Boys Are Disproportionately Arrested and Detained,” notes that
“black boys are more likely to be referred to the juvenile justice system than any other children.
In 2011 . . . 903 black boys per 100,000 were sent to detention as compared to 125 black girls. A
Rhode Island study found that black boys were 9.3 times more likely to spend time in juvenile
detention than white boys” (xiv). This first leg of education must be successful. The planting of
the seed of death begins with a faulty and biased educational system. As Plato noted in Republic,
Book 2, when discussing educating the guardians of the city, “Now, you know, don’t you, that
the beginning of any job is of greatest importance, especially when we are dealing with anything
young and tender. For that is when it is especially malleable, and best takes on whatever pattern
one wishes to impress on it” (57).
Research conducted by Yale professor Walter Gilliam showed a disturbing pattern in the
classroom, detected time and time again, in which the black male is or becomes a problem. This
is the beginning of the policing of the black man.
“Black bodies are policed in the streets and in the classroom . . . [Research] demonstrates
that black boys are viewed as four and five years older than they are. Research
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demonstrates that racial disparities in school discipline exist in the most subjective of
categories – “willful defiance”, “insubordination”, “disrespect”. Those racial disparities
decrease significantly for the most objective of categories: possession of alcohol on
campus, possession of drugs with intent to distribute, possession of a loaded weapon.
(Young)
One of Ranciere’s fundamental positions regarding emancipation is understanding its
relationship to politics, which he terms as policing. This is no longer the politics of traditional
etymology, a place and space for the community to be heard. The original meaning is critical to
our survey of the distribution of the sensible that is now evident in the perversion of politics to
protect citizenry as part of a larger discourse and community to that of dividing a community
into camps. Policing is one of the main tenets of this system found in the second leg of the
triangulation of corruption. In the meantime, it starts here structurally in its nascent form.
An article in the New York Times, July 14, 2014, reads, “My Son Has Been Suspended
Five Times. He’s 3”. What type of action could warrant the expulsion of a three-year-old from
the community at large? The essay was written by Tunette Powell, the mother of the child.
Rebecca Klein’s responds with a terse headline “The School-To-Prison Pipeline Can Start Even
Before Kindergarten, Mother Points Out.” In responding to the Powell’s essay, Klein quotes
Powell in stating that: “The problem is not that we have a bunch of racist teachers and
administrators. I believe most educators want to help all children. But many aren’t aware of the
biases and prejudices that they, like all of us, harbor, and our current system offers very little
diversity training to preschool staff” (Young).
It is not only the “biases and prejudices” that we all harbor, and we do harbor them. The
bigger issue is that teachers, principals, and other lenders of knowledge do not necessarily know
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that they are involved in a system that runs by itself and that they, too, are just machines to a
greater cause of capital. They, too, are detached from the connective thread of the humanness of
the Other. They have become complex machines of numbers, data, congruences, tests, deadlines,
and reports. Their movements are movements of their occupation, clocking in and out, stamping
time, marking tasks, etc. This state of affairs is a sad indictment of what we call humanity. Now,
as an already Other, the black male is caught up in the fury of injustice and the unfairness of a
socially dysfunctional order. Tanke, following Ranciere, calls this “counting” (48). Counting is
posited as the core of what makes for the distribution of the sensible.122
[In a]2005 report from Walter S. Gilliam, a professor of psychology at Yale University
and the director of the school’s Edward Zigler Center in Child Development and Social
Policy, [Gilliam] looked at preschool expulsions and found that black students were more
often subjected to the harshest punishments. He found that black preschool students
attending state-funded programs were more than five times more likely to be expelled
than Asian-American children and two times as likely to be expelled than white and
Latino children. (Young)
The state-funded schools are mere apparatuses of the State Ideal. Louis Althusser
includes the schools in the aggregate of agencies that keep the state alive.123 So, it should not
come as a surprise when I state that the schools are the breeding grounds that perpetuate the walk
towards the prison gates and the state apparatus that prepares the death march. A system in place
has become ingrained as it relates to keeping some order in the schools with the threat of
punishment. Your deviation from the norm of the community is being called out by the
community, at least those invited as participants in it. The black male is under constant
surveillance.
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How is the justice system involved in this entangled systemic disorder of the black man?
There is much documentation on racial profiling, legislation such as stop and frisk, the racial
disparity of sentences handed down for the same offenses for whites and blacks, and the inherent
racial structure in which the courts, police department, judges, juries are made up. It is no
wonder if there is a single black man left in society. Research conducted in 2014 showed that
black males are regarded as a greater threat to society as early as age ten while their white
counterparts are still considered innocent (American). In her discussion of French sociologist
Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic violence, Christa Buschendorf states, “being soft and
inconspicuous, this type of symbolic force is an apt means to naturalize the social order and thus
sustain its inherent inequalities” (West Black Prophetic Fire 7). The black child is already
socialized to this impending doom, as demonstrated by Bourdieu of James Baldwin’s writing in
Fire Next Time, in which the parents, in an attempt to prepare the black child for the white world
do so by transferring violence that is symbolic in nature but nevertheless real of an anticipatory
crossing into the realm of white authority and its repercussions. applying a type of violence of
their own making.124
The second leg of this system which involves the criminal justice system is well
documented in Alexander’s The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Color
Blindness, where she makes a case for the atrocities of the American judicial system that
is set up purposefully to make out of the black man a criminal. I will argue that this is part of the
triangulation of corruption in our police, lawyers, judges, court clerks, priests of the judicial
system, the new proprietors, and guarantors of the system. In an interview for the article by
Toobin, the District Attorney in Milwaukee County, John Chisholm claims that he is interested
in reducing the number of persons sent to prison. He instituted a program of early intervention
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specifically targeting low-level drug crimes. He is convinced that the prosecutor has a large stake
in mass incarceration because they have the range of the law to which they can adhere. Most of
them for Chisolm are just processors of the law. Toobin quotes Alfred Blumstein, a processor at
Carnegie-Mellon University, citing a legion of offices who participate and “has contributed to
the rise in incarceration” (Toobin) to include legislators, judges, police, and prosecutors.
Let us not forget the already socially entrenched perception of the black man villainized
in public spaces and places, with stories told and concretized through the lie of history and
science. The black devil has been identified repeatedly as the public calls on the justice system of
the police gang to answer their fears. Hayes implies that the call is not to “enforce the law but to
restore order” (16). And the who of the disorder as far as the justice system is concerned is the
black man. We are well aware of the law-and-order mantra touted by the Trump administration
to quell dissensus that is believed to be created by the enemies of the state. And we know who
Donald Trump considered the enemy. It was always the Other of white society. The terminology
of law-in-order, according to Hayes as well as Alexander, is a code that directly targets the black
community as needing to be put in its place; instead, it is marketed as an order of peace and
tranquility for all.125 Alexander discusses the 1980’s War on Drugs under President Reagan and
implicates, as we have discussed earlier, the media in the advancement of the new trend of mass
incarceration. She states, “the media campaign was an extraordinary success. Almost overnight,
the media was saturated with images of black “crack whores,” “crack dealers,” and “crack
babies”—images that seemed to confirm the worse negative stereotypes . . . of inner-city
residents” (5). Newspapers and magazines got on board not necessarily for the sake of humanity
but because it is a good story, which means good ratings. Alexander stated that the Washington
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Post had run over 1500 stories on the drug epidemic in a year while other media markets obliged
(Alexander 53).
And what of the countless millions of dollars passed from the federal government to the
states, funneled as incentives to be tough on crime with the promise of bonuses—certainly an
attractive incentive due to the low salaries in high-risk jobs. Along with countless legislative
efforts that are a sure-fire for black bodies Three Strikes, Stop and Frisk, which lead to arrest and
often long stays at the big house—this title was also synonymous with the master house at the
plantation—for the black man, while the white man with the same or worse infraction receives a
slap on the hand or a handshake. In 1994, Clinton passed a $30 billion crime bill that “created
dozens of new capital crimes, mandated life sentences for some three-times offenders and
authorized more than $16 billion for state prison grants” (Alexander 56). This bill placed the
building of more prisons over the welfare of the people, essentially becoming the new housing
project for the poor. (Alexander 57).
And finally, the prison system is the benefactor and fulfillment of the promise of capital
gain, Wall Street profiteering, stock margins, and the likes. No human value is placed on these
black lives, just monetary value. Black lives matter only in the sense of their weight in terms of
capital. Hayes posits that “the United States is the most violent developed country in the world. It
is also the most incarcerated” (22). Indeed violent, it can be no less as it was conceived on the
backs of black lives and will continue to procure and prosper from the same. The prisoner, as the
slave, was no longer an individual with the autonomy to move in and out of spaces. His name is
replaced with a number, and his identity is welded to that of the state. More clearly, he is a
property of the state. He has no right, no thought of being, no belonging except as a caged
animal. He is allotted to the lowest rung of society, and if he is ever released, he is never free. He
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is a slave forever and will never belong to the political body. He cannot vote; he is denied the
rights and privileges of the free. This guarantees the repeat offender. The system is full proof.
Alexander explains that the exponential increase of incarceration is due to several factors,
including, ironically, the Civil Rights Movement itself and other liberating movements of the
period. The success of the Civil Rights Movement caused a greater burden for the black
community, which had to justify the civil protests and combat what was considered not simply
peaceful protests but acts of insolence and brash disregard for law and order. And, though these
acts carried the title of civil disobedience, the system of justice considered these acts of
lawlessness and construed them as acts against the state. This resulted in arrests of the
participants and clandestine investigations of the leaders. There is no reform in prisons as
hundreds and thousands of gangs rise up, violence increases, and the deprivation of freedom
alters the very psychological disposition of these individuals. According to Toobin's report, Paul
Butler, a professor at Georgetown University, states that prisons are but “finishing schools for
criminals, so they breed more crime” (Toobin).
In Wages of Rebellion, Hedges describes a 1988 interview with playwright August
Wilson in which Wilson asserts that “the most valuable blacks are those in prison, those who
have the warrior spirit, who had a sense of being African” (108). Hedges insists that the prison
system is stable and feeds off the poor. “It is the empire’s solution to the economic crisis”
(Hedges, Wages 111). Mumia Abul-Jamal, a black revolutionary imprisoned since 1982, insists
that most black men would not be imprisoned if not for the 1994 Omnibus Bill.126 This is a
highly volatile bill mentioned earlier in this paper that funded an entirely new plan for the
proliferation of mass incarceration through the construction of new prisons, hiring, and
incentives for naming and arresting those who would be identified as criminals. According to
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Hedges, the Clinton and Obama administrations were co-signers to this new order of so-called
justice.
Foucault belongs here for his attention to the prison system and its emergence as part of
the distribution of the sensible, which does not forego the knowledge systems. All are
intertwined in some way and speak to the other in codes. Foucault notes that “the prison form
antedates its systematic use in the penal system. It had already been constituted outside the legal
apparatus when, throughout the social body, procedures were being elaborated for distributing
individuals, fixing them in space, classifying them . . . training their bodies, coding their
continuous behavior” (Discipline & Punish 231) Chris Hedges cites Louis Auguste Blanqui in
his Wages of Rebellion as stating: “Humanity is never stationary. It advances or goes backward.
Its progressive march leads it to equality. Its regressive march goes back through every stage of
privilege to human slavery” (13-14). And Abu-Jamal posits that “there is continuity between
modern systems of oppression and older systems of oppression” (Hedges Wages 113). There is
no doubt, as Marx would contend, the machine of capitalism rebirths itself incessantly by
necessity. The Ship of Fools refers to the ships that would carry the State’s undesirable
characters on a journey to another port is no longer a singular ship.127 In America, these
undesirables are housed in thousands of prisons across this free nation. Three major shifts in how
the penal system works positioned America to become the leading country in mass incarceration.
These shifts are the number of prisoners increasing exponentially, with a large percentage being
black men, the construction of new prisons, and the penal system prioritized funding from the
government over poverty and other social ills.
Art is clothed in mystery and at once uncovered most certainly as we have understood as
proposed by many scholars. At the fifty-eighth Grammy Awards Show, the Pulitzer Prize rapper
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Kendrick Lamar performed a protest against America and the hypocrisy of freedom as black men
moved shackled across the stage while many were caged on stage (e.g., see fig. 95). This was
indicative of the obtrusive theme of mass incarceration and the near-apocalyptic season upon us
in the case of the black man and injustice. This performance is an obvious critique of black
slavery in the form of mass incarceration. Like all art of liberation, the politically charged

Figure 95. Still image from live performance of artist Kendrick Lamar at the 2016 Grammys.

performance is not to entertain but to perform liberation. This work of art can be seen as one that
makes us aware of the problem of mass incarceration and at once liberate the spectator. And
these moments, these movements, are revolutionary; whether they are a brief performance, song,
or poem, they awaken us, raise our consciousness, bring us into self-awareness, provoke us to
political action. I don’t think that Lamar is necessarily trying to offer up philosophy, but he
doesn’t have to. It already is offered up. How do we move outside the caged limited space of the
shoemaker, who makes shoes and nothing else? This transcendence belongs to aesthetics.
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Chapter Three
Kara Walker: Politics, Aesthetics, Emancipation

Challenging and highlighting abusive power dynamics
in our culture is my goal; replicating them is not.
—Kara Walker, Art News
In the dialectical image, the present as the moment of revolutionary possibility
acts as a lodestar for the assembly of historical fragment.
—Susan Buck-Morss, Walter Benjamin and the Arcade Project
What are we to think of this other form of rebellion, which for the subject is no longer
represented by neurosis but by the creation of thought and language, the aesthetic creation
often parallel to neurosis and even to psychosis but irreducible to it?
—Julia Kristeva, The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt
It is the dream of art that would transmit meaning in the form of a rupture…
—Jacques Ranciere, The Politics of Aesthetics
There is nothing rational about rebellion.
—Chris Hedges, Wages of Rebellion
There is no entering into the seemingly nonsensical images found in Walker’s work;
everything is upended. No wonder so many viewers are astonished, put off, embarrassed,
traumatized by the very sight of her work. But, as noted by Hedges, “there is nothing rational
about rebellion” (Wages 20).128 The appearance in her work—I speak now of her epic staging—
is as if an explosion or war has occurred, resulting in a Freudian displacement, a dreamwork
where nothing is as it appears. And the remnants are the detritus of these objects’ former selves.
We are in the midst of a primal scene (e.g., see figs. 96-99). In Walker, we are confronted with a
rupture, a breech, a scattering, fragmentary debris. The images are discharged in such a way as to
leave no real clue for a gathering of the parts to an assumed whole. Therefore, we cannot ignore
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a psychoanalytic reading in this stream of consciousness that has disrupted the fluidity of
traditional modes of narrative, aligned, controlled, and ordered, determined with a beginning,
middle, and end, and read from left to right. In some way, we may be able to evoke Pablo

Figure 96. Kara Walker, Grub for Sharks: A Concession to the Negro Populace, 1994.

Figures 97-99. Kara Walker (left) Cover for Narratives of a Negress, (middle) 8 Possible Beginnings or:
The Creation of African-America, a Moving Picture, 2005, and The Renaissance Society, 1997.

Pablo Picasso’s Guernica (e.g., see fig. 100) though it belongs to an entirely different era and
readability. Picasso is interested in showing the effects of war in the dismemberment of
humanity and nature. This falling apart, irredeemable, is left without resolution. There is a horror
in this apocalyptic display that our rational mind cannot reconcile. Walker’s historical fragments
belong to a different semiological129 field, which signifies a type of regeneration though
assembled as death and destruction.
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What is so exceedingly problematic for many of Walker’s critics is this: Walker’s work
exacts a rupture from the traditional ways in which the subject matter of slavery and black
representation is presented to its audience. It is this rupturing of the image that, for some, is
unforgivable. It is the rupture
that Ranciere conceives as
emancipatory when he states
that “it is the dream of art that
would transmit meaning in the
form of a rupture” (Politics
63). Meaning in traditional
Figure 100. Picasso, Guernica, 1937.

terms implies a form of logic,

as clear knowing, lucidity, and rupture, its opposite as scattering or formlessness. The question
is, how can rupture, as formless, be at once meaningful? We will assume one of the definitions,
which states rupture as “a breach of harmonious, friendly, or peaceful relations.130”
Now, we can understand this concept in several ways, the dream as meaning the desire of
art in the Schillerian sense as a breaking away from representative art in its visibility. Or for the
modern artists whose desire was to destroy the historical idea of art in their withdrawal from all
resemblance of former representations. But we know how that ended in the critic of that period.
It is possible to take Ranciere literally in the Freudian sense of dream works that is a rupture, an
explosion of the image which no longer adheres to logic or readability. And this rupture is the
only way, Freud insists, that gives entrance to the unconscious.
In 2018 Walker was elected to the American Philosophical Society. I do not state this for
some grandiose naming in terms of elitism and selective status. Rather, this appointment is
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fundamental to my argument regarding the necessity to revisit Walker for the emancipatory
potential lodged in her work artist-philosopher. Walker’s seminal work with the silhouette is
essentially concerned with history and its construction of race as the third moment of the
silhouette in this study. But her work does not occupy the tracing of the traditional modes of
representation in the interrogation of race and stereotypes. Though her work is often associated
with Lavater’s silhouettes and physiognomy’s racist agenda in eighteen-century Germany, her
work can be seen for what role the silhouette plays in the repositioning of the present in the
rereading of the past. Walker’s work, Copernican in nature,131 is a treatise on knowledge in the
realm of the artist-philosopher. Following Ranicere’s distribution of the sensible, Walker’s work
is not a configuration of the slave narrative in the traditional sense, which reiterates power
structures, nor is it a reconstitution of slavery. Instead, it is a reconfiguration of power that once
stages revolution as an aesthetic rupture in which emancipation can be visualized as the new
myth of identity predicated on historical fragments.
The reason for proposing Walker’s work as liberating is, first and foremost, because it is
dialectic. Plato’s dialogues were brought to bear by elenchus, which denotes the same dialectic
measure of logical reasoning. Walker’s work is dialectic in that it does not illustrate just one
history, or a one-sided narrative as seen in the representative regime. Rather, she places an
argument before the viewer, showing both sides, which allows us to use our free will. This is the
same methodology that Schiller proposed in his aesthetic letters in which he states, “I shall be
pleading the cause of Beauty before a heart that perceives and exercises her whole power . . .”
(On the Aesthetic Education of Man 23). The challenge for Walker as dialectic is two-fold. First,
because her images are scattered, they do not have the appearance of making a logical argument,
and in many instances, are criticized for that reason or put off as not important. Secondly, which
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is an extension of the first, the readability to earnestly give way to critique is not available to
most. In the images’ unavailability, they become mute. This does not, however, discount the
dialectic measures in her images.
What do the aesthetic regime and aesthetic revolution subscribe to in her work regarding
the political body? More critically, how are these evident in Walker’s work as it engages in a
shift of perception that tilts the scales of an already remanded history? How does Walker’s work
participate in the project of the unconscious or the thing-in-itself?132 How will the black man
ascertain emancipation through Walker, whose images are rooted in violence and perversion in
the resurgence of historical stereotypes as understood by some in the critique of her work?
Lastly, to bolster my claim of Walker as the artist-philosopher and her work as a philosophical
treatise, this study will perform a brief assessment of her work corresponding to some of the
major philosophical theories in Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Freud.
This project returns to Walker’s work for its critique of history and the great
epistemological divide, which predicated the foundational turnstile in the problems of philosophy
and that of art. In other words, the rational impulse and the sensuous impulse are also understood
as art and philosophy. This theme is explored thoroughly in Schiller’s twenty-seven aesthetic
letters and is a pressing topic for aestheticians during the Enlightenment. And though Walker’s
work has been critiqued singularly in various ways as having the potential for disrupting the
norm and assuming the position of revolt, we will attempt to posit a more ambitious proposal
regarding her work and its potential toward the emancipation of the black man. I contend that
Walker’s oeuvre evokes the major themes surrounding the debates in philosophy from Plato’s
Theory of Forms, Aristotelean representation, Kant’s disinterest, Hegel’s master/slave dialectic,
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the end of art and history, Marx’s materialism, and Freud’s unconscious and the primal scene.
Intrinsic in this is the examination of the artist-philosopher for ushering in a new humanity.
Kara Walker: An Introduction
Known for her shock value, Kara Walker is an African American artist whose oeuvre has
been fiercely debated in the art world and the halls of academia since her inaugural exhibition.
There are myriad reasons for this. Her principal medium of black paper connotes Lavater’s
scientific racist project during the German Enlightenment, which had a monumental and
perpetual effect on the black man for over a century and, in fact, still resonates today. Her subject
matter of slavery seems to subvert history in favor of the colonizer, and her sexual excesses
appear as co-conspirators, confirming the stereotypes seeded in history. Vehement responses to
her work are understandable if one reads Walker in the vein of traditional representation. But
Walker’s work is neither traditional as far as the subject matter of slavery goes, nor is it
representative in the conventional sense according to the theories undergirding this study
primarily proposed by Ranciere. In this following statement, he appropriates Kant and
Foucault.133 Ranciere states, “aesthetics can be understood in a Kantian sense-re-examined
perhaps by Foucault-as the system of a priori determining what presents itself to sense
experience. It is a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of speech and
noise, that simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of
experience” (Politics 13). In short order, aesthetics runs the channel of Kantian a priori
sensibility, and his theory of Categorial Imperatives places before the viewer the two stems of
knowledge in contemplation.
This project will also claim that Walker’s work is not of slavery but emancipation. Not of
sex and debauchery but of the conscious and the unconscious and desire. Not of perversion and
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child pornography, but of autonomy and self-liberation that has not yet been ascertained through
legislation or a humanist education. Rebecca Peabody’s Consuming Stories further asserts that
Walker subverts the traditional narrative in plot, timeline, sequencing, and actions of the
characters that operate as a type of disruption of the normativity of storytelling, not allowing
what Peabody pens as the suspension of disbelief. The suspension of disbelief in film, novels, and
other media stages violence and sexual acts such as rape in the viewers’ mind as unbelievable,
therefore impossible. Not convinced that these are heinous acts, the act becomes mute and
instead is treated as not occurring. In its improbability of not taking place, the viewer now
partakes of the scene as pleasure.
Walker's images disrupt the suspension through unimaginable violence and horrific
sexual acts, making it inconvenient for the viewers’ intended fantasy to be taken up as
normativity (2). Desire is thwarted. In Walker, the conclusion is no longer attainable, the
characters no longer accessible, and the excessiveness of violence and sexual acts spills over into
something else, depravity.134 And Zizek would state that “the truly New is not simply a new
content but the very shift of perspective by means of which the Old appears in a new light” (14).
Since we cannot return to history or former epochs, then the restaging of history, that “new light”
occurs in the relationship between the object and the subject’s posturing. This necessitates that
the former relationship in which the object presented itself as determined always already
embodied thought which left no additional perceptual commentary be abandoned.
Zizek’s Organs Without Bodies gives an excellent explication for how we can situate
Walker’s rewrite on the walls of slavery as an African American artist. Walker’s race is
mentioned because of her own comportment as the “liberated negress.” This term is both
determined and undetermined at once, a type of qualification in which we can best understand
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Walker’s work as a work of the suspension, animated, oscillating between the regime of the old
and the actualization of the new again, dialectic. Zizek submits that “the moments of the
emergence of the New are precisely the moments of Eternity in time. The emergence of the New
occurs when a work overcomes its historical context. The emergence of the New changes the
past itself, that is, it retroactively changes not the actual past—we are not in science fiction—but
the balance between actuality and virtuality in the past” (11). This actuality and virtuality
coincide in meaning with Ranciere’s distribution and redistribution of the sensible. Walker has
transcended slavery through her work by returning to history in her transhistorical master/slave
dialectical images. Eternity in time is the mitigation of Walker’s transcendence from slavery and
its archetypes. Arguably, any transcendence of time where time is no longer obligated to eternity,
but eternity avows to time, there is a theoretical slippage that can be constituted in this instance
as an end of history. In Zizek, this can perhaps be amplified in his “explosion of time” (11). This
has the theoretical proposition locatable in Ranciere’s rupture.
Walker came to prominence in 1994 with her exhibition Gone: An Historical Romance of
a Civil War as it Occurred between the Dusky Thighs of One Young Negress and Her Heart, set
in Antebellum South. Walker’s panoramic scenes project all of the trappings of the idyllic nature
of plantation life perpetuated in traditional romantic histories, of the quintessential antebellum
film noir Gone With the Wind, 1939. Walker’s work has amassed considerable critique since
entering into the public sphere. There are those who venture to understand her work in its veiled
naming, signification, and categorization. Others, while receptive, examine Walker’s
unconventional figurations with conventional methodologies and analysis. Criticism from her
opponents rejects the work consummately as non-art. Ironically, this stands to support her work
in Rancerian terms as aesthetic. “In the aesthetic regime of art, art is art to the extent that it is
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something else than art. It is always ‘aestheticized,’ meaning that it is always posited as a ‘form
of life’” (Dissensus 118). To mark her work as non-art, these critics do not state it as
complimentary. Rather, they intend to disqualify her work altogether as not belonging to the
history of art and, therefore, its social import. This is true; it is not. This critique of Walker from
her opposing critics places her work directly in the aesthetic line of fire as the art of liberation.
Walker was young, optimistic, and determined to conquer the world, at least the art
world. She did not know fully that she had entered an unyielding battlefield. Like all good art,
her art has transcended even her at this point. It moves beyond the sphere of actualizing its
transitory revolutionizing purpose. In her exegesis of Walter Benjamin’s Arcade Project, BuckMorss provides this insight (329). As for Walker, wars are not intended for the weak and feebleminded. I thought an appropriate inclusion for this section would be a curator’s critique of
Walker’s 2002 exhibition at the Guggenheim, Insurrection, and Walker’s own words on the
same work in an Art 21 interview. The title of the Art 21 interview is befitting: “Projecting
Fictions: Insurrection: Our Tools were Rudimentary! Yet We Pressed On.” The curator from the
Guggenheim exhibition remarked:
Kara Walker provocatively engages American slavery in nearly life-size silhouettes that
hijack racial stereotypes and exaggerated physiognomies drawn from blackface
entertainment. Amid nightmarish revivals of the antebellum South, hyperactive shadow
forms expose and reverse a fundamental operation of minstrelsy: the projection of white
audiences’ illicit desires and irrational fears onto black bodies. Pushing derogatory
caricatures to absurd limits, Walker overturns the diffusion of violence through comedy.
Jokes are rerouted, punch lines go astray, and heroes and villains switch places. Walker
herself inhabits these scenes as the Negress. Mischievously subverting any “straight”
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story, these theaters of horror thrive on the proximity between attraction and revulsion,
drawing together love and hate, violence and tenderness, for a more complex approach to
an unsettled historical problem. (Guggenheim)
This excerpt needs no further commentary; however, I am compelled to note that
Walker’s play with light or projection of light is not arbitrary. I include two views of the same

Figure 101. Kara Walker, Insurrection! (Our Tools Were Rudimentary, Yet We Pressed On), 2000.

image from somewhat varying perspectives and different cast shadows. I believe the work first
brings into perspective Plato and the cave allegory (e.g., see figs. 101-102). The reflected light
cast upon the wall in the “allegory of the cave” yielded what has the appearance of truth. Many
critics have arrived at the same conclusion about Walker’s work, that light projected from a
media source symbolically reflects the desires of others as imprinted on the black body. The
other reading of the light implicates society as participating in this historical fiction of the
invention of race that perpetuates presently. We are part of the problem of race that still haunts
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the American landscape. This depiction allows those of us blinded by history to experience an
awakening of knowing that we have been historically duped. Walker would assert that America
has a love affair with race. If we are real with ourselves, we must ask: what would America be
without the obsession of race located in the Other? These reflections in Plato and Walker are also
used as an exercise in the education of perception.
In the interview, Walker
discussed her work poignantly as
historical regurgitation, dissection, a
disemboweling even. The idea of
fighting with the tools given to the
slaves is interesting as this is how
Walker’s work performs as
liberating. The tools that Walker has
Figure 102. Kara Walker, Insurrection! (Our Tools Were
Rudimentary, Yet We Pressed On), Image with
shadows of viewers, 2000.

leveraged upon history are those of
the silhouettes and its collective

narratives. The tools in Walker’s work mirror those in stereotypes of history of blacks as nonthinkers, non-creators, whose is suited for menial tasks which do not require higher intellectual
skills. These tools as identifiers of the slaves’ station are the same weapons used in the battle
which Walker instigates. Walker noted in the interview that she does not seek to tell the viewer
what to see but expects that they will derive a conviction of truth predicated on their own sense
of knowing. This statement is critical for the argument of Walker’s work as undetermined and
therefore liberating. We have for much too long been instructed in seeing. As for the various
characters and scenes that make up the countless narratives, Walker states, “they’re fantasies.
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They don’t represent anything real. It’s just the end result of so many fabrications of a fabricated
identity” (Guggenheim).
They are fabrications of fabricated fantasies that reveal themselves in their excess. But no
less real, belonging to the product of desire and truth once silenced under the reproductive
weight of scientific and artistic invention. Ranciere asserts this of the aesthetic regime pertaining
to fiction, “testimony and fiction come under the same regime of meaning” (Politics 37). The
aesthetic regime as a shift in perception showcases “testimony,” which is understood as an
eyewitness, and “fiction” as two histories to be perceived in the forming of equilibrium as
actuating political space. Ranciere gives an example of this statement in complete opposition to
the categorization and arrangement of visibility located in the Aristotelian model (representative
regime). There is no hierarchy of perception; rather, the object yields itself to an open and free
will. The example given by Ranciere is of Honore de Balzac’s writings in which Balzac
describes an antique shop. He creates a new perception in the shop that “jumbled up together are
objects both profane and sacred, uncivilized and cultured, antique and modern” (Politics 37).
This new perception emerged, according to Ranciere, first in Romantic literature.
But for many, these shadows conceived as fantasies by Walker are their truth. Walker is
accused by many of her detractors of having a sick mind, and some of these views were
published in the text Kara Walker/No, Kara Walker/Yes, Kara Walker/? One of the accusations
against Walker is that she is performing in tandem as minstrelsy, in blackface, for white society.
This idea has been advanced by several leading African American artists, including Howardena
Pindell and Bettye Saar, and countless others who led a petition against the young artist at the
beginning of her career. Walker’s work can be understood instead as a treatise on knowledge. In
2008, Grace Elizabeth Hale’s article critiquing Walker’s work bore a significant title of “A

189
Horrible, Beautiful Beast,” which in some respects points to a concatenation of the twomillennium artist-philosopher divide in the West. Hale is pinning her comments based on
Walker’s exhibition Kara Walker: My Complement, My Enemy, My Oppressor, My Love.
The title of Hale’s article and the exhibition title are at once a canceling out of the two
opposing fields, which is at the same time a suspension of both in the terms “horrible” and
“beautiful.” This suspension is what is known in Kant, Schiller, and Ranciere as an aesthetic
experience. The aesthetic experience neither obligates the object nor subject to perform in its role
as willed, but they both yield over to what is essential in both. As it regards Walker’s work, it is
important for the salvaging of the pivotal political matter of freedom lodged in perception in
general terms of knowledge and reiteration of her mission. Her declaration as a liberated negress
holds true to her mission in the same way any freedom fighter refuses to retreat without fulfilling
the charge. Walker’s work has also been demonized in such a way as to attempt to destroy what
good provoked this young artist to war. Walker subsisted in exposing false narratives that offered
no salvation in the way of emancipation but only a retelling of the same story in the redeposition
of subjugation in reiteration.
When I first started looking at Walker, I contacted a colleague who had written an essay
that bore a resemblance to my interest in Walker’s work and its compelling argument on the
theory of trauma in psychoanalysis, and in specificity, the traumatic recurrence in the black race,
generationally. The theoretician commented that she had gone past Walker, basically affirming,
as many people had, that the shock of the new had worn off. She went, she saw, she critiqued.
This shock is what brought people time and time again back to modern art: Marcel Duchamp’s
urinal (e.g., see fig. 103), Jackson Pollock’s drips, Piero Manzoni’s shit (e.g., see fig 104).
Walker is no different than the philosophers we are still left to ponder, constantly probing and
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interrogating. Zizek insists that “a truly new work stays new forever—its newness is not
exhausted when its “shocking value” passes away” (15). And though we have had the silhouette
before us since the beginning of history, Walker’s emancipatory silhouettes differ in presence
and gravity from those shadows on the cave walls, or the Egyptian tombs, or Grecian vases,
Lavater’s shades, or even Douglas’s silhouettes in the
rebirth of the New Negro in the Harlem Renaissance.
We have not moved past Plato. In Herman’s The
Cave and the Light, he refers to an editorial that confirms
this matter of the continued interrogation of the past. He
states, “An editorial in The New York Review of Books r
Figure 103. Marcel Duchamp,
Fountain, 1917.

recently asked: “Do the Classics Have a Future?” (ix)

Herman then retorts that, “the real question is: Will the classics ever leave us alone?” (Herman
ix). We have not moved past Aristotle. We have not moved past Kant, Du Bois, Hegel, or Fanon.
We have not moved past Freud. At that, we have not moved
past Marx or Heidegger, or others. What I propose is this,
that we should not so effortlessly and expeditiously move
past Walker.
When one approaches Walker’s works, one is
walking into history. But not just history as it pertains to a

Figure 104. Piero Manzoni
Artist’s Shit, 1961.

bygone period of time but something much more
complicated. Walker’s work is engaged in philosophical thought. To state it more emphatically,
Walker’s work is the end of history, art, and philosophy at once. It is the end of history because
her work transcends time, the end of art because, as non-art (not predetermined in the finality of
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form-Kant), it opens itself up to life as becoming community, politics. Her work is a
philosophical treatise, aesthetic. Philosophical in that it speaks.
Walker has a specific mission in mind: excavating the lost black subject of history
beneath the quagmire of history and its representations. This is central to the inversion of the
edict of Plato and the curse of the Platonian shadow, which will serve a dual purpose of fate, one
of defective knowledge and determinate form. Firstly, Walker had brought to pass what Socrates
feared the most when he threw out what he thought was an impossible challenge, discussed in
Chapter One, regarding the body/soul consensus, which is the bridging of the sensuous and
rational as the beautiful in the form. This understanding of Walker’s work is essential for the
black man. Walker lifts the black veil of freedom of history and of art at once, which allows
passing from the realm of the cave to the light of freedom. Ranciere insisted that “the aesthetic
regime of arts is, first of all, a new regime for relating to the past” (Politics 25). And it is critical
for the black man to not only return to the past but to confront history in its invention of his
subjectivity.
In the history of art criticism, forms of art have been qualified according to a specialized
system of knowledge made possible through education. Understanding a work of art is not
detached from the currency of art in a culture at a given moment. In other words, the work acts
as an ideological sign. Its readability has passed over into actuality. Clement Greenberg’s
writings afforded the spectators and critics alike a segue from the modes of interpreting
traditional art forms to that of interpreting and appreciating Abstract Expressionism.135 This is
not to imply that Greenberg was exact in his assessment, but his many essays and articles
educated the wider audience to this new form of art as a means to realize the dream of proletarian
art. Of course, decades later, we are placing Greenbergian formalism under the aesthetic
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microscope. I am hopeful that this study of Walker’s work can offer an invaluable addition to the
history of ideas in the West.
Walker’s work is ascribed to ghosts of the past avenging ancestors in Vivien Fryd’s essay
“Bearing witness to the trauma of slavery in Kara Walker’s videos: Testimony, Eight Possible
Beginnings, and I was transported.” Fryd contends that Walker’s silhouettes as apparitions are
haunting the viewers, forcing them “to acknowledge and remember” (Fryd). Sander L. Gilman,
in his essay “Confessions of an Academic Pornographer” in the anthology Kara Walker: My
Complement, My Enemy, My Oppressor, My Love, insists that Walker’s work as parody is a way
of representing the underlying unconscious “cultural images . . . which constitute our
construction of our worlds” (30) Gwendolyn Dubois Shaw interprets Walker’s work as the
conjuring, and the seeing of the unspeakable in her Seeing the Unspeakable. If Walker’s work
functions as Shaw claims, as speech that formerly was unspoken in the slave narratives
pertaining to the slaves, the masters, and the abolitionists who could not speak of these atrocities,
why do they now speak in Walker, and what are they saying? Is it intelligible or unintelligible? If
Walker’s work is satirical, serving as a mirror before the present to acknowledge the past, how
does that render any liberation for the present state of the black man? Is this Hegelian recognition
or the Freudian primal scene? Walker’s images are understood as phantasmagoria, dreamlike,
and this is not in question, but who among us will write its interpretation? Conceptually,
Ranciere attends to these questions in this vital work of the distribution of the sensible and the
regimes of art as the orchestration of new visibility.
We are far removed from Walker’s 1994 inaugural exhibition Gone. Her work then was
perceived by many as a desecration of the African American community. Just as Gustave
Flaubert’s Sentimental Education was perceived during his era as having a disregard for
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conventional norms, which in Flaubert’s case was the bourgeoisie. A scandal. What remains for
Walker is the controversy that continues to surround her work. What differs in her work from
Aaron Douglas’ or Robert Colescott’s that creates such uproar, even downright repugnance,
rekindling the age-old debate of representation and censorship? In Art in America (December 11,
2012), an article written by Brian Boucher blares the headline, “Kara Walker’s Work Censored
at Newark Library.”
The title evokes Plato’s detestation of the poets. This censoring conjures up a dark past of
the veiled, forbidden passages to knowledge, the expulsion from the tree of the knowledge of
good and evil. Michelangelo, Dorothy Iannone, Edouard Manet, Robert Mapplethorpe, Karen
Finley, Andres Serrano, Dread Scott Tyler are those who offended the hegemonic order of
visibility. According to Ranciere, censorship has always involved a verticality of knowledge. In
Ranciere’s Politics, in the section “Historical and Hermeneutic Methodology,” he states, “I
always try to think in terms of horizontal distributions, combinations between systems of
possibilities, not in terms of surface and substratum. Where one searches for the hidden beneath
the apparent, apposition of mastery is established” (49). Ranciere here speaks of leveling the
field of knowledge. Knowledge has always been used as a power source, keeping the tradition of
esoteric knowledge in the hands of a few to regulate the masses. Censorship allows, on some
level, the field of certain knowledge or standard ways of perceiving to self-perpetuate.
The contributors in the text on Walker, Kara Walker, Yes/ Kara Walker, No/ Kara
Walker? leave us with no deficiency of witnesses willing to testify against her while
admonishing her to heal her black soul. One of the dissenters, Camille Billows, declared her
abhorrence with this question: “Can you imagine, a Jew exhibiting a Jew in Auschwitz fucking a
dog? Or an Italian in silhouette sucking a Nazi’s dick?” (Pindell 8) What is lost in Billows is the
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methodology of excess that reveals not Walker’s dark soul but makes visible the violence and
control, levels of power, and influence in the perpetuation of the subjugated. Pindell, along with
Saar, led the protest of Walker early on, writing letters to museums urging them not to exhibit
Walker’s work and petitioning the MacArthur Foundation to rescind her Genius award.136 In
Pindell’s introduction for the literary harangue, she asks the following of Walker’s work:
What does her image of a nude black woman having sex with the skeletal corpse of a
Confederates soldier accomplish, except to create a fiction that becomes a truth in the eye
of the beholder eager to continue the lie of the racist. Or the work which shows a nude,
pregnant African-American with amputated legs, without any hope for help, presented
with cartoon-like eroticism. (viii)
I would like to address Pindell’s concerns. The works show firstly that this is also a myth,
a fiction, a fabrication. And at once, these are commentaries on history as myth, as imitation, like
reproduction. Ranciere’s take on this is quite extraordinary in which he proposes of the aesthetic
regime and fiction, that “it is not a matter of claiming everything is fiction. It is a matter of
stating that the fiction of the aesthetic age defined models for connecting the presentation of facts
and forms of intelligibility that blurred the border between the logic of facts and the logic of
fiction” (Politics 38). Again, we see here the middle ground in the redistribution of the sensible.
This redistribution is a reestablishing by tracing the old in some regard. That tracing is a
recapitulation of the old in the formulation of a new myth of identity. We can understand a
reading of the Confederate soldier corpse as ideological in that death have no mastery over the
living. Theologically speaking, “oh death, where is thy sting, oh grave, where is thy victory” (1
Corinthians 55.15)?
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Warhol uses a similar redress in style in his critique of the commodification of the object.
Works such as Campbell’s Soup Cans and Marilyn Diptych, both 1962, in their visual replication
and duplication, presented a view of a distilled relationship of the individual to themselves and
society in the new urbanity, an alienated self, skewing the line between subject and object, a
subjectivity predicated on exchange aligning with Marx’s historical materialism. Walker’s work
is populated exponentially with imitations, copies, and doppelgangers. We live not in, but as the
culture of the copy as noted by Hillel Schwartz. He gives credence to the idea by stating, “in
consequence, we confront on every horizon problems of duplicity and virtuality, which must be
resolved before we can reclaim or re-create a persuasive notion of authenticity” (9). These
reproductions constitute our myths. And cannot necessarily be less than Hegelian in their
assumption as the incarnate object in the history of thought.
Furthermore, Walker’s work possesses what Ranciere proposes as a new fictionality
which, “is the identification of modes of fictional construction with means of deciphering the
signs inscribed in the general aspect of a place, a group, a wall, an article of clothing, a face”
(Politics 36-37). It is no longer the image needing to be met with a sign. It is its own
interpretation for all to read. In Walker, we are immediately confronted with this fictionality
made new in the collection of historical fragments forged together. I use the term historical
fragments because the events are removed from history and no longer retain the same aim.
Walker explores the unconscious and conscious, reason and the imagination, trauma resulting in
violence against the oppressor, and self-affliction. This is displayed in the multitudinous
depictions of sexual acts, which Freud defines the unconscious, the passions, and unchecked
desires. Imagine the fury released but at once restrained. Rupture. “Violence turned inward
(Fanon Wretched of the Earth lxi).
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Walker’s images evoke history, and myth, or history as myth. Another critic of her work,
Betty Blayton, retorts, “Her works are not an exhibition that I would want children to see. Her
cute storybook cut-out characters do indeed tell a Grim Tale that does not include any redeeming
fairies” (Pindell 9). Let me ask Ms. Blayton: would you rather there be a continued march, a

Figures 105-107. Domitian, Arch of Titus showing the spoils of Jerusalem, c. AD 82, Kauffman. Cornelia
Presenting Her Children as Her Treasures, 1785, David. Oath of Horatii, 1784.

parade of the traumatization of slavery as we see in the flurry of remakes of the subjugation of
slavery in film, television, marketing the myth of an entire nation: the anniversary of Roots the
epic series, Twelve Years a Slave, “The Book of Negroes” the television series? I came by a
complaint that stated that there were too few black history films on slavery. I am inflamed that
there are far too many. Similar undertakings of the reiteration of the oppressed were part of the
rituals of Rome, the parades, and the triumphal arches, The Arch of Titus (e.g., see fig.105), The
Arch of Constantine, The Arch of Caracalla, and Augusta of victory of hegemonic powers of a
ruthless kingdom. These monuments were celebratory gestures reiterating the conquest of other
nations. And who are the recipients of these displays; those today masked as educational models
of an untainted black history? Your children are the forebears of the narrative, citing their
perpetual station. These are your offerings as Cornelia’s and Horatii’s were to Rome (e.g., see
figs.106-107).
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What is perhaps telling that Ms. Blayton does not qualify is that the very phrase cut-out
which she utilizes in her complaint is redemptive. It returns us to the philosophical explicative of
Bergson and of Schiller and other theoreticians who understood readily that history is
questionable. Using the term cut-out, Blayton has placed Walker not as a fabrication of history
but as an unquestionable contributor to thinking on the right side of historical probing regarding
the question concerning history, matter and form, object and subject, of nature and being. It is
appropriate to consider again Bergson’s attempt to bring to light this cut and paste of form in
Creative Evolution. He states, “the human intellect feels at home among inanimate objects, more
especially among solids, where our action finds its fulcrum and our industry its tools” (ix). And
again, he insists that “in vain we force the living into this or that one of our molds. All the molds
crack. They are too narrow, above all too rigid, for what we try to put in them. Our reasoning, so
sure of itself among things inert, feels ill at ease on this new ground” (Bergson x). Other
protesters compare Walker’s images to the buffoonery of J.J. Walker of Good Times, 1974,
George Jefferson in The Jeffersons, and other exploitative representations.
These individuals are not alone in their misgivings and condemnation of Walker and her
work. There are times when Walker, too, is uncertain of what she is experiencing in this surge of
popularity and receptivity since her emergence in the art world, not by all, but by the very ones
her discourse is most vehemently addressing: white society. She states the following in an
interview with Tommy Lott of “Black Renaissance/Renaissance Noire”137 in 2000.
I certainly didn’t anticipate the level of support that I’ve gotten, and it sometimes occurs
to me that it’s rather absurd. Success has been kind of peculiar, because there are
moments when I feel like I’m becoming another trope of African American artistic
history in the way I am patronized. Actually, in my last show, I acknowledged some of
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that, but maybe a little bit mysteriously. In a way, the more success I get, and the success
that I’ve had in these past four or five years, necessitates that I be dead now by some
dramatic overdose, suicide, something that would validate me, and I decided not to do
that. It’s hard, because you want to think your work is being valued for something with
more integrity, but, on the other hand, there’s always the paranoia that you’re going to be
viewed as somebody’s pet project. (179)
We can learn from many theoreticians, particularly Baudrillard, regarding capital and
revolution, that this acceptance does not mean that you are not genuine in your comportment
against the hegemonic society. The art world is autonomous still—no matter that aesthetics is
waging a battle to be heard—in the sense that it is also very elitist and capitalistic. Just as JeanMichel Basquiat addressed the problems of history and knowledge and the usurpation of art in
his work and other elitist practices, it did not change the outcome of his receptivity. While some
may have gravitated to Basquiat because he was the next new thing, others found a genuine truth
in his work. Of course, Basquiat, Walker, and other modern artists did not reject their popularity
and reception and accepted that this new fame afforded them a better economic status. One may
say Basquiat could have, and Walker now can make a profound stance against what some have
called exploitation by white folk by refusing to make art or refusing the fame that comes with it.
But by doing so and not taking on history in this manner, she would be standing right where the
modernist stood, in an empty lot in their refusal of the confrontation of history in her distancing.
The Politics of Art and Aesthetics in Walker
There should be no misconception by now regarding the work of Kara Walker as being
invested in the political discourse of race. Ranciere insists in Dissensus, “the resistance of the
work is not art’s way of rescuing politics; it is not art’s way of imitating or anticipating politics –
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it is properly speaking their identity. Art is politics” (172). The use of the silhouette in Walker’s
work, historically associated with the eighteenth-century racial politics of physiognomy, has
incited virulent debates and public outcry. This criticism has not impeded Walker's pursuit of
emancipation for others, as she always already is emancipated. The violence with which she
executes her mission is in the spirit of Nat Turner, Harriett Tubman, King, and Malcolm.
When I speak of violence, I refer to the tearing and snatching as a process of freedom
employed in Ranciere, which does not belong to the physical realm alone. The words of King
were as harsh and contentious as those of Malcolm without the threat of physical retaliation. Any
action that protests the reconfiguration of space and the redistribution of the sensible for a
subjugated populace would most likely be considered acts of violence by those in authority. In
his “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” King railed against the white hegemonic order, citing
Birmingham for its egregious acts and unjust practices against the Negro in his use of the term
“ugly” to cite brutal policing and “notorious” to describe their unjust courts.138 How much
different is this from Malcolm stating that the Negro didn’t land on Plymouth Rock; Plymouth
Rock landed on the Negro?139 Or, Schiller’s aesthetic letters primarily leveled against the state,
past, present, and future for fashioning a type of humanity of oppression for its own will to
power, implying that the State condemned the entire order of humanity to a mechanized subject
for the continuation of their “sorry existence” (41).
Further, who deemed the value belonging to violence as an act of profanity? Or stating it
differently, how is violence justified in the hands of the authority—this policing (Ranciere) that
has subverted the originary of politics—and unjustified by the masses? Violence begets violence.
We understand the state of violence more precisely in Sartre’s Preface to The Wretched of the
Earth when speaking of the colonized. “This . . . irrepressible violence is neither a storm in a

200
teacup nor the reemergence of savage instincts nor even a consequence of resentment: it is man
reconstructing himself” (lv). Violence as a rebirth140 seems antithetical, immoral even for some
who have forgotten what violence looks like and feels like. Sartre further states, “I believe we
once knew, and have since forgotten, the truth that no indulgence can erase the marks of
violence: violence alone can eliminate it” (Fanon Wretched lv). And in Derrida’s Grammatology,
in the chapter “The Violence of the Letter: From Levi-Strauss to Rousseau,” we are made aware
that violence is not only designated physiologically but is so intellectually, philosophically
through books and knowledge in their fabrication for propagandistic outcomes. Derrida quotes
Jean-Jacques Rousseau from Emile when stating, “oh man . . . behold your history, such as I
have thought to read it, not in books written by your fellow-creatures, who are liars, but in
nature, which never lies” (133). Rousseau then states, “so, I closed all my books” (Emile 133).
Knowledge is questionable, and the truth is ever the more debatable.
Walker’s work participates in ways in which art performs to protest conventional
hegemonic regimes of thought. These modes of protest critique phantasmagoria, satire, parody,
carnivalesque, the spectacle, are central to dissensus. Her written work—my concentration for
this project will primarily concern itself with the silhouettes—functions as what Ranciere deems
“living speech” (Politics 16). What this amount to is the written word which previously was
qualified as mute, comes alive—denoted previously as the discourse of the master—both mute,
and at once speech as a mode of thought, where form becomes the site of the inscription as living
speech. I have stated this previously in a different fashion. The aesthetic work of art does not
depend on the old narrative methodology in the finality of the form, but the image works to
create a new myth as form. The work makes for the possibility of the political in Walker’s A
Letter from a Black Girl, 1997, as previously expounded upon in the introduction.
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Walker’s reception, like her work, is dialectic. On the one hand, she is considered one of
the most important artists of our time, genius, and antithetical to this, the most disingenuous.
Walker has declared her work as emancipation in the first order from the beginning of her career.
A Letter is a love-hate correspondence which in some respects, contains similar resonances found
in Schiller’s aesthetic letters. I make this comparison for the aesthetic similitude of the promise
of emancipation inscribed in both. Walker redistributes the sensible on multiple levels, including
speech, place, and desire. The main thrust that is brought to bear regarding her position of selfemancipation is in the last sentence of the letter where she states, “I am left here alone to recreate
MY WHOLE HISTORY without benefit of you, my complement, my enemy, my oppressor, my
Love” (Vergne 161). This statement allows a re-evaluation, a reconstitution of being, a rebirth,
re-education, of the station to which the black man is bound from birth like the prisoners in
Plato's cave. Walker references a “blank space in a void” (Vergne 161).
Heideggerian in the nature the nothingness of Being serves as suspended ontological
disposition once disregarded as an uninformed component of Being, which is now critical for a
reformulation. And the term ‘complement’ in Walker’s letter is always engaged, not in
opposition, but the sameness, equality of state. Walker’s intention of using the term
‘complement’ is, on the one hand, satirical, laughable even, knowing that she is not the
complement of the white man in racial or gender status as far as society is concerned. But by
making this statement, she places herself before the racialization of being as his equal that is
possible once more through the dialectic image and the restaging of history.
How does Walker’s work participate in politics, and therefore perform as emancipatory
in the black man? Does any work that subscribes itself as dissensus in action make of itself a
work of representation, a reversal of that dissensus? I would think not. How does Ranciere’s
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reinsertion of the etymology of the term politics assign a new meaning to how Walker’s works
redistribute the sensible or interface with the voiceless community? Walker, whose work is
nearly a century removed from Douglas, the quintessential artist of the Harlem Renaissance,
occupies a political agenda different in some regards than Douglas, yet with the same demands
that the political infers. Douglas’s work is political in the sense that the period of the Harlem
Renaissance was remarkable in its effort to reinvent
the Negro as belonging to the order of humankind.
Yet, Douglas’s is more of a record of the rise from
slavery to the present condition of the black man, and
it does not address the historical reign of the
hegemonic order of white superiority in the
juxtaposition of history. Art has always inherently
echoed a political message, but to what degree?
The cover of the Crisis that displays a work by
Douglas does not provide a headline but opens up the
Figure108. Aaron Douglas Untitled, 1926

topic for discussion inside the issue (e.g., see fig.
108). Stretched across the horizon of the upper space of the tabloid reads the magazine’s name in
uppercase letters, CRISIS. It stands proxy as an S.O.S, a mark of desperation, but perhaps also a
mark of hope for an ensuing agenda. The shadowy black figures are illuminated against the white
backdrop. The contrast resembles in some respects the technique of chiaroscuro deployed by
Baroque artists in the Counter-Reformation, efforts to designate the dichotomous realm of
redemption and sin. The halo effects used in Christian iconography of the Virgin and Child and
the holy entourage are on display here in the black profiles as a divine mission. The magazine is
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a Christmas issue as indicated by ‘XMAS 1926’ inscribed below the title, so these figures likely
reference the occasion of the birth of Christ. Especially since one of the figures holds a
shepherd’s staff in his hand associated with the stories of the visitation of the holy baby in a
manger by three wise men. The extended arms of one figure may be an exaltation or praise. The
heads of the three figures lift in the direction of the light source from above, and the open mouths
may signal an adulation. The unified posture of the bodies implies participation in a ritual. But
how does this image by Douglass illustrate dissensus, political protest, emancipation, even? It
appears to signal a message of redemption but falls short of a call to action.
Let us turn to Ranciere’s, Dissensus in which Ranciere qualifies the political in ten
theses,141 one of which may be relevant here. Ranciere defines politics on these terms in Thesis
8: “the essential work of politics is the configuration of its own space. It is to make the world of
its subjects and its operations seen. The essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus as
the presence of two worlds in one (37). Though it carves out a space for visibility, Douglas's
image does so as a heterotopia, a utopia, without making visible the hegemonic political space
from which it is carved.
Kara Walker’s image Bureau of Refugee: Cut in a most shocking manner, 2007 appeared
on the cover of the December 2014 issue of Ebony magazine displaying the following title,
United Yet Divided: Why Race [Still] Matters (e.g., see fig.109). Beneath the abeyant figure, cut
paper resembling blood of brownish-red prism pours over the white surface. The feet of the
figure looms above the words, “United Yet Divided,” as a pointer to call attention to the
unsettling message which has resonated in the streets of America since the 2012 tragedy of
Trayvon Martin, a young black man of seventeen years old. Amidst marches, protests, and riots,
we are still a divided nation. Below the image of the suspended body is four inches of space, and
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above the bold red letters in all capital letters is the magazine’s title, EBONY, in all caps.
Immediately above the magazine’s name reads “The 2014 Power Issue,” in the black text, which
is always already paradoxical. Or is it? As in most of Walker’s work, this image is the drastic
contrast of black and white. The black paper is placed against the stark white of the glossy
magazine stock as her silhouettes blanketed on museum walls. The cover art is a dialogue on
race, loud, clear, and emphatic.
What is particularly interesting about
this image is its suspension in mid-air. It has no
anchorage, no grounding. We are aware of a
detached presence without the usual markers
subjecting the figure to a particular era or
region. Walker understands that the black man
in America holds a precarious position, without
political grounding, having all identifiers of
humanity and place stripped at his inception,
then birthed into a new form. But Walker’s

Figure 109. Kara Walker
cut in a most shocking manner, 2007.

image as suspension gives credence to her work as liberation. This suspension not only belongs
theoretically to Schiller but is also part of the language of a recently published text by Peabody,
where she discusses the methodology of interruption in Walker that suspends the
narrative.142This is the legacy of the silhouette in Walker, a new birth cut from the fragments of
history. What is that legacy? I would state, recognition, confrontation of history, perception.
Ranciere’s Thesis 6 is significant here for what is not said or seen in Walker’s work discussed
above. Here he states, “if politics is the tracing of a vanishing difference with respect to the
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distribution of social parts and shares, it follows that its existence is by no means necessary, but
that it occurs as an always provisional accident within the history of domination. It also follows
that the essential object of political dispute is the very existence of politics itself (Dissensus 35).
Ranciere writings are aesthetical. Politics in its orignary meaning is present, and politics
as becoming the policing of a community without space or voice is available to make the
comparison. What is unique in this revealing is the fact that space does not have to be created for
politics as equilibrium, in the very essence of the “history of domination,” it is its outcome and
inherently present even in its absence. The black man, as the essential object in his presence as
visible as claiming ground, is already involved in a political dispute. While Douglas’s work
carves out a space for the voiceless, Walker addresses the differences amid the political body.
She places black and white in the room of history and asks that we behold the other in the face of
their countenance, confront the past, and move on with the business of freedom. The idea of
moving on with the business of freedom echoes Agamben, who states, “whatever face, in which
what belongs to common nature and what is proper are absolutely indifferent” (Agamben The
Coming Community 18). The concern then is the misunderstanding or the misrecognition of
Walker’s work by the old guard of African American artists who safeguard what they believe to
be the integrity of black representation in history and slavery in specificity.
The relationship of Walker’s work to the community is unquestionable, I believe, for
what the work can accomplish toward emancipation. For this reason, I am compelled to examine
her work in light of the historical presence of African American artists in history. How does the
work of Walker differ in tone and tenor thematically? What makes for the acceptance of many
artists, such as Douglas, who cut from the same cloth of the theme of slavery and the silhouette?
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Why are these artists not vehemently persecuted? Why are they accepted when Walker's
character is attacked, and her work rejected?
I intend to make a case for Walker’s work as a work of aesthetics that do not abide by the
rubric of order, rather of disorder. Though her work mimics other forms of visibility in
synchronicity and perception, it is not tied to traditional hermeneutics. Walker writes a
philosophical treatise that bears a resemblance to others who have erased previous writings
thought to be the final word of truth in the project of humanity. She is the artist-philosopher who
refuses to write as Bartleby143 and, in her refusal, still writes her own “passivity” (Agamben, 35).
Let me turn aside to state this of Walker. In Kant’s commentary on genius in Critique of
Judgment, he insists that genius144 is always already in the mode of protest inherently. The
genius does not occupy herself in work by a set of rules ordained by man, but those of nature.
And those of nature are in such a way hidden from her so that she cannot necessarily teach this to
others. In this way, the genius is not considered the untouchable being of history removed from
reality but subsists in freedom. This idea of genius is even more pronounced in Jasper’s reading
of Kant. Jasper states in Kant, “Genius is the unity of the world soul.” This statement supports
the idea of the artist whose work is dialectic and is therefore not limited to the channels of reason
alone or the intellect. Aesthetics indicates an art lending itself to the full spectrum of humankind
in intellect and imagination, which defines genius for Kant. Walker’s work qualifies because, in
Rancierian terms, aesthetics is ‘a form of thought that has become foreign to itself” (23). Foreign
to itself, in this, that thought moves in the realm of something else, aesthetics.
This unification of willed and unintended processes, of an “absolute doing” and an
“absolute passivity,” is developed in Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism and is
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perhaps best articulated in Kant’s account of genius. Tanke would suggest that “according to
Kant, only a small portion of artistic production is deliberate, with the end results ultimately
unexplainable in terms of rules.” (116). The genius is not aware of her actions. Her act is the act
of conscious and unconscious, or knowing and not knowing. “The aesthetic revolution

Figure 110. Eastman Johnson Negro Life at the South, 1859

establishes this identity of knowledge and ignorance, acting and suffering as the very definition
N
of art” (Tanke 119). In this manner, art no longer
is representative as a chasm that identifies and

concretizes hierarchies, rather as one which dislodges the conventional social order of things.
Eastman Johnson’s Negro Life at the South (e.g., see fig. 110) is a traditional form of art
that depicts slavery. If you would recall, the distribution of the sensible assigned places and
stations, and in so doing identifies the individual’s inclusion or exclusion from the community,
from those who are visible, and speak, to those who are invisible and mute. When we observe
Johnson’s image, we see that the slaves are assigned and determined subjects who not only know
their place but dare not move from it. The slaves are performing in their assigned space. Johnson
composes the narrative so that the viewer is convinced that the life of the Negro is natural.
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Johnson is most likely arguing that the black man is subsisting in this proposed natural character
as his essential self, perpetrated by white society. Therefore, he is happy in his condition as a
slave and that of property. Further, Johnson validates this by the courtship scene of young slave
man and woman, the musical presentation on the banjo by an old slave, the games being played
by what could be a mother and daughter, and the entertained, satisfaction of the woman peering
from the top window. Nor are the slaves in a state of fear, fight, or resistance. Thus, the work is a
fabrication of the idyllic life of the slave, who is shown to be content, and thereby proposed by
the racist agenda, justifiably positioned as nature intended.
The portal whereby the mistress of the house is making her entrance into the slave space
is symbolic of the separate worlds, the division of space, time, and action of the slaves and the
master differing from the other. We deduce this because there is no entrance for blacks as equals
in the white world of the master’s providence on the other side of the opening. The mistress slips
in to make her appearance but is a participant in both realms. For Johnson, this may appear to be
a gesture of humanity, a suggestion of care, or a shared community. Instead, it signifies that the
whites oscillate between both worlds, and the slave is bound to the one.145 One of the
characteristics of representative art is that it is the work of the logic of fiction. The logic of
fiction which Ranciere discusses in his writings is the forced or unnatural appearance of things
that compose certain arrangements and configurations. No matter the lie of its staging, it
becomes the truth in familiar circles of agreement. No truth can ever account for enslavement,
sub-human conditions, fractured families, disjointed spaces, usurpation of time, subjugation,
invisibility, and muteness. The slave became familiar with the language and movement of the
slave body necessary for the survival of body and soul.
One way in which Walker’s work contradicts the work of Johnson is that while Johnson’s
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image fastens down bodies to their assigned places, Walker works to release them. When
Ranciere implicates bodies as snatched violently from assigned places, he is reversing Plato’s
community in the taxonomy of compartmentalization and specializations. Wherever one is

Figure 111. Kara Walker Gone: An Historical Romance of a Civil War s it Occurred between the Dusky
Thighs of One Young Negress and Her Heart, 1994.

stationed informs performance, location, as well as the time needed to perform. These assigned
and designated spaces restrict one intentionally from participating in the political body. In
contrast, in Walker’s Gone (e.g., see fig. 111), there is an uprooting, a dislodging of former
positions relegating seats of power. This tearing is such a violent act it permeates the whole of
the image in its attempt to forcefully reverse what has been laid down for an eternal grounding.
There are accounts in history that imply that many emancipated slaves refused to leave their
masters after the document of freedom was issued. Caught up in the delusion and betrayal of
identity, they believed themselves part of a genuine familial environment.
In Negro Life, there is no ambiguity of space; the slaves are in their appropriated places.
Their position denotes their place. The divider of Johnson’s worlds is obvious. We were only
privy to the world which lay out of reach, through the mistress, whose body has only partially
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passed over the dividing entrance. In Walker, no markers indicate certain spaces and places
belonging to the master and others to the slave. There are no demarcations. In many instances,
we are not certain what this scene is about because no one is performing what they have been
assigned to do, neither are they in the
place to do it. In this kind of refusal,
equality presents itself. The slave is not
slaving, and the master is not mastering.
“Real revolutions abolish the
distinctions between activity and
passivity, between those who form and
Figure 112. Honoré Daumier
The Third-Class Carriage, 1864.

those who are formed” (Tanke 107).

Here we will discuss two methods in the dialectic image which work to reconfigure the sensible,
that of the blurring of the logic of facts and the logic of fiction explored earlier. Ranciere cites
this example:
When Balzac places his reader before the entwined hieroglyphics on the tottering and
heteroclite façade of the house in At the Sign of the Cat and Racket, or has his reader
enter an antique dealer’s shop, with the hero of The Magic Skin, where jumbled up
together are objects both profane and sacred, uncivilized and cultured, antique and
modern, that each sum up a world, when he makes Cuvier the true poet reconstructing a
world from a fossil, he establishes a regime of equivalence. (Politics 37)
Walker’s images are replete with examples which denote this regime of equivalence? We
see it in the linking, the mixing of the metals of the slave and the master, of the mute and “living
speech,” (Ranciere, Politics 37) the visible with that of the invisible, the sacred with the profane,
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the historically inferior with that of the superior. In the image of the couple to the left, we see
clothing that denotes the woman's skirt as belonging to Southern gentility. But underneath, the
presence of two barefoot children who seem to be involved in some sport, game, or play. They
are identified as slave children because they are barefoot. The young white master and young
slave girl are copulating. This is less about a sexual act than
it is about violence perpetuated in the division of community
and of the forbidden, the taboo of interlacing—the Myth of
the Metals found in the Republic in Book 3—in the
redistribution of the sensible (miscegenation). The
Figure 113. Kara Walker
The Keys to the Coop, 1997.

watermelon, the chicken, the enlarged phallus, the weeping

willow trees, the clothing loosely fitting, the bare feet of the slaves, occupying the same
interchange of understanding, “making two things
interdependent” (Ranciere, Politics 36). In the image, there is
rational intent in this seemingly irrational display. It is an
attempt to bring meaning to this event as belonging to a shared
history, which is not only about the black community, but the
white, not about slavery alone, but mastering. In some regards,
both races were exploited by the hegemonic, capitalistic

Figure 114. Michael Charles
Beware, 1994.

system, and both are having to face the history of such exploitation. But not only that, this is a
display of equality belonging to the slave and the master. The various inscriptions described are
occupied conventionally as belonging to separate spheres, such as the watermelon to signify the
black and the willow tree, the Southern plantation life. These are now acts of emancipation
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written on the items, interchanged, mixed, out of place, and defining a new community no longer
obligated to history.
We touched upon ways Walker’s work is critiqued: satire, phantasmagoria, the spectacle,
as well as the carnivalesque. In Ranciere, we see these clearly as instruments of dissensus
belonging to the aesthetic regime. For instance, in its ordinariness, the art of Realism was not an
effective instrument for political inclusion. For it was not enough just for the silent community to
become visible. But when a work is taken out of its ordinariness, these resound of the political.
This is evident in Daumier’s The Third-Class Carriage (e.g., see fig. 112), where the caricature
in its presence transfers from the voiceless, powerless to a political platform. The familiar posed
in a different way; Daumier’s political work is an example of out of ordinariness. The poor are
highlighted against the men in the high hats suggesting a different classification of being. The
generational poverty is implied in the woman, baby, lady with basket, and small boy. We also
find these measures in Walker’s powerful expressions. In its excess of the ordinary, even the
ordinary of the myth is extraordinary in The Keys to the Coop (e.g., see fig. 113), where the
ordinary way in which to eat chicken is subverted, bringing attention to the violence of character
against the black community in the stereotypes of history. Hogarth is another example of this
removal from ordinariness in the carnivalesque as well as the spectacle. Hogarth exposes the
calamity of the aristocrats and their arranged marriages and excesses of the upper class in his
series Marriage a la Mode of 1743.
Similar in nature is the image embodying several stereotypes of the black man as
blackface, little black Sambo, and the Uncle Tom in Michael Ray Charles’ Beware (e.g., see
fig.114). The exaggerated physiognomy, the excessively dark skin, the engorged lips, wide eyes
illustrate a languid characterology of the performer who appears content while wearing the mask
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of indifference. Charles’s work attempts to drive the point of critique of the black man as a
constructed being in his naming.
Colescott’s George Washington Carver Crossing Delaware: Page from an American
History Textbook (e.g., see fig. 115) replaces the hegemonic order in his parodied work
appropriated from Emanuel Leutze’s Washington Crossing the Delaware (e.g., see fig.116). We

Figure 115. Robert Colescott, George Washington Carver Crossing Delaware: Page from an American
History Textbook, oil on canvas, 1975.

see in Leutze the heroic stance of George Washington, the aura of self-destiny, of superiority, not
only in Washington but as represented by the group of white men. But we know that the history
of America and its structural institutions was made possible by the black bodies in slavery who
built the physical foundation, hewn the rocks, and also invented, created, receiving no
recognition, but instead experienced constant dismissal, as they were cut out of history as not
belonging to the political body. In Colescott’s work, leading the way is the inventor George
Washington Carver, whose highly significant work with the peanut is mostly unacknowledged,
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except during Black History Month, even though there are numerous medicinal usages for the
peanut compounds discovered by Carver. In comparison, Colescott presents a confident Carver
leading the way, with a band of stereotypical misfits, who are neither competent for the
occupation of discovering nor anything else. These misfits belong to the stereotypes of history,
invented forms. But the stereotypes are not altered in their display or behavior. The readability of
it is somewhat ambiguous.
What is disconcerting in this
work is not the inclusion of history for
the black man but the complete
disavowal of the white. So, while the
point is well taken as a parody and is
effective in some regard. But, when one
history replaces the other as the show of

Figure 116. Emanuel Leutze, Washington Crossing the
Delaware oil on canvas, 1851.

one mastering over the other, there is no alteration of history, rather a substitute for hierarchy and
an erasure. It becomes the same as a designated place in history for the black man, but not
belonging to any community of history, lacking any context.
The erasing of historical reference is evident in much of modern art. It appears that the
whole of modern art was in a hurry to discover a proletariat art, an art of freedom, an art of
political inclusion. I do not contend that these are not works of protestation, but I argue here that
Walker’s work does more. It signals the fulfillment of the emancipatory promise in Schiller.
What is the promise, and how is it outlined in Walker’s work? We will come to this shortly.
The promise of emancipation as located at the end of the “Fifteenth Letter,” Schiller
declares, has been here all along, “operative in Art, and the feelings of the Greeks, its most
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distinguished exponents; only they transferred to Olympus what should have been realized on
earth” (Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man 80). Ranciere, who follows and expands
both Schiller and Kant in his propositions of aesthetics, states in Dissensus Chapter Nine, “The
Aesthetic Revolution and Its Outcomes,” that the promise will be made possible by what he calls
the “original scene of aesthetics” (116). What is the original scene of aesthetics save it be art
before the fall? In Colescott’s effort to carve out a place for the black man in history, he cuts him
out of history by removing the context. While a similar method of decontextualizing is used in
Walker, hers is the contextual conflation making the traditional readability impossible, thereby
providing a new perceptual experience of an old theme. What has Colescott set the black man
against? What backdrop, what claim?
In the introduction of the catalog for the only exhibition of Walker’s that I have had the
opportunity to experience directly, “Emancipating the Past,” Jill Hartz, executive director for the
Jordan Schnitzer Museum of Art, states of Walker’s work that these scenes are where “servitude
and freedom are played out” (Emancipating the Past). And Jessi DiTillio, curator for the same
exhibition, in her essay, writes that “old traumas reverberate through the generations”
(Emancipating the Past). This dialectic image is what is important to the promise of
emancipation inferred in Walker’s title. She has never veered in her conviction that these are
exorcisms of the trauma of slavery and ground for liberation. A work of art that does nothing to
recover the lost object of subjectivity is a failed art. Not only has it failed, but it is determined,
with a finality. To critique Walker’s work as a ritualized site, I do not contest. For the curator to
state that it shows intergenerational transmission of trauma, I will not dispute. But only in this,
that perception is taught. In Untitled (e.g., see fig. 117), Augusta Savage discloses the
psychological trauma of the black man in the display of the severed head of the black man. But
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the work does not claim to be one of emancipation, just an acknowledgment of castration—
reportage. And, although I will admit that confronting past trauma is half the battle, Walker’s
work not only reports, confronts, but liberates.
An examination of the work of two main critics of
Walker, the artists Betye Saar and Howardena Pindell, reveals
that their own work does not incite the horror they project on
Walker. Not that their work doesn’t elicit highly charged
violence, because they do, or the stirring of the blood of
revolution. Have we become afraid of the sound, taste, sight,
and reverberations of revolution? Having come out of the era
of such belligerence against the state machine—youth lending

Figure 117. Augusta Savage
Untitled, 1938.

their voices and lives to a cause, marches and demonstrations, political agendas, standing at the
point of death from the place of revolt –Angela Davis, the Black Panthers, Huey B. Newton,
Bobby Seale. Have we lost sight of purpose? Students were walking out of classrooms in protest
of the disenchantment of universities, the cavernous rooms of knowledge, antiquated beyond
time to gain insight into wisdom taught by the world community. Have we so deceitfully
believed in the comfort of the illusion of democracy?
Pindell and Saar and countless others are a continuation of the legacy of revolutionary
aesthetics, working to dismantle oppression in what Ranciere refers to as “revolutionary
vibrations” (Dissensus 171). These vibrations are extrapolated from works throughout the ages
and transmuted into the existing utterance, this polyphonic revolution owing to no one woman or
man. In this light, I will explore Saar’s, The Liberation of Aunt Jemima (e.g., see fig. 118) and
Pindell’s, Autobiography: Water/Ancestors/Middle Passage/Family Ghost (e.g., see fig. 119).
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Saar uses the stereotype of history in a revolt against the
Mammie stereotype in this double image. Her suggestive
pose is indicative of a resistance to the history of the type.
The black woman in history was assigned the duty of raising
white children while her family was neglected and at once to
attend to the duties of the house, the task of domesticity. In
Liberation, the gun represents a violent retrieval of the black
woman’s identity, exploited by white despotism. She protests
the commodification of the Mammie stereotype and
Figure 118. Betye Saar
The Liberation of Aunt Jemima,
1972.

performativity of the black woman as mammy. Saar’s work

is a work of resistance against the machine of usurpation. It is
an affront to the mammie as double product.
Pindell’s Autobiography: Water/Ancestors/Middle
Passage/Family Ghost is a narrative of the traumatic transport
that would alter the face and compass of the lives of the Negro
for generations, even to this present day. The title cues us in on
what we will see and experience in this work. We receive a
type of spontaneous education. Pindell presents this
submerging to denote the many lives that were destroyed by this

Figure 119. Howardena Pindell
Autobiography, 1988.

act. But her work does not ask a question, nor does it seek restitution. It is part of an ongoing
retelling of a very harrowing time in the history of humanity that was beyond the veil of
humanity. One of the problems with some works of art is the vein in which slavery is
represented. They serve as memorials, a homage to slavery. Pindell’s work seeks recognition,
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acknowledgment of humanity but does not necessarily provoke political action in the overturn of
the condition of the black race.
Walker’s work as a continuation of a revolutionary discourse as understood in Dissensus
in “The Monument and its Confidences,” or in Deleuze and Art’s Capacity of ‘Resistance,’” is
the descendant of these vibrations. I suppose that Walker’s adversaries—and she has many—
believe that they and Walker are on different sides of the battle for emancipation. I am certain
that they are not. We find similar in tenor in these works the entrance to history, and that in my
estimation to the primal scene as history.
The Aesthetic Unconscious: Black Masculinity and the Primal Scene
The primal scene is central to the discussion of psychoanalysis as it regards the recovery
of the lost subject lodged in the unconscious, and, for this project, it is the confrontation of
history as the primal scene for the black man. I claim that history is the primal scene of the black
man and therefore must be understood as the split of identity and at once the starting place of a
rewrite of the black man in history. Ranciere would state in Politics that “however, the primal
scene can be taken in two senses, either as the starting point of a process or as an original
separation” (28-29). What do I mean by this? I argue in Chapter One that the black man is an
invention of science and technology, and again in Chapter Two as being performed through
media. Suppose the black man is an invention that is interpreted as non-existent. In that case, the
primal scene for the black man is also fabricated and can be nothing less than a fabrication as
with the Wolf Man’s subjectivity, a knotting together of tall tales, fairy tales, and myths. The
black man need only return to history and the history of the constructed images to understand
those old constructions and reconstruct a new image from the fragments persisting to this present
hour.
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One of the propositions of this project is the claim of the emancipatory potential for the
black man that is locatable in the aesthetic experience, vis-à-vis the dialectic image, which I
make the case is evident in Walker’s work. As stated in earlier pages, Fanon, writing in 1952, in
Black Skin, White Masks, relays his findings of the effects of colonized people and racism and
concludes that the black man has a complex neurosis and needs to be liberated, quite frankly,
from himself. His neurosis, as far as Fanon is concerned, is multilayered and accounts for his
perceived masculinity, his subjectivity. Similarly, Freud states of the Wolf Man, “and it was
from his threatened narcissism that he derived the masculinity with which he defended himself
against his passive attitude towards his father” (Gay, The Freud Reader 415). This statement
implies that the mind creates the means of acceptance and or adaptation to certain identities
when psychological annihilation is threatened. In the case of the black man, he adapts to the
condition of being white in some cases and forgoes the persecution of being black, which he
cannot fully realize. This is the black man’s neurosis. In the case of the Wolf Man, his very
subjectivity is fashioned from his neurosis and nothing more.
According to Fanon, it is only through the psychoanalytic process that the neurosis,
which he claims are socially constituted, can be rectified. He notes that the problem of the black
man’s ‘inferiority’ and the white man’s ‘superiority’ results in “a massive psycho-existential
complex” (Black Skin, White Masks xvi). And that “by analyzing it we aim to destroy it” (Black
Skin, White Masks xvi). The correlative between recognition and destruction is paramount,
seeing that the site of an existential crisis is at once the moment of recognition. The primal scene
then serves as a dual encounter. We hope to make the necessary argument of the black man and
history as the scene of the crisis of identity and at once the possibility as the starting place of
redemption. I do not pretend to be capable of elaborating on psychoanalysis in either Freudian or
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Lacanian terms. I would like to see come out of this concatenation of aesthetics and
psychoanalysis is their relationship to art, its effect on the black man as a traumatic subject of
history, and the furthering of this discourse in Walker.
The project of Freud’s psychoanalysis developed in the wake of his work with hysteria. It
was in this that he began to interrogate the relationship between the sleeping and the waking
neurotic. The dream was the portal into the cavernous abyss lost to time in what he identified as
giving way to the primal scene and eventually that of deferred action. This deferred action is a
schematic of time warding off the impact of the traumatic event in the subject until, according to
Freud, there comes a period when the individual has gained the maturity to access what they
experienced as trauma mentally. I speak specifically of one of Freud’s most celebrated cases,
The Case of Infantile Neurosis (The Wolf Man), which was introduced earlier, but which I will
examine presently in a close read.
The case of the Wolf Man in the larger scope of philosophical inquiry is a treatise on the
ongoing debate of the subject. Where does the subject reside? Is the subject a social, biological,
or political construct? Freud’s Wolf Man is a direct response to these questions as this case opens
up to these variants. As a social construct, the Wolf Man is a collection of fairy tales and tall
tales that the Wolf Man experienced throughout his childhood. As a biological construct, his
psychological disposition is revealed in the form of neurotic episodes in anxiety dreams as well
as wet dreams and fits. And if we are to understand him as a political subject, as belonging to the
social body, his condition has estranged and alienated him from the community.
Many theorists have contributed to the understanding of the unconscious. Descartes, who
is considered the father of modern thought for having understood the subject as his cogito, at
once paved the way for entrance into the unconscious subject as well. Lacan states that it was
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that step that made it possible for the excavation of the unconscious. Modern thought is the
emergence of the human sciences which Foucault claims is the science of the unconscious (The
Order of Things 374). This statement by Lacan is significant because the unconscious has always
existed since the beginning of time, though not named. Opposite his certainty, there is the
subject, who, as I said just now, has been waiting there since Descartes. I dare to state as a truth
that the Freudian field was possible only a certain time after the emergence of the Cartesian
subject in so far as modern science began only after Descartes made his inaugural step.
What I find intriguing about the following passage from Lacan’s The Four Fundamental
Concepts of Psychoanalysis is the idea of recall or call as recollection.
It is on this step that depends the fact that one can call upon the subject to
re-enter himself in the unconscious—for, after all, it is important to know who
one is calling. It is not the soul, either mortal or immortal, which has been with us
for so long, nor some shade, some double, some phantom, nor even some
supposed psycho-spherical shell, the locus of the defences and other such
simplified notions. It is the subject who is called—there is only he, therefore, who
can be chosen. (47)
In Plato, if we remember correctly, recollection was the idea of the soul’s remembering that it
had once stood before the Theory of Forms in its perfection. The concept of recollection for
Plato guarantees the determined subject and knowledge. Lacan states that this recollection is the
call of the subject which has always been there, at home, the dream which reveals it, and in
language that delivers it through “a stuttering, stumbling way” (47). These recollections are
close, even as close as our inward desires. The reentrance in oneself is humankind as now the
subject of the object of his nature. Even throughout the years, when the unconscious was not
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named, it existed. It was credited as something else, veiled for a time, hidden in darkness under
visible light. This enigma belongs to the unconscious, the lost subject. Though we speak
specifically of the black man in this project, we understand that humankind, in general, is in
possession of the delusion of subjectivity as Lacan understands it in the mirror image of
misrecognition.
The case of the Wolf Man is considered one of the most extraordinary cases in the annals
of Freud’s psychoanalytic oeuvre for the critical role of the dream in coming to terms with the
patient’s psychopathology. What is unique to Freud’s experimentation is the idea of the neurotic
as the traumatic subject. Having understood sexuality as intrinsic to the formation of the subject,
Freud sees the neurotic subject as having been derailed as a result of a traumatic event.
Therefore, the sexual phase— this phase helps navigate the process of the subject that allows for
a healthy social condition—is compromised. In its place is a displaced subject, construction of an
anamorphic subjectivity, if you will. And subjectivity being not without the witness of desire—
the desire of the other is now lodged in the unconscious vault of repression. In the Wolf Man, we
have a privileged front seat as Freud unfurls the traumatic subject and gains access to an
otherwise unrecoverable primal scene vis-à-vis the dream. How are dreams represented? Are
they logical, or are they illogical? Should we see them as linear in time or not subsisting in time?
Can they be read like a map, or are they more akin to a maze? And can it be that Walker’s
images are part of the same network of signifiers?
What has formed the condition of infantile neurosis is the repressed primal scene, the
trauma, which is not technically or theoretically trauma. In what could be both the sexual and
intellectual development of the child, there is a deferment of trauma. It is not considered trauma
because the infant of one and one half is not mature enough to express this traumatic event at the
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first moment. Freud clarifies that “the impressions of that early period of life, though they were
for the most part buried in amnesia, left ineradicable traces upon the individual’s growth and in
particular laid down the disposition to any nervous disorder that would follow” (Gay The Freud
Reader 20). Trauma after the fact is where this whole matter becomes convoluted and where
Nachträglichkeit enters. Nachträglichkeit, a German term translated into English as deferred
action or afterwardsness, and in French as apres coup are immediately taken up in the dream act
as a reconnaissance. Deferred action branches off in the deterministic model of causality and the
hermeneutic model of re-interpretation. Apres coup, also interpreted as the deferred action, is
taken up by Lacan in his revival of Freud’s Nachträglichkeit and branches off into the mode of
retroaction and anticipation. Freud’s outcome of this process of retrieval from the spoils of the
unconscious is to confront the ego regarding the symptom(s) of neurosis and then discharge
them. Does the discharge create the subject anew?
Lacan states that when Freud came upon the dream as fundamental to his discovery of
psychoanalysis, he primarily gained the tool needed to pursue his study of the mind aggressively.
Freud was interested in establishing psychoanalysis as a science. In Lacan’s Four Fundamental
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, he states, “here, in the field of the dream, you are at home” (33).
And in Gay’s Freud: A Life for Our Time, he insists that “the Wolf Man supplied the master key
to his neurosis in the form of a dream” (193). Understanding the place of the dream was
important for Lacan in his departure from Freud regarding the matter of deferment. The dream
images refer to time and anticipation for the future made possible through the network of
signifiers that are always in motion. Lacan’s concept of the unconscious is very similar to
Ranciere’s reference to the aesthetic unconscious or the aesthetic regime. This always in motion
predicates the indeterminate object in Lacan. The aesthetic image, similar to the aesthetic
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unconscious images, needs no translation or mediation. They are intentionally scattered,
ruptured, unrestrained.
Malcolm Bowie’s reading of Lacan and Nachträglichkeit is distinctly different in that
Freud’s psychoanalytical theory is based on the hermeneutical model. Though the dreamwork as
aesthetical was the key, Freud positioned himself as the possessor of esoteric knowledge, as a
philosopher, which left the patient in a position of dependence instead of self-liberation. For
Lacan, it was an intentional act of moving towards an intended future but controlling as much as
possible the outcome of the hand that fate had dealt. Lacan, having restructured the whole telos
of Freudian psychoanalysis, does so with that of Nachträglichkeit. Lacan postulates apres coup
as retroaction and anticipation. He moves psychoanalysis into the arena of the linguistic model
and ascribes those critical concatenations of the primal scene, the symptoms, the history of the
patient, and the dream in the network of signifiers. As to the primal scene, he moves into a model
of calculated subjectivity. Freud’s obsession to retrieve the original primal scene was
problematic for Lacan while ignoring this kind of reinvention of self through language and
logical time.
Freud demands a total objectification of proof so long as it is in question of dating the
primal scene, but he no more presupposes all of the resubjectifications of the event that
seem to him to be necessary to explain its effects at each turning point where the subject
restructures himself-that is, as many restructurings of the event as take place, as he put it,
nachtraglich, at a later date. What is more, with an audacity bordering on offhandedness,
he asserts that he holds it legitimate in the analysis of processes to elide the time intervals
in which the event remains latent in the subject. (Malcolm Bowie, Lacan 34)
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Here is where Freud and Lacan part in their assessment of deferred action. Lacan states
that the regressive mode in which Freud persists in locating the primal scene as the pure scene is
counter-productive. Why? Because these concatenations together were what composed the
subjectivity of the individual. In the case of the Wolf Man, Freud linked subjectivity through a
series of events, such as the inoculation of the sheep on the grandfather’s farm, being exposed to
the elder sister’s friends urinating, as well as fairytales of wolves, which contributed to his
neurosis. Lacan is concerned that this retroactive method, which Jean LaPlanche calls
determined, did not leave room for an anticipation of the future. This rewriting does happen to
the patient, but it does not take into account future possibilities. Rather, according to Lacan, the
patient creates the scenario of the past as it relates to what the patient can live with as their truth.
Lacan states it as such:
An entire dimension of Freud’s work redramatizes the myth of the Furies: the past is
visited upon the individual in a series of violent incursions, and his future, if he has one,
can be envisaged only as a prolongation of these and a continuing helpless desire to lift
their curse. The retroactive mode, operating alone, produces a backward-looking hope, a
wish to create for oneself a past that can be lived with. (Malcolm Bowie, Lacan 65)
What is important in this statement is that it bears the burden of recouping the lost object
of subjectivity for Lacan. Let me bring Fanon to the conversation. He states that the “black man,
however sincere, is a slave to the past” (Black Skin, White Masks 200). He cautioned the black
man not to become his history. And again, he states, “I do not want to sing the past to the
detriment of my present and my future” (Black Skin, White Masks 201). For Lacan, language was
at the foundation of this effort not to reestablish a past that is livable but to envision a future that
is possible. Malcolm Bowie’s Lacan proposes that “the subject comes into being at the point of
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intersection between an irrecoverable past and an unattainable future” (165). In other words,
Freud’s primal scene is not obtainable, so a new subjectivity must be founded on both loss and
the potential of the new. That which Lacan reaches for and finds in this is “desire in pursuit.” He
states that desire is always mobile and ubiquitous. So, Freud, because he did not necessarily
make language his model as did Lacan, has not explicated this mode of reiteration of the telling
and retelling as both a mode of irrecoverable and unattainable. And that in that mode is the
continual pursuit that desire makes. For Freud, it is the dreamwork and the ambiguity or the
confused images, displaced without logic and narrative, to make this connection to language. For
the most part, at least as it had become in Western terms, language is a semiological system of
understanding. What Lacan did was to make a connection in this new narrative of the dream as a
network of signifiers. In this network, there is an ever conferring to the other in this becoming of
the subject.
This desire in pursuit comes close to the Hegelian model of subjectivity and history,
which Lacan tried hard not to fall into completely. Bowie states that “what happens in Lacan’s
theory is that difference is relentlessly transferred from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, from the
world we see to the world we speak, from senses to signification” (Malcolm Bowie, Lacan 123).
Lacan speaks like an aesthetician when he engages language as not stationary; it is constantly on
the move; it signifies and moves desire along the path, which is desire as becoming of being.
This becoming of being is the promise of aesthetic emancipation.
I was fortunate to come across one of Ranciere’s small texts, The Aesthetic Unconscious,
that I think sheds light on the relationship of psychoanalysis to aesthetics. The text also allows a
provisional correlation with Walker’s silhouettes which has the similitude of being a discourse
on the unconscious. In the critique of her work, the correlation is evident in terms such as
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apparition, phantasmagoria, etc. Further, there is a connective thread to that of the unconscious,
which lies within the framework of Walker’s work and subjectivity which is the project of
psychoanalysis from the beginning. How in the greater scope can we understand her work as
participating in the project of emancipation in the case of the black man? In Freud’s most notable
case, we find a thorough examination of the methodology of psychoanalysis through the
components of the dream, the primal scene, the history of the patient and his symptoms, and the
relativity to deferred action.
I would like to see how we can apply this methodology to the reading of Walker as it
relates to the primal scene and deferred action. The importance of this mitigation of the
unconscious analysis is first to come to terms with the method in which Walker works. Secondly,
what is important for this project is to return Walker’s work to the community in the pursuit of
releasing the manacles of the black man from his imprisoned state, in its duality, as mind and
body, and the impending enslavement belonging to that of mass incarceration. Up to this point,
though, Walker is discussed as a force of dissensus, rebellion, and liberation. The approach to the
exigency of the black man and emancipation or that of mass incarceration has not been
interrogated. We will also apply the same analysis of one of Walker’s works through the
Lacanian lens. First, a return to Ranciere.
Ranciere makes two claims in The Aesthetic Unconscious that I will use as a starting
point. Firstly, Freud’s unconscious is possible because the aesthetic unconscious is already
activated. Provisionally then, to think unconsciously to a certain extent is to think aesthetically.
Kristeva’s entrance belongs here and repeats the claim of Ranciere that psychoanalysis is derived
out of the aesthetic unconscious.146 Ranciere asserts that to move in the aesthetic realm is to do
so without knowing your actions fully. It is what is stated of the artist who participates in the
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genius world soul implied by Jasper. Walker does just that, but not by conventional
methodologies of projecting meaning, so therefore the methods cannot be taught. That which
cannot be retrieved as recollection and taught belongs to an unconscious state. Secondly, the
aesthetic unconscious was ushered in by literature before Freud’s project of psychoanalysis. The
aesthetic regime of literature made Freud’s project possible in that Romantic literature began to
assign thought to that which had once only been handled in literature as an object. The sensuous
world became utterance. Ranciere dates the aesthetic regime’s appearance by stating that “the
Romantic Age actually lunged language into the materiality of the traits by which the historical
and social world becomes visible to itself . . . the new fictionality” (Politics 23). The Romantic
Age is understood as occurring around the end of the eighteenth century. Ranciere establishes the
aesthetic regime as aesthetic unconscious made its presence in literary works such as Flaubert
that no longer attended to a conventional order of things, but made evident an unconscious type
of mode, the underbelly of the hidden revealed through the symptomatology of language and
image.
Is Ranciere proposing that there are two unconsciousness, one belonging to the field of
aesthetics and the other belonging to the domain of psychoanalysis? Or is he substantiating
literature first and foremost to validate aesthetics as thought? Ranciere asserts that Freud
understood that the model in which he was to traverse from hypnosis to that of the excavation of
a lost subject would have to be radical. He was able to go to literature and choose the subjects of
literature and even critique art with a psychoanalytic rubric because these were first the workings
of the aesthetic regime already operative. Further, we see in Freud so much of his methodology,
displacements, resistance, transference, condensation, dream distortion, the ambiguous images
that are a calabash of heterogeneity occupying the same space. If this appears to be in the same
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vein as the distribution of the sensible, it is because it is. But it is a distribution of emancipatory
potential, a re-distribution. Every act distributes. But the question is whether that act is for
subjugation or freedom. This placing together marks the potential of a new myth.
Are Walker silhouettes sexual acts to be examined as Freudian drives playing out in the
field of the unconscious in this orgiastic display? Is Walker’s work the presentation of a
dreamwork where the meaning lies behind it, veiled by the ego? The following statement by
Ranciere is very telling. The “invention of psychoanalysis occurs at the point where philosophy
and medicine put each other into question by making thought a matter of sickness and sickness a
matter of thought” (The Aesthetic Unconscious 19). What Freud instigated in his new project was
not a way to fully liberate the subject but to investigate thought as an illness and place it back on
the right road of consciousness. What is problematic for Ranciere is that thought in
psychoanalysis had been portrayed as pathological in the first place.
Ranciere is important in this conversation for what he brings to bear on our understanding
of the aesthetic unconscious—the aesthetic unconscious refers to arts that no longer abide under
the aegis of the representative regime of art. Therefore, these works have shed their former
signifiers—and how that unconsciousness not only made it possible for Freud’s project of
psychoanalysis but his usage of these aesthetic models. i.e., in literature as a witness to the
scientific proposition of the new science through the hermeneutic methodology. In The Aesthetic
Unconscious, in the section “What Freud Has to Do with Aesthetics,” Ranciere makes a case for
Freud’s unconscious being grounded in the aesthetic unconscious, which was ushered in through
literature during the Romantic period, well before Freud’s psychoanalytic project. Freud himself
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makes the same reference in The Freud Reader in which he admits that “poets and students of
nature” (20) had long discovered what he is now archeologizing. It is not a question, nor an
inquiry, but a statement as such, a proposition. The reason for the pronouncement and the
examination of Freud is this: that Freud based his entire psychoanalytic enterprise on a literary

Figure 120. Kara Walker, The End of Uncle Tom and the Grand Allegorical Tableau of Eva in Heaven, 2012.

subject, Oedipus the King, and his countless references to literary and visual examples, as well
analysis and interpretations.
For many aestheticians, there is a thread that runs from aesthetics to the unconscious.
Kristeva indicates this in The Revolt of Sense and Non-Sense “What are we to think of this other
form of rebellion, which for the subject is no longer represented by neurosis but by the creation
of thought and language, the aesthetic creation often parallel to neurosis and even to psychosis
but irreducible to it” (7)? The reducibility of aesthetics to neurosis would place aesthetics as
claiming itself pathogenetic and belonging to the category of illness. But aesthetics as thought
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challenges the convention of knowledge and thought to begin with Plato as the field of a
segregated thought in philosophy and the guardian of said thought as philosopher-king.
The black man stands before Walker’s image
The End of Uncle Tom and the Grand Allegorical
Tableau of Eva in Heaven (e.g., see fig. 120), and
the question is: what does he experience? I would
argue that he does not experience a traumatization
as what would be inferred by Fryd from her essay
Figures 121. Chase & Sanborn
Advertising Cards, 1888.

“Bearing witness to the trauma of slavery in Kara

Walker’s videos” Testimony, Eight Possible Beginnings, and I was transported,” where she
proposes generational retraumatization. Instead, the black man discovers that these are not
depictions of historical stereotypes because they are present, not as themselves, but as
fragmentations and ruins of
former selves. These images of
the stereotypes may appear to
signify the historical primal
scene because they must appear
in order to be recognized. But
having observed these
prototypes of history (e.g., see

Figure 122. Frederick Burr Opper, Darkies Day at the Fair, 1893.

figs. 121-122) as appearance, at a closer look, their actions betray their historical naming. In
Walker, the stereotypes of history are no more; they are ruptured, scattered, suspended,
emancipated. In the mode of the Lacanian network of signifiers, the images are ever chasing
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each other and allowing for an entrance of narration that cannot be placed on any former treatises
of the historical representation that previously bound the black man to his place, his form, his
station.

Figures 123-124. Kara Walker, Fixin’, Pitted, Fished, Pitied, 1995, Three-dimensional pop-out book.

Image after image, Walker’s characters rewrite history in the narrative form of nonnarrative suspension, just as in the Wolf Man’s retelling was a rewrite and an erasure of the
former position of his subjugated self. Ranciere, noting of Baumgarten in his summation of
aesthetics, states that “this identify between knowing and not knowing, between activity and
passivity, is the very fact of art in the aesthetic regime; it radicalizes what Baumgarten called
“confused clarity: into an identity of contraries” (Ranciere Unconscious 24). Walker’s work is a
work of aesthetics not belonging to the representative order. The aesthetic or dialectic image is
confused and clear knowledge (e.g., see figs. 123-124). When we speak of confused clarity, it is
as much about the form as referencing a certain knowledge. Traditionally, lucidity is the defining
character of reason. The question is always: is it clear knowledge? Walker’s images are cut and
designed in a classical form which could signal a type of ideal or perfection, yet because they are

233
rendered in the form of a silhouette, they are analogous to the Platonic shadow and can be
interpreted as unintelligible It is not so much the subject matter we are attending to at this
moment, as it is the form.
The Aesthetic Revolution and the Promise of Emancipation
This promise was touched upon earlier in this chapter and, as mentioned is in Schiller in
his “Fifteenth Letter.” Now I will make further correlations in Walker’s work. We have
discussed the aesthetic regime and how it differs from the representative in Walker and politics
in its etymology as the way in which those designated as “noisy animals”147 reinsert themselves
in the community. Ranciere’s assessment of modern and postmodern artists as having not
realized their dream of revolutionary art is expounded in his
various writings. For the modern artist, the work had become
the flat surface like an empty signifier of the absolute, and for
the postmodern artist, the aesthetic of hope had become “a
deliberation on mourning” (Politics 38), and art became
unrepresentable. The postmodern claim, asserts Ranciere, lies
directly on Lyotard’s interpretation of Kant and the division of
the sensible and the supra-sensible in the reach of reason. In the
aesthetic regime, nothing is veiled; nothing is behind the image
Figure 125. Kara Walker
You Do, 1993.

that does not speak. There is nothing, in other words, that can

stake the claim of being unpresentable without having removed itself in its autonomy from the
very thing they sought, the political body. Ranciere states, this is the characteristic of the
representative regime where we meet with embodied fiction representing itself as the natural
order.
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Although the modern artist’s works may not be considered truly revolutionary, they are
revolutionary as “material” for dissensus in Ranciere’s viewpoint. “Suitable political art would
ensure, at the same time, the production of a double effect: the readability of a political
signification and a sensible or perceptual shock caused conversely, by the uncanny, but that
which resists signification” (Politics 42). The uncanny (e.g., see fig. 125), the perceptual shock,
and that which resists signification can all be found in Walker’s work. Uncanny as
uncomfortably strange or mysterious is visible in Walker’s You Do. The large twin figures loom
in space and hold miniature versions of men. Who can guess the interpretation? There is nothing
that signals to the spectator the readability of these images.
But not just these traits which mark a political signification, but I would like to look at
Walker’s work regarding play and suspension based on the theories of Kant, Schiller, and
Ranciere for their contribution in the aesthetic revolution and that of the promise. Even though
the revolution and the promise appear distinct, they are at once the same act, that of promise as
revolution, and revolution in the promise. In other words, the promise itself is revolutionary. I
state that all art is not conceived as a promise but as desire and driven by usurpation. In
Schiller’s aesthetic letters, we not only hear the “vibrations” of Kant, but he takes what Kant
surmises and makes a promise to those who are without hope of arts’ redemptive value.
Vibrations is another way Ranciere describes the resounding effect of the revolutionary chain of
history. Vibrations are intrinsic in the object that remains, not as an object, not as subject, but as
experience, life. These works are part of a continuum of aesthetics lodged not in the object but
the essence. In other words, an artistic residue that is never lost to the past but partakes of the
present.
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When Schiller, following Kant, introduced the idea of suspension and the third impulse,
this was a revolutionary stance that would alter the face of art and its relationship to the
community. In his “Fifteenth Letter,” Schiller postulates what he knows has the formulation of
being a paradox, a contradiction. The statement of man’s relationship to play as being the
condition wherein humankind is in his/her nature. True human nature is neither rational nor
sensuous but both in equilibrium at once. To indicate ‘free’ is already indicative of how this
impulse will subsist. Rousseau brings the power of freedom to a simple example in his first
chapter in Emile. He states that “the baby constantly makes useless efforts which exhaust its
forces or retard their progress. He was less cramped, less constrained, less compressed in the
amnion than in his diapers. I do not see what he gained by being born” (42). In this passage, he
presents the innocence of the birth of a child whose restriction was already evident in the womb,
but at the least, more natural. When the child is delivered, he has no sooner been constricted to
the point of physical exhaustion and possible deformation. In particular, the latter of the passage
appears to be as cruel as the constriction. Rousseau makes this comparison to denote the role of
the state and the order of a tyrannical education that forms all free creatures into restricted
citizens of the state.
The play impulse is no arbitrary musing but stands as mediation for what was lost in the
transition to a thinking animal. It appears as contradictory as a false truth because the work of
being human seems to be that of seriousness, and reason is involved in that very act. It would
also seem that play as a third impulse is more synonymous to the sensuous, just by the language
association, and therefore would fall short in consideration for emancipatory potential. What
Schiller has been setting up since the beginning of the letters is to construct the path in which we
now have entered. He states that “man plays only when he is in the full sense of the word a man,
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and he is only wholly Man when he is playing” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 80). There
are a few operative words here that should assist us in understanding this statement: ‘full,’ and
wholly.’ There can be no claim to full humankind without being in the state of play. Further, the
same acclamation of such a claim as the state of play is the state of being wholly human.

Figure 126. Kara Walker, Slavery, Slavery, Slavery, 1997.

That is the understanding of the dual nature of humankind, and the loss of the innocence
of that nature, and of the equilibrium of reason and the sensuous which at various times acted on
their own in their states as claiming the rights to humankind as the state of freedom. Having left
the natural course of freedom and nature, Schiller proposes a need to develop another impulse
differing from both that would be a cross between them both. The inclination he suggests is play.
Not only that, but that play is the state of humankind when they are free to be themselves. What
is this new impulse, except that of aesthetics, this play of beauty? “Aesthetics promises a nonpolemical, consensual framing of the common world” (Ranciere Politics 69). Plato believed that
play was instrumental in the process of education even though he was devout in his attention to
the letter of the law. I would like to consider here the discussion of Walker’s Slavery, Slavery,
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Slavery (e.g., see fig. 126) as it pertains to the conceptual model of play and suspension in Kant,
Schiller, and Ranciere in their role in the aesthetic regime. How are these concepts conceived in
art as an aesthetic revolution and that of a promise?
Ranciere describes the aesthetic revolution as “the end of an ordered set of relations
between what can be seen and what can be said, knowledge and action, activity and passivity”
(Politics 50). Kant wrote during an important period in the history of aesthetics. Thinking about
art is not art as a subject to simply muse upon, but art as a mode of thought. It is Kant who
initiated this proclamation of the critique of all things. And in his Critique of Judgement, 1790,
beauty is expounded upon. The term disinterested, genius and other neologisms are involved in
this important subject of art as it participates in modern thought. In this grand scheme of
postulating the judgment, we encounter the term play or free play.
When one approaches Kant’s epistemological mountain, it can be quite disconcerting.
The language alone is a challenge to understand. But, with patience, one can be guided to the
dialectic in his writings, which sets up the impetus for a new potential of perception. And,
although his concepts of disinterest and transcendental deduction may have the appearance of
belonging to the order of Plato, this is not so. Plato postulates the forms as actual in some
removed realm where everything is realized in perfection, beauty, virtue, wisdom. Kant’s forms,
instead, are the structuring of knowledge operationally in its pure and practical manner. The role
of play is critical for our understanding of how it resides in the project of emancipation. For
Kant, play resides in the imagination as understanding. In Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic
Judgement: Translated with Seven Introductory Essays (1911) is the following, “The cognitive
powers brought into play by this representation are here engaged in a free play since no definite
concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition” (58). And elsewhere Kant insists, “as the
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subjective universal communicability of the mode of representation in a judgement of taste is to
subsist apart from the presupposition of any definite consent, it can be nothing else than the
mental state present in the free play of imagination and understanding” (Kant 58). The discussion
of free play in Kant can perhaps be understood as to state that all forms are forms of knowledge.
In what category that form belongs is an entirely different issue. In the free play of form are the
dictates, not of finality of form in what suggests an end, but a loosening of form in the
imagination. Thus, in free play itself is the proposition for emancipation.
This disinterest in the allocation of the form only in contemplation was misinterpreted
and then adopted by avant-garde artists, stripping all associations of the work of art from the
history of thought. This withdrawal led to an absolute rather than a return to the communal life.
Simply stated, Kant was not proposing a doctrine of art that emptied itself of purpose, only of
will. In abstract art, with no way to locate either, the goal of the modern artist fell short. The
absoluteness of the art was its pure autonomy. I would like to apply these concepts to continue to
explore Walker’s work as it is grounded not in philosophy but as philosophy, as language, as
speech, as liberation, in which art speaks and at once is visible speech.
One of the things readily perceived in Walker’s work is that the characters are actively
involved in the appearance of play. While this is an astonishing way to approach work whose
theme revolves around the most horrific act of humanity, the Slave Trade, I believe that it is
worth analyzing. It is not only in this work of Walker’s that we encounter play, but it is evident
in most of her work in the silhouette format. In Kant’s “Analytic of the Beautiful,” the Second
Moment, Kant postulates that the given object as a judgment of taste is universal. He states the
following as a summary: “The cognitive powers brought into play by this representation are here
engaged in a free play, since no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition . .
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. it can be nothing else than the mental state present in the free play of imagination and
understanding (58).
Kant divides knowledge into two regions, the one a priori and the other a posteriori. The
latter involves the analytic and the former synthetic, which is pure understanding and
imagination, while the other is involved in empirical matters. It is his argument in the judgment
of taste that they become universal in the conjoining of these. For cognition is not there to
present law to the object but is suspended in its disinterest. So, though the object has the very
appearance of representation, that representation is of no consequence. Ranciere would state that
“behind the Kantian definition of aesthetic judgment as a judgment without concepts—without
the submission of the intuitive given to conceptual determination—Schiller indicates the political
distribution that is the matter at stake” (Politics 43-44). Elsewhere, Kant states that “all form of
objects of sense (both of external and also, mediately, of internal sense) is either figure or play”
(Kant 67). He describes free play as divorced from all constraints of rules, as not grounded in the
object as a concept, harmonious by contrast, and as the conversion from labor.
When Schiller discusses the idea of a man being only himself when he plays, he is
immediately discussing two concepts. One is the role of humankind and the utilization of the
imagination and its role in the elevation of consciousness not as reason but as suspension. And
two, the suspension of both impulses that no longer can regard the object’s appearance as one of
representation with interest. The result of this is now before the individual as free play. And what
is free play except emancipation? According to Schiller, the concept of justice, beauty, and virtue
that Plato assigned to another region, a virtual region of forms, is the duty of culture in the task
of aesthetics. This does not mean that either impulse of reason or the sensuous overtakes the
other, but both come together to form a promise of a new perception. Schiller contends “that
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there shall be a partnership between the formal and the material impulse, that is to say, a play
impulse, because it is only the union of reality with form, of contingency with necessity, of
passivity with freedom, that fulfills the concept of humanity” (On the Aesthetic Education of
Man 121). This will fulfill nature which requires variety, and reason, unity. It is in this union of
opposition that freedom is launched. Not as an absolute but as another element unto itself.
Beauty, then defined in Kant, Schiller, and Ranciere, is equilibrium between sensuous
and rational. Lavater was assured that his project fulfilled what he believed was the absolute state
of man in physiognomy. He believed he had come upon a doctrine and approach to fulfill
nature’s true commission. Lavater’s project did not come close to this idea because it bears all
the marks of prejudice in the content of political intention and establishing a discourse belonging
to the representative regime. “For to declare it once and for all, Man plays only when he is in the
full sense of the word a man, and he is only wholly Man when he is playing” (Schiller, On the
Aesthetic Education of Man 128). In his opening statement to the letters, Schiller states that his
appeal is to the whole man. Throughout his letters, he surmises that humankind, for the most
part, operates in only one state, the state of reason. But this is not the natural state of reason, but
unnatural reason. The idea stands on this: that the dual nature of humankind in the reconciliation
of humankind is located in a state of play, where neither impulse abides in law or in the
sensuous. It is only then that play can come into being this is the place of freedom.
Again, Schiller insists in his “Third Letter” that man can only become moral when he has
become aesthetic. Moral man is possible because the state of or the experience of aesthetics is
lodged in the Other, in the taking of freedom in perception. How do we imagine a common
world? The representative regime constructed a lie of perception, the who and how we perceive
in which the aesthetic regime must reverse by choosing to see ethically disregarding previous
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determined perception of the Other. Ethics, morality have always been important issues. But the
law of reason could not accomplish judiciousness through binding agreements, nor the morality
of the institutionalization of restraint of personality located in Christian hermeneutics. The
substantiation of truth as being underwritten by God is why
Andrew Bowie declared that the beginning of modern thought
was that of the death of God. Christian hermeneutics also
references Nietzschean nihilism and at once the representative
regime.
The quality of being human lies in the union of reason
and the sensuous in aesthetics. The conversion from work to free
play is evident in Walker’s Slavery. The figures appear to
pronounce a representational work, but they are immediately
suspended, elevated above and beyond the image itself. It is the
Figure 127. Kara Walker,
The Emancipation
Approximation, 2005.

action that is what is most fecund. The older lady dances with a
child, the two women on the rooftop appear in a playful

encounter, the twin Victorian ladies sneak up behind the slave as if to play a prank, the roles are
suspended in animation, no one acts out as slave or master. Labor is absent. And what is this act
of suspension except for that suspension in Hegel, that middle ground found in the master/slave
narrative of recognition? The boat-like figure, the young slave, pouring water led us to believe
that we are capable of analyzing these traditionally, but then suspension is inevitable. And in this
inevitability, we realize that the suspended, animated actions are preventing the characters from
fulfilling their historical roles. As such, both the slave and the master are liberated. The two
figures walk off the frame, defining the distance. The woman’s missing heel immediately betrays
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the action of the woman, as the young slave boy catches her feces as she walks. The woman
holds a mask in her hand with features resembling a slave girl. A man is flatulating, while his
reflection is that of a black male slave. All of these images are a dialectic in their refusal to be
read.
The play paradigm is evident in Walker’s work across various series. In The
Emancipation Approximation (e.g., see fig. 127), which we discussed previously in the image of
Leda and the Swan, we experience instances of the act of play. We observe a black slave playing
dress-up. These dress-up times were fantastical days of a childhood filled with long dresses,
baggy pants, or tight ones, hats and umbrellas, shoes not fitting tiny feet, ties and Sunday hats,
frills and lipstick, and cigars in our pretense to be grown-ups. And no matter the actual condition
of our lives, at that moment, we are in another role, and we are someone else, something else, of
which we had participated in its creation.
On the plantation, with its strict adherence to the division of race and place, dressing up
as master would have been tolerated. The very thought would not have ended well for the black
man as he strode even in his space, perpetrating a different representation of visibility. History
tells us of the relationship of power and fashion in various societies and how fashion, in general,
denotes class differentiation. Daniel Purdy’s The Tyranny of Elegance describes an entire
generation that adopted the dress code of Goethe’s character in The Sorrows of Young Werther.
Purdy states it as such: “A blue jacket, a yellow vest, and breeches made of tanned leather, a tall
hat with a wide rounded brim, and a pair of high leather boots . . . left the relatively small circle
of Enlightenment intellectuals and entered German fashion history as the de riguer masculine
uniform of rebellion” (27). The playful act of exchange is an act of reinvention and can be
compared analogously, perhaps to the role playing performed in childhood, which allows the
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child to transcend one's station even if only momentarily. Again, this occurs in the suspension of
the rational impulse’s lean towards the law and the sensuous impulse toward unencumbered
Dionysian frivolity.148 Play is another way to approach the concept of suspension and the
aesthetic mode, to extend the theory into the disposition of humankind. We may want to consider
that similar measures were taken in the Freudian psychoanalytic
concept of the id, ego, and superego, the id as unlawful, the
superego as lawful, and the id intercepts and mediate both in its
role to suspend.
In this place of the suspension of reason and the sensible
as staging, one finds this child-like freedom unafraid and
unabashed. And what are these individuals displaying in the
image from the series, The Renaissance Society? These two
slaves (e.g., see fig. 128) embody freedom in the very way in

Figure 128. Kara Walker
The Renaissance Society,
1997.

which they have recouped the body and clothed it with the dignity that was not allowed degraded
by physiognomy and slavery. This act of play, this freedom, and air of contentment is an
aesthetic education possible in Walker’s work. Again, Walker cues us in with the title of the
work. Renaissance as in a rebirthing of oneself through these aesthetic acts.
Thinking about art in aesthetics is not about the passivity of the abstracted role of thought
but that of action in art that thinks. No longer is art relegated to the politics of the hegemonic
order. Instead, it participates in the revolution and the turn of politics to politics in its originary,
according to Ranciere, which is returning the voice and place to the people. This move towards
aesthetics as emancipation, as would any developing trend in thinking, is weaving itself through
the rhetoric of academic and scientific postulations that seek to overthrow and return art to the
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pantheon of the object only. Some believe that Ranciere’s theory repeats the offenses of the past,
although he speaks against those offenses that would place art at risk for subjugation to a law of
utility.
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Chapter 4
By Way of Conclusion
The Future Image of Race

To make Beauty from beautiful objects is the task of aesthetic education.
—Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man
We initiated this project by examining the problems of the black man in America and his
unrelenting strive for emancipation that at every turn is thwarted through a systemic
commandeering by a society bent on him remaining in his place. This is not missed by Carter G.
Woodson in his 1933 The Miseducation of the Negro in which he contends long before Fanon
that the black man has been educated to such a degree—through various modes of propaganda
and brainwashing—that he does not have to be told where his place is. He automatically
positions himself there (xix). In earlier pages, we posited history and its relationship to the black
man as the primal scene through myriad representations that perform as the subjectivity of the
black man. The representative regime of art proposed by Ranciere as the regime of visibility was
discussed as participating in the invention of the black man embodied in multitudinous forms in
science and technology’s role in his construction and characterological institutionalization.
Throughout this study, we have interrogated aesthetics and its potential as emancipatory through
an aesthetic education proposed in Kant, Schiller, and Ranciere. And we examined Kara Walker
as a case study in these matters of aesthetic education.
Chapter Two explored the nineteenth and twentieth-century representation of the black
man by both white and black society. And these deficient forms were unfolded, brought to life in
tautology by means of storytelling in a cacophony of illustrations, alterations, reiterations, whose
manifestations in music, visual art, literature, film, advertisements were abundant. The black
community's response to this fold in the visibility (Ranciere Politics 22)—these copies,
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doppelgangers, twins—was strong but blighted by white society at every turn as campaigns and
crusades were launched in succession in this war for the soul of the black man.149
The problem we are left with today is not simply the non-truth of this history but how to
create a new truth through an aesthetic education. Tanke cites Ranciere in conversation with
Fulvia Carnevale and John Kelsey as printed in Artforum 2007. Ranciere states, “the problem is
to define a way of looking that doesn’t preempt the gaze of the spectator . . . Emancipation is the
possibility of a spectator’s gaze other than the one that was programmed” (90). The history of
black representation has already been located in art as art and against philosophy, whose
foundation is predicated on reason and science. Civilization has not purchased freedom for
humankind in general, and specific to this project, not the black man, because of the rigidity of
the law. The law is the word. The word of the philosopher. The alternative outside of the law is
that of grace lodged in reason as an aesthetic education.
In Schiller’s 1794 essay “On Grace and Dignity,” published before his aesthetic letters,
he states, “grace is always solely the beauty of the form moved by freedom, and movements
which merely belong to nature can never deserve this name” (Schiller). Differing from a
humanist education, aesthetic education is “where the activity of thought and sensible receptivity
become a single reality” (Ranciere, Politics 27). This is the moral ground expressed in this
concept that allows for a community of equals. The cancellation of both the activity and passivity
accommodates a new concept, one who “constitute[s] a sort of new region of being—the region
of free play150 and appearance—that makes it possible to conceive of . . . equality” (Ranciere 27).
Ranciere states in Dissensus that “aesthetics promises a non-polemical, consensual framing of
the common world” (119).
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How do we free ourselves from such strictures of the past? How does the black man turn
the theory of aesthetic education into the living truth of being in the world? I argue that the black
man’s emancipation will be predicated not on a humanist education nor on the law, which binds
the black man as a determined subject to the archetype of a designed history. Instead, his
freedom will depend on aesthetic education, not based on the object of will but the object of
freedom found in the beautiful through perception, which alters the experience to a free course of
action, a self-emancipation. What is mimesis or imitation except a story told in a certain form
towards a specific end? That specific end for this project is a tale woven together in the
subjugation of the black man. There must be a reworking of the past founded on a new myth of
identity through storytelling. This must derive from the formulation of a new narrative.151 The
language of Plato established the ability to conceive and disseminate the narrative as truth, which
has perpetuated in the West according to Heidegger’s “Doctrine of Truth,” expounded upon
earlier in this writing.
When we consider the narrative, then we are aware of its occupation in language as
language. It is necessary to recall Plato here, who used language to conceive and fabricate
untruths and deliver them as truth before the interlocutors, valorizing and confirming by quorum.
And, if we are convinced by Heidegger that “language is the house of being” (Basic Writings
217) and we understand Being’s relationship to language as to reveal its unhiddenness, as “that
which is already in existence” (Heidegger, Basic Writings 217), then it seems probable that
language has a crucial role in the taking shape of being as form. Heidegger dwells in language, in
that his spoken word is the taking-form of language as Being. When I evoke language here, I do
so for literary modes as well as visual writing and iconography. I speak here of language in the
form of narrative and narrative as imagery or image-making.
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In Book 6 of the Republic Adeimantus, the interlocutor asks Socrates to be clearer
regarding a statement about the philosopher-king. Socrates responded by stating that
Adeimantus’s persuasion would come by means of an image. Adeimantus sarcastically implied
to Socrates that he never uses the methodology of an image to validate his arguments, surely.
Socrates proceeds, acknowledging the slight, and states, “anyway, listen to my image” (181).
This assessment must be recognized as an extension of the discussion we broached on language.
This statement is an exposition on the correlation of spoken language with visual image. Socrates
was well aware that language used by the poets would conjure up images just as influential as the
spoken word.
In “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” Heidegger writes what I believe is of further
significance to our conversation as he unveils what is intrinsic in language. Discourse, or the
narrative, is no less of an image than a painting or a sculpture, leading to Plato’s repudiation of
the poets. Heidegger explains:
It is language that tells us about the essence of a thing, provided that we respect
language’s own essence. In the meantime, to be sure, there rages round the earth an
unbridled yet clever talking, writing and broadcasting of spoken words. Man acts as
though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the
master of man. Perhaps it is before all else man’s subversion of this relation of
dominance that drives his essential being into alienation. That we retain a concern care in
speaking is all to the good, but it is of no help to us as long as language still serves us
even then only as a means of expression. Among all the appeals that we human being . . .
can help to be voiced, language is the highest and everywhere the first. (Basic Writings
348)
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Heidegger insists that “‘Education’ ((Bildung) implies two things: it means first of all forming in
the sense of developing and molding a character . . . through a standard aspect which is therefore
called the prototype. Education (Bildung) is above all molding and giving direction by means of
a form” (Barrett 256). Schiller argues in his aesthetic letters that humankind can only arrive at
moral man through an aesthetic education.152 And, in that arrival as moral man/woman, he/she
occupies emancipation. But Schiller’s understanding of morality is not only for the sake of
oneself but also for the judicial necessity of the Other. This moral man refers to the equilibrium
of the law and sensuous impulse, which is the fulfillment of both in an aesthetic education.
Heidegger insists that “if man is to find his way once again into the nearness of Being, he must
first learn to exist in the nameless”153 (Basic Writings 223). This nameless could be interpreted as
formless matter before education.
Lyotard’s assessment of Plato’s discourse engendered a narrative not standing alone but
as validation and authentication of science. I reiterate that the major project of the West that we
can attest to through the multifarious examples of this model is the molding of being through a
humanist education. All of these theoreticians have one thing in common: language. To educate
is to teach, but by what means? The means of language, narrative, storytelling. All manner of
teaching is storytelling: relaying a particular concept, math, science, engineering, botany,
through language, words, speech, narrative.
Heidegger’s statement is crucial for what has become the categorization of Being. The
shaping of language that Heidegger evinces is the very commission and undertaking of the
ethical and representative regimes, as discourse and mimesis. The transference of living speech
to the flat surface of a painting in Ranciere’s representative regime can be seen as what
Heidegger refers to as the subversion of language. This simply is referring to the Platonist ethical

250
regime in the dialogues as living speech with a certain autonomy, and then the representative
regime where what stood for power in the ethical regime is now present in the representative
regime in a painting, a print, a drawing, which now speaks authoritatively. Language has its
appearance first as a taking place of knowing, it would seem, even in the ontological call which
Levinas affirms. What is important in Heidegger is the same problematic in humankind, an
overreach in the pursuit of desire. The management of language, which we saw in Plato’s
dialogues, is not for the development and happiness of a culture but domination. This “care in
speaking” is important to Heidegger for it produces an end into itself, imagery, form.
For Heidegger, there appears to be so much languaging in the world without the care of
what is being spoken. This is because language for Heidegger has fallen into abeyance, and yet
we still speak but only in an altered state of language, not the coming of language. Rather, it is
its opposite. We know that an education that places language as a taking place of language will
serve this project of education as one of freedom. In what way? In the way, that does not
encompass the commandeering of thought but thinking through matter. It is not to this end that
we seek freedom for freedom’s sake but the apprehension of ethical accountability in the matters
of humanity. What is meant by this is that the narrative by way of language has established a
certain lot in humankind. In this case, the human dignity of freedom for the black man is
afforded to him in equal proportion to that of the white man. The desire of the white man does
not speak to Fanon’s indictment against the black man in his unending pursuit of the desire to be
white. It is something entirely different and worthy of distinction. This equal proportion must be
found in the black man as he returns to himself as man.
The question is: how does art intervene in matters of education? In Ranicere’s Dissensus,
he states that the “matters of art are matters of education” (119). What might this statement
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infer? We have already acknowledged how the very contextualization of art in the ethical
regime, and again its role in the representative regime, created the very ground in which
humanity was given its form. How does art participate in the discourse of education, and how is
Walker’s work a lesson in aesthetic education, and therefore invaluable to the cause of
emancipation in the case of the black man? What is important in any interrogation of aesthetics is
the awareness of the split of nature which has caused the crisis of art at work since the beginning
of Western thought.
Schiller states: “It must be false that the cultivation of individual powers necessitates the
sacrifice of their totality; or however, much the law of Nature did have that tendency, we must be
at liberty to restore by means of a higher Art this wholeness in our nature which Art has
destroyed” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 45). Schiller continues by proposing that the
ancient Greeks participated in art and politics as well-rounded individuals in the balancing act of
the sensuous and reason. For Schiller, this period in Athenian history was a time when reason
had not gone off course, and neither had the sensuous nature become detached from humankind;
there was equilibrium in humankind’s whole nature. However, in due process, another governing
body with a different agenda moved in opposition to the call for greater humanity, and culture
fell into something that resembled “a piece of machinery” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man
40). The fissure between reason and the sensuous has been interrogated throughout the ages in
the perennial question of civilization and Being in the realm of knowledge: Descartes cogito,
Kant’s transcendental deduction, Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian, Heidegger’s Being and
nothing, Hegel’s phenomenology of the spirit, Freud’s unconscious, and now Ranciere’s
distribution of the sensible. All of these are ways to approach the problematic pursued in the
beginning in Plato’s metaphysics.
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The argument appears to return time and time. And art, having participated in that very
debate from Plato’s refusal to Nietzsche’s Death of God and the loss of presence, to Freudian
dreamworks, is fundamental to education. Platonic thought throughout this exposition on the
black man and emancipation cannot be avoided but insisted. The dislodging of history is in the
exactness of its tracing, recalling Zizek’s postulation on the tracing of history.154 Plato’s project
was primarily lodged in education for this essential reason, to educate, regulate and control
desires. Education is the chief discussion here as to the type of humanity that modes of
knowledge will construct.
Education has been debated throughout history as various contending doctrines of
knowledge vie to inform Being and determine minds. We see this no clearer than in the case of
the transfer of knowledge from master to student in Socrates to Plato and Plato to Aristotle.
Later, Alder and Freud’s partnership disintegrated because of fundamental differences based on
the concept of the unconscious. And Althusser and Ranciere parted ways in doctrinal disparities
about the role of the university as the site of the transference of knowledge in the structure of
teacher and student relationship. “The function of teaching Althusser wrote in 1964, is to
transmit a determinate knowledge to subjects who do not possess this knowledge” (Ranciere The
Ignorant Schoolmaster xvi). Althusser’s educational doctrine involved the conventions of the
hierarchy of knowledge. Heidegger states that “language, moreover, leaves itself to our mere
willing and cultivating as an instrument of domination over beings” (Barrett 274). And Lyotard
contends that knowledge is the new capital of exchange.155
Thus, the founding principles in the West in regard to formal education have endured for
centuries in the form of a liberal arts education. The liberal arts tradition, founded on science and
mathematics, as opposed to an aesthetic education (which interrogates the beautiful or sensible),
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is the subject of our concern in this chapter. This entire project hinges on our understanding of
how education not only birth policy and compose thought but also craft a certain subjectivity.
Indeed, it is the construction of a “specific type of humanity” (Ranciere, Politics 24). What was
Plato’s project in the dialogues and Aristotle’s in Poetics in succession? It was to supply a guide
to epistemological precepts and principles to chart the course of knowledge and its distribution
for a particularized form of being. Form here is not without its emphasis to that of the
configuration of matter to serve the purpose of domineering the will.
I am not concerned with examining particular pedagogical models or constructs in
history for this project. These have been explored and noted by many historians and educators
whose work is ongoing. This exercise explores the relationship between the founding schools of
thought and the educational models they provide in the design of subjectivity. Education in its
common usage refers to the development of the power of reasoning and judgment in preparation
for one’s intellectual life. Aesthetic education is defined by Ranciere as liberated perception and
Schiller as the making of beautiful objects. These beautiful objects are acquired through the
ascertaining of an equilibrium between matter and form, which I discussed previously. Plato
challenged anyone to find that equilibrium in the sensible world, governing both the inner and
the outward form. It is about the equilibrium of form, “organic grace and beauty” (Schiller, On
the Aesthetic Education of Man 18).156
The campaign against the black man in high places explored in Chapter Two informs the
black man that his proper place is behind prison walls. This stance is fostered and propagated,
even precipitated by countless reiterations of the themes of slavery in media on big and small
screens and through other visual apparatus camouflaged as pure knowledge or enlightenment. Be
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assured that knowledge has always been involved in a directive relative to the purpose of a
certain ethos of visibility. And this purpose has never truly diminished but changed in strategy.
Just as there is a transference of trauma, there is a transfer of power in society from one
generation to the next. Socially airborne. That trauma and power are played out in our prisons as
the nexus of trauma, and the justice system itself as the seat of power. Institutions such as the
prison system conveniently provide the naming and categorizing of a diseased community
among the undefiled. This distribution of the sensible, like Foucault’s “Ships of Fools,” has
never ceased to exist. It is a group designated for removal because they are perceived to threaten
the hegemonic order. It is as difficult to acknowledge this new paradigm of education as it is to
name it. We formulate terms such as institution, university, academy, or college. With this comes
the stigma of order, that of hegemonic practices of the mastery of knowledge. Knowledge as the
new commodity is evidenced by social media and monopolies such as Facebook, whose imprint
is everywhere in the acquisition and distribution of what for some constitutes knowledge, whose
market shares depend on this distribution. I will look to Agamben, who keenly discusses this
new humanity as a new community of beings, not located under the auspices of the rule of law
but elsewhere and whose exclusion from the rule of law is their emancipation. This can be
referenced as a new humanity.157 Every model of education, let me emphasize, shapes humanity.
Conventional education measures are evident throughout history and antithetical to the proposal
of aesthetic education in support of a new humanity.
Education and Forms of Humanity
Forms of humanity derive from actual forms associated with art through language, visual
arts, as well as other means. Schiller would state in his aesthetic letters that aesthetics is the art of
the beautiful, which produces forms of humanity that are fair and equitable, and that any other
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form divides the community (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 138). Thought has always been
encased in the language of the hegemonic order of things. For this reason, thinking must enter
again into view in the pursuance of emancipation, for language is the testing ground of freedom.
But, not as thought that doesn’t think, but living thought. The entire premise of this project
argues an aesthetic education for the black man for envisioning emancipation. Aesthetics as the
science of the sensible in consideration as an alternative to the traditional humanist, or liberal arts
education is thought that is in the very act of thinking Being.
The return to the beginning of thought in Plato and Aristotle and its relevance to this
study is not a detachment of thought to the black man but an undeniably necessary
concatenation. Nor should it be regarded as my need to use European literature to validate any
discussion of the black man, thereby accepting the status of an always already inferiority of the
black race. The black man, though removed from the history of thought in history as socially
inferior, does not mean that he does not properly belong to the thinking animal. Further, he is
human in what constitutes humanity, not civilization. It is civilization that is the perpetrator of
naming, counting, and categorizing.
Therefore, the black man is not exempt from the discourse as early as Plato. If
humankind of any type is involved, then all are involved. Therefore, it is only language,
discourse, rhetoric, dialogues, and narratives that have caused the split of community. Is it not
Plato who perpetuated those divisions that he postulated as natural, and from these, all others
persisted? And though he may not have named the black man, as he did not name Christianity,
yet it has proceeded from him in interpretation and perception as having been birthed by him.
And, is it not Aristotle whose lie of Plato became truth in his reversal of the fate of the poets
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through the birth of tragedy? In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon insists that “I am a man, and I
have to rework the world’s past from the very beginning” (201).
Throughout Plato’s dialogues are the insistence and insertion of some aspect of his
educational system. His demonstration in the “allegory of the cave” is remarkable. It creates an
image of the chasm that divides the intelligible and the unintelligible and demonstrates the
unintelligible as a mere shadow of the real. In Meno, Plato introduces the reader to the common
core of recollection in his story of the slave and slave’s ability to answer the mathematical
equation. The dialogue constitutes several doctrines at once. In telling the slave story, Plato
confirms his theory of Otherworldliness, his doctrine of determinism, and that of the belief of the
predetermined station by nature. Socrates discusses the types of knowledge and teaching models
that he regards as false, such as the sophists, rhetoricians in the Republic, Phaedo, and other
dialogues. Even though it would be Socrates who died being accused as a “villainous misleader
of youths” (Jowett 282), which he vehemently denies in Apology.158 In other words, he
transferred knowledge not authorized by those charged with its authentication and validation.
An initial statement in the introduction of Aristotle’s Poetics notes the importance of
knowledge to the thinking animal. “All human beings by nature desire knowledge” (ix). Though
distinctly specific as belonging to a certain qualification of beings, this all human beings includes
the black man. Thus, the imposition of his enslavement was not of the body only but one which
severely dehumanized him and denied him access to knowledge. Aristotle, after years of tutelage
under his master Plato, left his house. Aristotle’s Poetics is the rebellion of the son who sat at the
feet of his master, ate from his table of knowledge, only to betray him. It is not in all cases, but
certainly in some that the sons betray the father in likeness and deeds. Poetics is the audacity of
Aristotle to be, for he could not betray his true nature.
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In A.E Taylor’s Aristotle, the author surmised that Aristotle is closer to Plato than his
antecedents admit (39). But it is in that guilt, the consumption occurs of the betrayed father’s
flesh, and to eliminate the debt, one carries him inside. And though he reversed the edict of Plato
against the poets as an ethical evaluation, he would utilize mimesis for the benefit of the State in
an even more effective way. In so doing, he and Plato both participate in the distribution of the
sensible. While Plato’s metaphysics established truth in the Forms beyond the sensible world,
that of beauty, justice, virtue, Aristotle chose to perform his truth in the sensible. “For Aristotle,
the evolution of human culture is in large part the evolution of techne. The first arts which
human beings developed were those concerned with producing the necessities of their existence”
(Poetics ix). This thinking for Aristotle gives rise to his theory of mimesis as nature’s way of
teaching humankind, and for Aristotle, imitation could be manipulated and willed according to
necessity.
In the film Kill Your Darlings (2013), a poignant statement is included that surmises the
educational model that the West has adopted in perpetuity. The film dramatizes the life of Allen
Ginsburg, the poet, philosopher, and writer, who was one of the leading figures in the Beat
Generation, a group of writers working during the 1950s whose works defied the conventional
norms in literature. I bring this into the discussion to establish that the enduring educational
programs of Plato and Aristotle prevailed in our institutions in the post-World War era and have
been sustained to the present day. In a classroom scene, the professor lectures on the components
of a Victorian poem as the high standard of the classical order. He elucidates that the Victorian
sonnet contained certain identifiers such as “rhyme, meter, conceit” (Kill Your Darlings 08:02).
He further notes that “without this balance, a poem becomes slack, an untucked shirt” (Kill Your
Darlings 08:12). Allen Ginsberg, one of the students in the class, asks, “Then how do you
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explain Whitman” (Kill Your Darlings 08:17)? Professor Steeves asks Ginsberg to expound
directly. At which time, Ginsberg states that “Well, uh, he hated rhyme and meter. The whole
point was untucking your shirt” (Kill Your Darlings 08:19). Professor Steeves regains his
composure and, with a stern disposition, states, “this university exists because of tradition and
form. Would you rather this building be built by engineers, or by Whitman and his boys at
play?” (Kill Your Darlings 08:51). Steeves concludes his lecture with an even more astonishing
proclamation, “There can be no creation before imitation” (Kill Your Darlings 09:00). In other
words, creation is imitation, or fittingly, we recreate new from the groundwork of imitation.
The scene and the professor’s closing statement express what the whole of philosophy
has wrestled with since the establishment of Western thought, that is education. The battle
concerns itself not just with formal constructions of things but the causality of humankind. It is
not that humankind should or could go without an education. Self-education has its potential as
the emancipatory project, for example, in Jacotot the ignorant schoolmaster, whom Ranciere
aims to emulate in tenor, according to Gabriel Rockhill, that “rather than transmitting
performatively contradictory lessons on the content of emancipation-aims at giving a voice to
those excluded from the hierarchies of knowledge” (Politics 2-3). But what is important is what
these modes and models of education construct now and for the next generation. How do these
educational models assist in imagining society, the designing of communities, and subjectivity
itself?
One of the many issues addressed in the Civil Rights Movement was that of education.
Countless marches and protests aimed to send a message of inclusion, of transmission of
knowledge to become integrated into a society of equals. The legislation as a result of these
protestations included Brown v. Board of Education of 1954, which overturned Plessy v.
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Ferguson (separate but equal) law of 1896, which had allowed separate educational facilities for
blacks and whites. The desegregation of Little Rock Central High School in 1957 (Little Rock
Nine), and Ruby Bridges’ integration of an all-white elementary school, William Frantz
Elementary in 1960, were other monumental victories. These were giant steps toward blacks
being regarded as belonging to the human species. The Ten-Point Program of the Black Panthers,
composed in 1967, was an educational agenda for the black community and at once a demand for
action. One of the items listed directly involved educational reform. The language in the
document states, “we want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent
American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the presentday society” (Austin Up Against the Wall 315). It is no wonder this group of subversions was
destroyed. They desired equal treatment under the law.
The three regimes of art are models of education in Ranciere. The ethical and
representative regimes establish, for the most part, what we understand as the conventional
model for education which translates as the distribution of the sensible. The Schillerian or
aesthetic regime redistributes the sensible. I use the term Schillerian following Ranciere’s
“Schiller’s aesthetic state, which is this regime’s first manifesto (and remains, in a sense,
unsurpassable), clearly indicates this fundamental identity of opposites. The aesthetic state is the
pure instance of suspension, a moment when form is experienced for itself”159 (Ranciere Politics
23-24). Ranciere postulates that the aesthetic regime presents one mode of thinking, or one
ontology, or singular epistemology. Schiller’s aesthetic letters are teeming with oppositions that
he proposes are reconciled in the aesthetic regime, not as one, but to achieve the state of
equilibrium. Schiller understands in a clear and distinct way that “reason indeed demands unity,
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Nature demands diversity” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 32). What are the lessons
transmitted through these art regimes that were once educational forms, humanity prototypes?
Most social structures are mere evolutions, not new institutions. They are metamorphoses
of older models. I would argue that Plato’s dialogues represented an ethos of class division
within the community and thus could be interpreted as fascist or nationalist, though not named.
These would collectively create a legacy of censorship, absolute authority, and the reign of fear
that Hedges denotes as belonging to fascism.160 Most predominant is the division of the
community into sectors in the assignment of being. In Book 5 in the Republic, Plato uses the
term golden race to confer honor on men of the republic who would die in battle while
designating another group as barbarians (161). Aristotle followed that line of thought according
to A.E. Taylor's Aristotle, in which he states of Aristotle, “hence the distinction between Greek
and ‘barbarian’ came to mean for him much what the ‘colour-line’ does to an American brought
up in a Southern State” (7). Plato’s goal is to construct a perfect city by gathering a certain group
of individuals whose desires would coincide with the vision of the city that Plato conceptualized.
The question concerning the history of education is that of desire. But what does this desire
entail? Plato would identify the desires of the community and then educate those desires. As part
of educating their desires, he named the various passions in the city as appetitive, spirited, and
rational. Further, each group would be educated according to their essence (desires, appetites).
Plato must first create a doctrine that places desire in question and a punishment and
reward system accordingly. Next, he will educate desire. It is here that the introduction of
education to the masses is essential. Plato will use the apparatus of education in the shaping of
the will of the people, forming in them a new desire. It is in the establishing of his republic that
we become familiar, simultaneously, with Plato’s desire. The desire of Plato is three-fold: First,
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it is to educate the will, which translates as a usurpation of individual desire. Secondly, it is to
limit the power of the citizens by assigning specializations, and finally, it is to have the sensible
reflect ideal principles assigned to the otherworldliness. “Philosophers . . . make of the sensible
the meanings they choose, which, it is claimed, serve the community’s welfare” (Tanke 30).
What Plato worked to avoid is the concatenation of knowledge to the sensorial. Kristeva
states this regarding desire and meaning: “Here, I want to examine briefly the kairos, this subtle
and in a sense miraculous encounter between desire and meaning during the phallic phase that
henceforth seals the fate of the human being as desiring and speaking beings” (The Sense and
Non-sense of Revolt 97). What is critical to our understanding is this coming of selfconsciousness through the realm of the sensuous as so indicates the theory of the phallic phase,
experienced by both men and women. One is the fear of castration, and the other, the lack of the
phallus. Desire is not able to be thwarted or fulfilled in either case. The phallus is the signifier
first and foremost, as understood in Lacan. It is the supreme signifier, as it signifies all desires of
both absences and presences. Psychoanalysis may be seen as the birth of desire and thought, but
the underlying human factors have existed since the beginning of thought. The repressed desire
is the same desire cultured, manicured, and sequestered by Plato. It is not that the unconscious
was an invention of psychoanalysis; it instead was necessarily an excavation. It is that veiling
that was first established in Plato’s dialogues.
Socrates contends that until the philosopher-king is put in place to rule, evil will persist
over cities and the whole of humanity. Plato desired the absolute and constructs a philosophy
where determinism, essentialism, and formalism are made into a unified template, ensuring the
element of the absolute on the one hand and stability in the sensible world on the other. In
Tanke’s read of Ranciere, he states the following, “what Platonic philosophy thus forges is a
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system for chasing away other means of distributing the sensible … it wants there to be a single
meaning assigned to sense, its own, and thus a single direction for the community” (Tanke 31).
In the Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Reeves proposes that:
What the philosopher-kings do is construct a political system—including primarily a
system of socialization and education—that will distribute the benefits of their
specialized knowledge of the good among the citizens at large. The system they construct
relies on Plato’s theory of the soul or mind (psyche), the seat of consciousness, emotions,
desire, and decision-making. According to this theory, there are three fundamentally
different kinds of desires: appetitive ones for food, drink, sex, and the money to acquire
them; spirited ones for honor, victory, and good reputation; and rational ones for
knowledge and truth. Each of these types of desire “rules” in the soul of a different type
of person, determining his values. People most value what they most desire. (Plato xiv)
The educational system that Socrates installs institutes primary education to guard against
the corruption of the mind in the later stage of life. This education, which is political and ethical,
was not “to provide knowledge . . . but to socialize desires” (Plato xiv). Socrates believed that
one must begin to instill the lessons early as the nursing phase. The nurses and storytellers
should be consistent in relaying their stories to set in place certain epistemological
predispositions. Socrates insists that the “nurses and mothers…spend more time shaping their
souls with these stories than they do shaping their bodies by handling them” (Plato 57). Socrates’
intense proposal for the philosopher-king included a minimum of ten years of math, five years of
dialectic, fifteen years of political training. The training calendar does not have the primary
education agenda. Then and only then would an individual be fit for the task of philosopher-king.
Plato’s system of primary education is still in use today.
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For Plato, the tales of the poets were associated with mimesis, imitation. In the
representative regime, there is no illusion that what is being told is necessarily being presented
as truth, and therefore imitation is an acceptable form of storytelling. But it nevertheless serves
an agenda that lends itself to the practice of fabrication intended to set a precedent for what
would be conceived of as truth. For this regime is the intentional creation of fiction, a
redesigning of history, not as linear but as an arrangement of “intelligible structures” (Ranciere
Politics 36). The arts are autonomous in that now they participate in the appearances of things.
For the most part, the representative regime can be seen as the state of mimesis, not necessarily
as what is, but what is properly conjoined as signifying a certain message, not as an organic or
natural principle, but as practice. These designations of art particularized in their specificity as
imitations are understood as forms of knowledge and hierarchies of visibility.161(Ranciere,
Politics 22). Further, “these imitations are extricated, at the same time, from the ordinary control
of artistic products by their use and the legislative reign of truth over discourses and images”
(Ranciere, Politics 21). The representative regime is not controlled by the artists in their art
practices, nor the ethical regime that dictates their truth value. Still, in the representative regime,
the visibility of the arts and the content and context of art are determined and have a finality.
What is this manipulation of history, of nature, and the world? Starting with Plato’s
metaphysics, this division of body and the mind has become the very absorption of historical
probing. Descartes’ cogito, Kant’s thing-in-itself, and the sublime, Schopenhauer’s world as will
and idea, and Hegel’s phenomenology of the spirit are all attempts of particularity of desire to
substantiate a universal. From the beginning, what has been at stake is the humanity type
produced out of these ideas and postulates. And it remains paramount, in particular at this time,
as we are still divided on the issue of race. Fanon contends in his conclusion of Black Skin, White
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Masks that both the white and black man are constructions of history, “have to move away from
the inhuman voices of their respective ancestors so that a genuine communication can be born”
(206).
Whether it is Plato as belonging to the ethical regime, or Aristotle ushering in the
representative regime, these regimes alter form into an object of the will. The will indicated here
is the will of the State. Desire (will) is taken up in the representative regime in what Ranciere
assigns as the distribution of the sensible. In this regime, we experience the arrangement of
actions, the fabrication of a plot, as the activities of humankind. More to the point, it is “primacy
of action over characters or of narration over description, the hierarchy of genres according to the
dignity of their subject matter, and the very primacy of the art of speaking, of speech in
actuality” (Politics 22). In Plato, art does not exemplify reason, good judgment. In the case of
Aristotle, as stated previously, no matter the action or event, the art in this regime is conceived as
an assignment of a predetermined message.
One of the major complaints of Schiller was the perceived mechanization of humankind
to that of the “imprint of his occupation, of his science” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 41).
This characterization appears soulless. Let me interject that this is the very premise of Schiller’s
argument for an aesthetic education, for emancipating humankind in the overreach of what
reason had become—this parceling out of knowledge, this shutting down of the imagination.
This was profoundly vexing for Schiller—much in the same way Plato perceived his era as being
too liberal, thereby calling for the intervention of Reason. Schiller railed against the State
throughout his highly polemical letters. His use of phrases to describe the human condition as
detached, fragmented, stunted, and a feeble vestige (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 38) in
his “Sixth Letter” is an illustration of his sense of the debauchery and mockery of humankind.
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Thus, Schiller turns to the Greeks in his deliberation to showcase the workings of both
the sensuous impulse and that of the rational. He asserts that, even in the assignment of these
attributes of human nature to the gods, there was no annihilation of either impulse, but both were
evident in the gods as representing the “whole of humanity” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man
38). Differing in tone and purpose is Schiller’s aesthetic letters of 1795, which remain current
and pertinent to our project of the black man. It is most likely because, in the present condition of
the black man and oppression in general, mass incarceration in particular, the politics of injustice
still rears its ugly head. Schiller is somewhat ambivalent as he delivers what Ranciere considers
the first manifesto on aesthetic education. Those educated under the ethical regime in Plato will
produce a specified humanity, which Schiller sharply rejects as state orchestrated.
Schiller posits Reason as a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it constitutes humanity
because humankind will use logic and reason to shape their being, further educate themselves,
refine their constitution, and perfect their order. He is not a fruit; she is not a tree; she is not a
flower. Reason then is also responsible for this balancing act of Nature, or the sensibilities,
raising a man from crude nature associated with the beast to an intelligent being. Reason is at the
forefront of the Kantian doctrine of freedom as this state of free will and choice.
Humankind is free, with free will and choice, endowed by Nature. But humankind is not
idle. Rather the fashioning and molding process begins the building and executing of a new
creature, the investigation and interrogation of Nature herself, and the creation of laws for
Nature. Schiller’s “Sixth Letter,” his most portent against the State, bemoans humanity and
questions civilization’s evolution. Schiller knows that humankind has overstepped its boundaries
and limitations regarding reason. Conventional education as corrupt and useless is not just the
finding of the angry black man blaming everything on the white man, but it was also the tenor of
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Rousseau. Long before black voices of discontent were raised against a certain track of
knowledge, Rousseau published Emile: Or On Education (1762), which was so controversial it
was both burned and banned during his lifetime. Burning and banning are extreme methods of
censorship, destroying or removing from sight what is not agreeable with the principal order.

Figure 129. Kara Walker, A Subtlety, 2014.

Rousseau writes during the period of the Enlightenment. He believes it to be a time that the
enlightened soul has set before them both paths and understanding of what has been hidden,
veiled as it were. Rousseau sees before him the destruction and removal of the dominant regimes
of Classicism and Christianity in what he and others thought would be the coming of a new day
of freedom. Instead, the bourgeoisie emerged. The bourgeoisie in classification and spirit is not
concerned with the good of the community but only with individual desires. And today, perhaps
this is the same reason so many have no problem turning the black man over to the eternal
machine of mass incarceration, his descendants estranged, as long as the state of the bourgeoisie
remains intact. 162
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Rousseau’s writing interested both Schiller and Kant. Kant states in regard to Rousseau’s
Emile that “its publication was an event comparable to the French Revolution” (4). To make a
comparison of an artistic project to that of revolution is to state that aesthetics can be used as
revolutionary warfare. Rousseau believed that civilization was not the admirable state of
humankind but the opposite. He insisted that “man requires a healing education which returns
him to himself” (Rousseau 3). This return refers to humankind in the state of innocence before
the perversion of Reason and the subversion of Art. According to Rousseau, man was crude in
nature but was good and happy. This state of being changes in civilization to unhappy and
immoral. Rousseau’s introduction reveals an anecdote about Robinson Crusoe, who was deserted
on an island but had at his disposal nature and the ability to fulfill his needs. In discussing
education and form, Rousseau states, “plants are shaped by cultivation, and men by education”
(38). This twisting and bending results in a type of manipulation in both cases. Either way, there
is a process of shaping and forming to the exact purposes intended.
In analyzing Walker’s works throughout this project, the focus has been her silhouettes.
Perhaps her sculpture, A Subtlety or Marvelous Sugar Baby (e.g., see fig.129), which is of great
fascination, could be used to demonstrate another means of seeing the dialectic, an emancipated
experience of perception. This is an illustration of form in its equilibrium, or two histories visible
at once. Ranciere’s concept of the equilibrium of form is involved, not in the exclusivity of
seeing, but in the dialectic of perception, this seeing both histories, not as necessarily merging,
but side by side (Politics 24). In this image are the arguments of the history of stereotypes as
subjugation and a history of power that has been obfuscated beneath historical lambasting. First,
this image makes visible the historical posturing of the stereotypes of history in the mammy
figure most evident in Antebellum South. The generous buttocks, though now in vogue, are most
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likely a negative portrayal of Sarah Barton, the ‘Hottentot Venus’163 who was on public and
private display, performing race in comparison to the idealized Greek anatomical canon
established and hallowed from Winkelmann to Hegel. The engorged lips, the oversized breasts,
the wide nose were all attempts to emphasize a deformed physiognomy in racist history.
According to Kimberly Wallace-Sander's analysis of the mammy figure, the body of the mammy
acts as a "tendon between the races, connecting the muscle of African American slave labor with
the skeletal power structure of white southern aristocracy" (Wallace-Sanders). Symbolically
speaking, the mammy figure represents the physiology of the ability of the slave to be capable of
all labor that would arise in the demands and commands of the white master. She is a crossbreed
of the black man and the black woman as far as labor is concerned both in the fields and
domestically, to include cooking, cleaning, and nurturing.
The rag-like kerchief on the figure’s head bears no elegance. Rather, it is symbolic of a
domestic worker, not a woman of leisure or high society. This kerchief represents
marginalization. The head rag is believed to be a custom from Africa, as it was sometimes
necessary for women to cover their heads for religious ceremonies and other occasions (Jewell).
The inclusion of the head rag, with its traces to Africa, can be seen as an effort to express the
exclusion of these women from mainstream American society (Jewell). The specific reference is
to the infamous image of the great Mammy signifier of Aunt Jemima. Subtlety helps us
familiarize ourselves with Walker’s approach to history and its stereotypes in preparation for the
encounter of her silhouettes, in which the interpretive value can become obfuscated. In
Ranciere’s Politics, he interrogates what differentiates the representative regime of art and the
aesthetic regime, which is evident here in Walker’s image when stating that "the aesthetic regime
of the arts does not contrast the old with the new. It contrasts, more profoundly, two regimes of
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historicity. It is within the mimetic regime that the old stands in contrast to the new. In the
aesthetic regime of art, the future of art, separated from the present of non-art, incessantly
restages the past” (24).
The beauty of this work is the two histories that are juxtaposed. The one purports the

Figures 130-31. The Great Sphinx of Giza, 2558-2532 BC, The Pyramids of Giza, 2580-2560 BC.

stereotypes in history while housed in the form of The Great Sphinx of Giza. The sphinx
references the origins of black self-consciousness before the stereotypes, the once-upon-a-time of
fables. These great monuments represent the civilization of Egypt, with its advances in science
and technology. (e.g., see figs. 130-131). That monumental presence is hidden and, at once
revealed, in Walker’s work. This is the dialectic nature of Walker.
Why is form so important? From the beginning in Platonic discourse, we understand the
invention of the singularity of thought and form in his Theory of Forms. This theory described
the perfect form as an ideal. When Ranciere, Schiller, or Plato use the term ‘form,’ what exactly
did this mean to each of them, or are they the same? Are they using it theoretically to denote a
certain thing, but hermeneutically it is being informed differently? We already know that for
Plato, he dared not participate in the copies and representations that belonged to the sensible
world, but he conceived that there was another region that housed the true forms as ideals. These
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ideas or ideals in Plato’s republic were how a concept is conceived in one's mind. Plato stated
that there was a form of virtue, a form of beauty, one of truth, and others. One of the
problematics of the Theory of Forms in Plato derives from the cave allegory. Many scholars
believe that Plato was not referring to Otherworldliness, a utopia, but, instead, to a certain region
of the mind. Kant pursued this line of inquiry in what he proposed as the two stems of
knowledge, the rational and the imaginative. He introduces what we understand as formalism.
When we investigate form or formalism, an excellent example to consider is the mode of
representation in abstract expressionism. In their efforts to distance themselves from the
challenges of the former regime of traditional art, it is argued that modern artists failed in their
efforts. They were seen by most and certainly promoted by Greenberg as concerned with form
only. However, form is not regarded as an empty concept that revolves around an object bereft of
substance but is involved in the philosophical discourse of the politics of emancipation. It is a
return to the foundation principles of the distribution of the sensible, matter, space and time,
determinism, freedom, and reason. Most profoundly, it concerns what instrument is more reliable
in education and knowledge and how this representation will assist with political freedom and
harvest new humanity. We will return to Greenberg and the avant-garde shortly.
An error in hermeneutics was made stemming from Kant’s discussion of disinterest,
interpreted by some as the stripping from the surface all resemblance of history in becoming the
object as autonomous. Autonomous is defined as owing nothing and therefore removed from the
political body and at once absolute. When Kant stated that work should be taken into perception
as disinterested, with interest—with the ability for contemplation without the object's interest in
connection with the subject matter of its making, nor its religious or political associations, but
just as the object—he was suggesting an aesthetic experience. That lifting of the associations and
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the resulting disinterest is what is deemed as a suspension in Schiller. The reason Schiller could
follow Kant in his writings on art for the potential for freedom was for this very reason and
because he was able to conceive from Kantian theories the true nature of the work of art as free
play. I discussed free play in Chapter Three. But I will speak to this important concept briefly as
it regards form.
Schiller’s project of aesthetic education is understood as the equilibrium of “matter and
form, sensuousness and reason” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 72). Schiller reprimands the
present hegemonic powers as part of his argument, but his grievances can be understood as
reaching back to Plato’s republic. When Schiller states in his Sixth Letter that the Greeks
combined the “fullness of form with the fullness of content” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man
38), he is addressing the objects created and the philosophy that was the ethos of the community
which served to construct what Schiller called “splendid humanity” (On the Aesthetic Education
of Man 38). The form and the content were equally instructive in the community for the social
needs of the community. Humankind desired to be better than what nature had formed, and in
humankind’s discontent, they sought another form.
The problem of the black man and slavery is that he had to be made over as a form of
labor and production, a product, sub-human. He was doubly removed from himself, in the
Lacanian doctrine, and as a colonized being. The African is coming out of a certain place of
designated form, theoretically and physically. The very purpose of the slave trade was to secure
workers for the newly established colonies in America. How else were white British colonists
going to imagine the New World without literally millions of workers who would have to
commit their bodies to the task at hand? The challenge of this ambitious undertaking for the
white man is converting the form for the work to come, which involved turning the black man
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into a machine, an animal. How do you take an African always already formed, convert him
again into the matter, and reformulate him as a utility?
An example of just such an ambitious undertaking of pure invention in the art world is
abstract expressionism. When abstract
expressionism emerged, it did so with
what would be considered by Hughes in
his film series and book as the shock of
the new. Jackson Pollock became the
leading figure in this new
representation which had its tentacles in
the primitive and Jungian
psychoanalysis, collective
consciousness, and some residual of
surrealism. Greenberg, a literary critic
before taking up the critique of art,
Figure 132. Norman Rockwell, The Connoisseur, 1961.

assumed the position of the voice of this

new expression which he sanctioned as formalism. He would first establish an understanding by
creating a new lexicon foreign to most individuals and then educating the spectators through his
multifarious writings, articles, and essays.
Formalism in Greenberg was his interpretation of disinterested art, stripped of any
resemblance of political obeisance, an absolute within itself. Greenberg’s essay, “The AvantGarde, and Kitsch,” published in 1939, would begin this project. Without guidance in viewing
and understanding the new art, even the most sophisticated spectator is lost. The confusing style
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of modern art is depicted in the work of Norman Rockwell (e.g., see fig. 132) as a man stands in
front of a work resembling the style undertaken by Jackson Pollock. That work contains no

Figures 133-136. Kara Walker, The Emancipation Approximation, 1999, Courbet. The Origins of the World,
1866, Manet. Luncheon on the Grass, 1863, Mantegna. The Lamentation over the Dead Christ, 1480.

familiar figures, no clear topic, no recognizable iconography. It is unreadable to the average
viewer. While the abstract expressionists worked, Greenberg wrote and disseminated, and a
larger audience took in that knowledge to articulate a new appreciation.
Greenberg’s argument for art as formalism is that the work should be stripped of all
essences, content, political, religious, and social signifiers. It meant nothing. And its emptying is
a release of accountability to history. As the leading figure, Pollock was presented as a form of
disinterest much like his work, a bohemian. This depiction was never agreeable to the artists, and
many rebelled. But Greenberg had established a certain epistolary regarding the work. The work
Greenberg said finally exemplified the Marxian model, the leveling of all classes, starting from
ground zero politically. But instead of creating a community as a free political body, abstract
expressionism became institutionalized as part of the bourgeois art world. It did not realize a
Marxian dream.
There was a similar response in the case of the critics and spectators who viewed
Walker’s 1997 inaugural works. This exhibition confounded many. Though it fashioned itself
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as the depiction of slavery, it was seen as a horrid rendition of the buffoonery of Black America.
The orgiastic sexual depictions seem like a re-traumatization of the stereotypes. African
American artists from the old guard were highly vocal and discredited Walker, while historians
and critics contemplated explaining her work.
But how do they explain this new kind of work that is neither grounded in a logical
narrative nor has any correlative signifiers (e.g., see fig. 133) to point the spectator to a
reasonable finality? What do they say of the sexually explicit acts in Walker that many claims
have no precedence in the history of fine art? But sexuality is not exempt in images such as
Courbet’s The Origin of the World, Manet’s Luncheon on the Grass, Andrea Mantegna’s The
Lamentation over the Dead Christ (e.g., see figs. 134-136)? And thousands of naked women
throughout the history of art have always been understood as representing hidden desire. We
should not so easily forget about the nudity of Christ as a child and adult, as well as Gian
Lorenzo Bernini’s Ecstasy of Saint Teresa, which has been critiqued as form of sensuous rapture.
Lessons in an Aesthetic Education
One of the things paramount to this project is understanding what aesthetic education
means and its application. We are well acquainted with humanities textbooks that mold us into
engines of society, memory, will, and reason. And though we have demonstrated in earlier pages
aesthetics as a mode of thinking about art, it seems necessary to further the discussion. Our
probing will seek to understand how an aesthetic education participates in a new humanity. How
does one move from the formulaic of mechanization in the sciences to the essence of Being?
This section will look to Schiller and Ranciere by exploring some of the main tenets inherent in
the redistribution of the sensible. Let us be clear that an aesthetic education is not an education
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that removes the community from politics, nor politics from the community. Rather an aesthetic
education is understood as what is essential to politics.
Andrew Bowie’s The Aesthetics of Subjectivity quotes Foucault regarding what is
essential to politics in aesthetics.
In 1983 Foucault suggests that the ‘transformation of one’s self by one’s knowledge is, I
think, something rather close to the aesthetic experience, and … I do indeed believe that
there is no sovereign, founding subject, a universal form of subject to be found
everywhere … I believe on the contrary, that the subject is constituted through practices
of subjectification, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices of liberation (13).
Foucault’s postulation is relevant here in the “transformation” and the “practices of liberation.”
The idea is that one is transformed through one's own education, not through the state or
university, per se, but self-emancipation through a particular knowledge. And that knowledge
does not come from small sessions. Liberation is to be practiced incessantly. How one creates
anew is performing the task of liberation, not subjugation.
The most convincing way to approach this matter is to go directly to these aestheticians
and place the two modes of education and their outcomes parallel to the other as aesthetic
training. Plato's educational model is based primarily on the hierarchy of knowledge, its
distribution, and the primacy of reason in its assessment. This comes down to what is being
taught, who is receiving the teaching, and who the instructor is. We know that from the
beginning, Plato was interested in controlling every aspect of knowledge in the republic. His
teachings were based primarily on logic and reason, not intuition or the sensible. Plato went
about purging any thoughts that would otherwise interfere with the humanist education, which
was education of monism, a limited and fixed system. The education one received was
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predicated on the station one held in the republic. But in general, it was education that would
constitute the overall ethos of the community.
An aesthetic education reverses this order and is, for the most part, introduced by Schiller
during a devastating period in the history of Europe. The aftermath of the French Revolution had
raised questions concerning the educational apparatus of reason which had guided man in logical
and scientific methodology since Plato. There was a realization that the nature of the sensuous
man, in pursuit of a more excellent society, had been removed from as representing a disordered
nature. Ranciere’s lessons are strategically aligned with his theory of art as political. Schiller’s
“Second Letter” speaks of looking for a “code of laws” (25) that would be assigned to aesthetics
to guide man into his whole self. Schiller discusses the challenging period that had seen the
decline in Germany and throughout Europe as the French Revolution, which had promised
political freedom, crashed and burned. Political freedom seeks not a removal of the dominant
society but the creation of a place for politics.
Ranciere states in Politics that the emergence of the aesthetic regime does not replace the
representative regime. It is most probable that more than one regime exists at once. So, how is it
that Schiller suggests that art would participate in this unraveling? We do know that art has
always participated in the makeup of communities since Plato and Aristotle. Schiller discusses
the meeting ground of both the sensuous and reason as suspension. And it is that same
suspension, working in Ranciere’s regimes, which allows one to have an aesthetic experience.
The political freedom sought by the people after the French Revolution, and the black man in the
wake of the Emancipation Proclamation, failed them both. The black man must seek and tease
out his emancipation in the full light of an aesthetic education.
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Political freedom does not refer to whether you have voting rights, nor does it assist in
passing legislation in Congress or other political platforms. It is that, but much more. It is about
making a space to speak, to move in the place which had been designated for other groups or
orders. What representational art does is make visible a certain order, space, place, people while
making invisible those who are not considered to belong to this particular group or have a right
to state or promote certain ideas. The work of art is the beginning of subjugation or
emancipation. Art was categorized as dark, deceitful, and removed from the community in the
ethical regime. In the representative regime, art is used in the service of the state, fashioned to
reflect the will of the state apparatus. A work of art that emancipates does so not by dictating the
spectator on what to see or demanding a certain sightline. Instead, a free object lends itself to the
viewer’s will and his inclination of moral efficacy. As I have stated before, it is the Kantian
Copernican Revolution in which the viewer is no longer given knowledge by the object but gives
it to the object. This is the paradigmatic shift in subjectivity and objectivity.
Ranciere asserts that “the autonomy is the autonomy of the experience, not of the work of
art. In other words, the artwork participates in the sensorium of autonomy since it is not a work
of art” (Dissensus 117). What a fascinating oxymoron that art, which is the site of aesthetic
experience, is no longer art. It has become part of the sensorium, which is to state that it is the
commonality of the experience equated with that of life. The work of art in film, sculpture,
pictorial painting, literature, or otherwise is not the work of art experienced as the work of art.
Therefore, when reading Schiller initially, one can be somewhat confused when Schiller states
that “the aesthetics condition itself has no significance” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 12).
What? According to Schiller, if it has significance, it returns to merely being art, resemblance.
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“All it does” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 12), continues Schiller, “is to restore Man to
himself, so that he can make of himself what he wills” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 12).
There are a couple of ways Ranciere considers this. Ranciere is not interested in the
reader being distracted by theories of art as life and life as art. One makes art completely dissolve
into life, and the other life wholly overtaken by the art. Art as life is understood as art’s
relationship with the community, as political, that seeks not its
autonomy but to participate in the liberation of humankind. The
line between these is a thin one and blurred. I will return to
this. The other way Ranciere discusses this concept is what he
calls revolutionary vibrations. I previously discussed this
theory in Chapter Three. If you recall me stating, the opponents
of Walker’s work previously perceived her work as non-art. If
her work is perceived as art, it is as an object and separated
Figure 137. Juno Ludovisi.

from the community, inaccessible. But as non-art, it moves in

the realm of an aesthetic experience. These revolutionary vibrations stem from monuments left
over from various epochs in history, which have now become fragments. These are fragments,
exist as a moment. Ranciere calls the moment anticipatory, in expectation of the coming
community.
Juno Ludovici is a “colossal” sculpture (e.g., see fig. 137) from the first century CE. In
some ways, this work is important because it automatically signals us that, if we are observing it,
it is most likely a historical remnant. Ludovici is removed from her original location, her original
expectations of representation in the area of religious or civic duties. In times past, she stood in a
courtyard in Rome, at the Villa Ludovici where spectators came to behold her beauty as
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captivating and reflecting the city in which she dwelled. There she represented a certain ideology
that was prominent for the city and the politics of the time. But now, removed from the original
city, the politics, and the era, she is in suspension. The whole point of suspension in the theory of
aesthetics is that you cannot grasp the
object as substance in either its subject
or its content. So, in that resistance, that
suspension, the viewer has the liberty to
contemplate. Not only to contemplate
but to re-imagine and to experience the
work of art for itself. Listen, briefly to
Figure 138. Kara Walker, The Renaissance Society, 1997.

Schiller:

It is neither charm nor is it dignity, which speaks to us from the superb countenance of a
Juno Ludovici; it is neither of them because it is both at once . . . Irresistibly seized and
attracted by the one quality, and held at a distance by the other, we find ourselves at the
same time in the condition of utter rest and extreme movement, and the result is that
wonderful emotion for which reason has no conception and language no name. (On the
Aesthetic Education of Man 81)
The term ‘charm’ and ‘dignity’ are seen as opposites, but which are both, and at once, in
the statue suspended. Suspended in the sense that neither rule over the other. At the moment, the
viewer is captivated by charm, it is arrested by the opposing dignity. This oscillation never
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allows for grasping, holding, capturing what would cause the form to be bound by its traditional
conventions. The other way we can look at this conceptually is that whatever the monument,
statue, painting, there is a vibration of a revolutionary impulse that remains as a whisper to the
next epoch. For instance, in Ludovici, what would have been captured before in her countenance
that speaks to the community's life can now be experienced in contemplation. The removed
requirement of a determined gaze is recast as transcendence.
As for Walker, her entire work is a work of opposites. An
immediate juxtaposition of form (e.g., see fig. 138) does not allow
for a clean-cut calculated rendering of analysis. Her work hides and
seeks at once and never rests. It is always in motion, never overcome
by time, but moves as if it were eternity and time at once. Reading
Figure 139. Vermeer
Woman Holding a Balance,
1662-63.

Walker’s work is challenging because no real interpretation can
stand up to the contorted and polymorphic figures, machine and

human, slave, and master at once. In the figure, what is the point of the trumpet protruding from
the genitalia, the clock-like armature from the back of the black male slave, and the relationship
of all of this to the banjo? These juxtaposed acts are a type of announcement of freedom.
Remembering this: all movement, time, and space, which dictate the navigation belonging to the
body in the political sense, is embedded in the form. And it is that form that either occupies
freedom or is occupied by enslavement.
One of the paramount lessons in Ranciere is the idea of a common world, not to remove
diversity but to experience equity. Equality is the ability not to replace one humanity with
another nor to extinguish our differences. Instead, it’s the moral ought to participate in a world in
which political efficacy can be perceived and realized. Art reflecting a singular worldview and
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inclusion can be seen in the examples of Johannes Vermeer’s Woman Holding the Balance (e.g.,
see fig. 139) and in Jan van Eyck’s The Arnolfini Portrait (e.g., see fig. 140). The worlds
described in these works serve a linear purpose of visibility. The work by Vermeer is indicative
of the representative regime. Woman Holding a Balance distinguishes an ideology, religious in
nature, Catholic in specificity, with a moral message that
leads the viewer and educates with an expected outcome.
Vermeer’s work marks an educational lesson in Christian
values.
What is the lesson? The lesson is one of the
sacrifices of an ascetic life weighed against the coming
judgment in which the doctrine proclaims each individual
will be judged by God, the supreme judge, who will grant
her eternal life or eternal damnation. She weighs the worth

Figure 140. Jan van Eyck
The Arnolfini Portrait, 1434.

of wealth against that of Christian morals and righteous
living. The analysis is made clearer by the painting inside a painting, a double representation of
arranged actions. We can barely make out the gold halo with Christ figure whose arms are
stretched upward. But it mirrors, parallels, or aligns with the woman's head who, too, appears to
wear a type of halo, a symbol of virtue. This is the work of the Last Judgement of Christ, which
links the two messages to state how one weighs one's life on earth will dictate one’s final
destination. It is an eschatological question.
The work by van Eyck is similar in nature as it gives rise to humanistic Christian values
displayed in this simulated marriage, perhaps symbolizing a marriage to the Catholic Church or
as the bride of Christ. What is visible are the signifiers of Christian righteousness and sanctity.
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Ranciere makes a case for the representative regime as the visibility of some and the invisibility
of others. Those who partook in the community of speakers were visible and made to appear as a
natural occurrence. In aesthetics, art makes its appearance not as a selective showing but as
belonging to two histories parallel to the other, in equidistance. What an aesthetic education
allows is a political space envisioned for equality. You may ask how Walker’s work exemplifies
a common world. The common world is understood as the world which no longer is prejudicial
in its showing.
Finally, is the lesson of making
“Beauty from beautiful objects
[as] the task of an aesthetic
education” (On the Aesthetic
Education of Man 83). As an
educator, one of the ways I
introduce newly minted first-year
Figures 141-142. Leonardo da Vinci Mona Lisa, 1503-1506
Jean Michel Basquiat, Potomitan, 1983.

students to my art appreciation

course is to expose their minds to the opposing images of Leonardo da Vinci’s 1797 Mona Lisa
and Basquiat’s 1983 Potomitan (e.g., see figs. 141-142). Da Vinci's work belongs to the era of
the Italian Renaissance and Basquiat’s Modernism, which initiates our examination of how our
understanding of beauty is constructed and what it stands for in terms of the political. The works
set the tone for an undertaking of aesthetic education in contradistinction to that of humanist
education. Schiller describes humanist education as a reductionist of Being in the mechanization
of the human intellect through science, technology, math, memory as alienated knowledge, not
informing the full spectrum of humankind.
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The terminology used to describe the works was beautiful and monstrous. We need not
guess which term belongs to which image. Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa is the quintessential
example of classical fine art. And Basquiat’s work is seen as one of dissensus, a protest against
traditional norms of representation. One of the important occurrences in Plato’s cave is that one
prisoner rose out of the cave. And in doing so, he received an education. The freeing of the
prisoner informed the prisoner that there existed something else. He moved from the lower to the
higher; he perceived light instead of the darkness he had become accustomed to. He saw objects
of resemblance but in full view of the sun. All of these actions are involved in educating the
prisoner in what Socrates would propose as the true forms. These steps are a lesson in
perception.
The concept of beauty is taught and has the appearance of belonging to Kantian
disinterest. However, in the teaching, and herein lies the problem of Western education, beauty is
misinterpreted as mere cosmetics, and disinterest as mere form, although they belong to freedom.
That disinterest is not a pure disinterest but rests in the interest still of new perception. Kantian
disinterest conceptually releases the object of its obligation to perform, leading to freedom. At
once, it allows the spectator the liberty to be informed through the object as an object of
freedom. The disinterest simply means the object no longer comes with an agenda, yet it still
holds vital significance qualified by the spectator. Basquiat challenges beauty and the canons of
perception. He pleads the case of beauty as Schiller does for the importance of happiness.
Schiller's term “happiness” supports the case for beauty as found in the Declaration of
Independence. Though we are quite aware that this declaration of liberty was not meant for the
black man as it was penned in 1776, rest assuredly, he is to take hold of it as his own.
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How does one make “Beauty,” and what are “beautiful objects?” Furthermore, how has
Schiller tasked these objects with such a weighty assignment? How is this assignment fulfilled in
Walker, and what does this mean for the black man and emancipation? We discussed in earlier
chapters the implications of image and representation and the politics of those visibilities.
Schiller is well aware of how he uses his words in determining the necessary action that must be
taken to secure a new paradigm. In his use of Beauty as a noun or personification, he has
returned to Plato and the Theory of Forms, which Plato explains not many but one as belonging
to Beauty as a term or a concept that may well be misunderstood in the general sense. When one
speaks of beauty in common speech today, it most likely refers to something that pleases the
eyes. But beauty in Plato and Schiller is political and at once moral.
Socrates qualified beauty as the form removed from the sensible world. One would,
therefore, for the most part, never experience the beautiful until after death. In discussing
wisdom with the interlocutors in the republic, Socrates spoke of the urgent desire of philosophers
to die, which is their victory because it is in death that they would obtain wisdom. For Socrates,
there were no true forms in the sensible world. Socrates posed the statement as a riddle: if one
could find the inner and outer in harmony, this would be the most beautiful sight. This riddle is
lodged in anticipation of aesthetics. Schiller was able to respond to Plato in his Sixteenth Letter
by stating this: “From the interaction of two opposing impulses, then, and from the association of
two opposing principles, we have seen the origin of the Beautiful, whose highest ideal is,
therefore, to be sought in the perfect possible union and equilibrium of reality and form” (On the
Aesthetic Education of Man 81).
Thus, it appears that Beauty, from Plato to our present age, is a subject that goes to the
heart of the political. If we would consider this in Plato, Kant, Schiller, as well as Ranciere and
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other theoreticians, defining Beauty conceptually was not far removed from the political.
Principally speaking, it was about the equilibrium of form and matter. And for Plato, he could
not accept that this would or could be ascertained in the sensuousness.
The Future Image of Race
In conclusion, I would like to correlate two titles that link two ideas in the very essence of
this entire project and a thought-provoking closing regarding the two stems of knowledge. One
title idea derives from Ranicere’s The Future of the Image, while the other is taken from the
work by Gates and West entitled The Future of the Race. I have juxtaposed these to compose a
concerted discourse that now entertains the future image of the race. One speaks to image and its
relationship to the political body assigned to art. The other is a meditation on a humanist
education espoused by Du Bois and analyzed through the lens of time by Gates and West from
Du Bois’s 1903 essay “The Talented Tenth.” But what does the future image of race imply?
Simply this, that art will be the liberating factor for the black man in his fight for political
inclusion, which, in its emancipatory position, is referred to as aesthetics. This art, representing
freedom, is no longer separated from life, as a specialized unit unto itself, set apart in space,
divided in time and operations, occupations, and specializations. Freedom is not a narrative of
elitism, separatism, nationalism, colonialism, religion, or anything traditionally postulated
through art. It is political in that politics in Ranciere goes against the grain of the police order in
the pursuit of space and place of equality through aesthetic redistribution.
In Chapter Two, we considered the grim reality of mass incarceration, an enterprise that
is not retreating but is, by all accounts, the new slavery of the black male experience. I am no
longer deluded that society will rid itself of fascism, racism in the desire of the Other. And
though I know the problem seems insurmountable, I subscribe to Davis’s book title in my
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understanding that freedom is a constant struggle. How do we begin to imagine political freedom
through aesthetics for the black man in a corrupt society? What does emancipation through an
aesthetic education look like, sound like, feel it? How do we move from an aesthetic experience
to that of an aesthetic education and emancipation? Ranciere proposes in Future that “a new
form . . . offers itself to eyes trained to see differently, trained to see the pictorial appear on the
representative surface, under representation” (79). The casting of one’s gaze not on the surface as
much as beyond must at this moment of revolution and emancipation make its appearance. In
contrast to this is the legacy derived from Du Bois in his 1903 essay “The Talented Tenth” and
continued retrospectively in Gates and West’s revisit of this seminal essay in their writing The
Future of the Race. The liberal arts education is not available in equal distribution, but aesthetic
education is an individual existential project in shifting the gaze.
Du Bois’ essay was written in the same year as his more well-known work, The Souls of
Black Folk. Du Bois conceives the humanist education as the mountaintop of freedom for the
black man even to the point of transcendence, stating the following: “The ideal of ‘booklearning’ . . . here, at last, seemed to have been discovered the mountain path to Canaan . . .
leading to heights high enough to overlook life” (5). He contends that “it changed the child of
Emancipation to the youth with dawning self-consciousness, self-realization, self-respect” (Du
Bois 5). The term Emancipation is used here to refer to the Emancipation Proclamation's
legislative document that was to be the impetus of black freedom. Du Bois was adamant that a
humanist education was the final solution for the black problem. Du Bois states, “In those
somber forest of his striving, his soul rose before him, and he saw himself—darkly as through a
veil; and yet he saw in himself some faint revelation of his power, of his mission” (Du Bois 5).
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Before proceeding further, I would like to consider Benjamin and Zizek’s postulations
that challenge our premise of the future image of race as being predicated on a look backward,
and instead of a longing or mourning, championing the notion of advancement. It is also my
intention to analyze several films as dialectic in nature which holds out the potential as belonging
to the future image of race: Quentin Tarantino’s 2012 Django, David Peele’s 2018 Get Out,
Ryan Coogler’s 2018 Black Panther, and finally Spike Lee’s 2019 The BlackkKlansman. What is
critical in these is the potential for emancipation for the black man in the dialectics of seeing. I
will then discuss two texts introduced earlier, one by Du Bois, one by Gates, and West.
The dialectic of seeing is important in Benjamin’s arcade project as it relates to
fragmentation and ruin, an idea with which we began this chapter. Buck-Morss’s text The
Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcade Project conveys Benjamin's theory as:
The Copernican Revolution in historical perception is this: Before, one held the
past for the fixed point and saw the present as an effort to advance knowledge
gropingly to this point. This relationship is to be reversed, and the past
becomes the dialectical turnabout that inspires an awakened consciousness.
Politics maintains preeminence over history. (338)
The Copernican Revolution in Benjamin and Kant conceives the object as perception. In Kant,
the shift is to understand positionally where man is no longer informed by the object but assigns
its knowing. This new shift is a shift not only in subjectivity but in free will and emancipation.
The Copernican Revolution in Benjamin is less about the position of humankind’s place in
relationship to the object as much as it is the historical predilection of seeing objects in the world
and how this affects one’s subjectivity. The aestheticians working during the Enlightenment
sought to implement an educational curriculum based on aesthetics for the political efficacy of
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society. In Schiller’s aesthetic letters, he berates the State for having provided an education that
was degraded. Schiller meant that any education that does not educate by way of the whole man
does not educate wholly. Aesthetic education, which he supports, neither honors the intellect nor
the sensuous as primary. Instead, it suspends both for a third impulse: the equilibrium of reason
and the sensuous. I have made some efforts to understand Schiller’s theory of the third impulse
earlier in this chapter, in section two, “Lessons in an Aesthetic Education.”
What has been handed us in Walker is certainly a historical fragment that alters our
perception of the present. What is our perception, save it be our understanding? Our
understanding of Kant is the predisposition of the two-fold nature of cognition and imagination.
This idea returns to Ranciere’s fold in making possible representative art visibility. The fold in
the distribution of the sensible allows us to see those visibilities and art forms that were
otherwise not available in their hiddenness of the Platonic ethical regime (Politics 22).
Let us follow that argument. Now we can see (representative regime) that which at once
was censored from sight, but that seeing is predicated on a specificity of seeing, a controlled
sightline, a constructed vision. How, then, does perception change the past? In other words, how
does the object become disinterested in the sense of aesthetics to potentiality? The short answer
is that the image is no longer connected to the historical narrative. We have learned in earlier
chapters that perception is lodged in the narrative, not in the object itself. History itself is
narrative. Ranciere posits, “words no longer prescribe, as story or doctrine, what images should
be” (Future 87). Ranciere is looking at Schiller and Kant in his extension of the concepts
deriving from these theoreticians. In this case, it is the theory of disinterest, which we have
discussed to some degree earlier.
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The image as constructed narrative valid in its time is now lost through the distancing of
time. It has become a fragmentary discourse, a disruption, which can no longer be read in the
same vein as its former reading. The term disruption is synonymous with rupture. This disruption
of narrative is an unraveling of history. The unraveling of history, which is the narrative as
history, is understood in Ranciere as the representative regime. When we look at Lyotard’s
proposal of the narrative, we find that it is passed on as truth, as axiom, in its authoritative act of
being told. These reiterations then become institutionalized and performed as truth. Zizek takes
similar measure of history and emancipation lodged in perception when he states:
The only shift that effectively occurs is subjective, the shift of our perspective (i.e., all of
a sudden, we become aware that what previously appeared as conflict already is
reconciliation). This temporal move backward is crucial: the contradiction is not
resolved; we just establish that it always already been resolved. (In theological terms,
Redemption does not follow the Fall; it occurs when we become aware of how what we
previously (mis)perceived as Fall “in itself” already was Redemption). (14)
The starting place as redemptive did not change. It was there from the beginning. What has
changed, what has altered, is the peeling away of the multitudinous layers of philosophical,
psychological, political, religious sheathing, which has managed to veil the redemption through a
certain narrative, i.e., the split of nature, the epistemological divide, etc. It is not necessary then to
create a different image of the subject to defy history and its stereotypes—this is the problem being
lodged against Walker—but to imagine freedom from the stereotypes that no longer subsist in the
narrative. What changed in the cave allegory? Perception, perspective, value. The prisoner in the
cave ascended to the light and experienced the true forms. His perception transcended the image
before him.
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In Ranciere’s Future, the author cites several examples as clear indicators of how the
image participates in political emancipation in general. Ranciere’s claims throughout his writing
are consistent as regards the image and political body. For example, one of the methodologies
that are evident in these images is fragmentation. Fragmentation results from rupture. What is
fragmented, and what is being ruptured? Ranciere discusses several films, including the 1949
adaptation of Flaubert’s novel Madame Bovary in which Vincente Minnelli, the director,
examined the breaking up of the narrative through types of compartmentalized shots and close
ups that give us no true signification, no logical storyline. Ranciere notes this of fragmentation:
“And the fragmentation does not simply break the narrative sequence. It performs a double
operation with respect to it. By separating the hands from the facial expression, it reduces the
action to its essence” (5). The connection to the essence of the object, as opposed to the rhetoric
of the object's narrative, is an entirely different experience. The image is liberated two-fold
through the refusal of a fixed narrative and the spectator’s perception, both dialectic in doing and
making.
In recent years the concept of alternative endings for films was introduced, at least in
theory, where the spectator has become involved in the actions and deciding factors of the film’s
ending. Though this is not a general practice, it has been tested. The emancipated spectator is
involved in the same type of engagement with the dialectic image in that the image is not
predetermined, and the seeing is not predisposed. In fragmentation, the image lends itself to the
exercise of free will and choice much in the same way as the Kantian “Analytic of the Beautiful”
is understood. An example of this can be found in Spike Lee’s 2018 film The BlackkKlansman.
The stable signifier, which is generally responsible for relaying a precise and logical telling, is no
longer available in the dialectic image. What is experienced instead? To explain, I will use the
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Lacanian psychoanalytical term—a “network of signifiers” that constantly and perpetually refers
to the other, ad infinitum in a type of becoming of the subject.
The film opens with Alec Baldwin, cast as a white supremacist, delivering a speech,
which is being filmed. In his performance, he reveals the false constructions of history, including
the invention of the black man, that film and live performance played a pivotal role in. In this
film, he at once performs and parodies that construction. media. The camera moves from a
frontal shot of Baldwin and cuts to a succession of three images of the camera, firstly the reel,
secondly the film strip moving through the apparatus, and finally the lens itself. The closeup on
the camera reveals an apparatus of power and its ability to create. This series of shots can be
linked unequivocally to the invention of history through film, an idea profoundly noted by
Ranicere when he posits the manipulation of history through cinema (Future 55). Throughout the
opening scene, interruptions are constant, either by way of the cut-away from the image to
something else, the disruption by grunts from Baldwin, or a call for a prompter to feed accurate
lines or general cues from the script.
What I find quite effective in the telling of invention through film as it regards the black
man: in the same swing of the pendulum, Lee discloses the fabrication of history through
performance in film as critique and renounces the crown jewels of film in the invention of the
black man performed during earlier years. He does so by their very inclusion in his film, scenes
from both Birth of a Nation and Gone With the Wind. Lee’s film opens up with scenes from
Gone and Birth overlaid throughout Baldwin’s speech. One of the overlaid scenes is of the white
man in Birth performing the characterology of the black man in the South Carolina Legislation.
The black man is portrayed as an ignorant, chicken-eating, unintelligible creature. This denial of
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Figure 143-145. Film stills from Get Out 2018.

the black man as intelligent, with the ability to perform logically and judiciously, disallows
political ascension, aspiration, or trust from party members, voters, constituents.
This broken narrative is evident throughout Peele’s 2018 film Get Out. The scene takes
place in the operating room in the house where the brain of the white man is being prepped to be
placed into Daniel, the African American male. This correlation of body and intellect can
perhaps be understood in eighteenth-century racist science phrenology that postulated the black
man as an inferior species from his cranial measurements. What the black man was noted to be
endowed with was lodged in the body only: strength, agility, endurance, and his fitness for labor,
according to the narrative perpetuated throughout history. As mentioned previously, the
Enlightenment’s agenda was to establish this inferior/superior rhetoric. The whole idea
conceptually of phrenology and other scientific experiments, including the Bell Curve, was that
the white man was superior intellectually. There is a rearranging of the narrative of history
through various cut and paste fragments in the film (e.g., see figs. 143-145). The television and
the teacup, used as repetition—hypnosis vis-à-vis images of the black man displayed via the
media television—are interrupted by a closeup of Daniel’s head falling back onto the chair and
the grasping of the cotton from the tattered arm of the chair (e.g., see figs. 146-148). From the
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unbuckling of the chains from the legs to the immediacy of the hand, the camera shots possibly
suggest black male mass incarceration.

Figure 146-148. Film Stills from Get Out, 2018.

The new narrative undercuts history in its naming when the black man’s use of the cotton
releases him from the spell or brainwashing of hypnosis predicated by the teacup—the teacup
can signify Victorian gentility which is not lost in the Antebellum Southern tradition—and
escapes the impending doom of the sunken place. This play on the narrative of history as far as
phrenology is concerned is upended in similar fashion in Django Unchained. To set the scene:
Calvin Candie, played by Leonardo Di Caprio, is made aware of Django and Schultz’s real
purpose for their arrival at Candyland, which is to purchase Django’s wife, Broomhilda. Stephen,
the house slave, played by Samuel Jackson, informs Candie of the plot which Stephen had
threaded together. Candie, as the white superior, gave no recognition to Stephen for his critical
thinking ability. Instead, Candie takes the credit for having read the intent of Django and Dr.
Schultz. This inclusion, in my estimation, is a direct response to the edict of history that has
attributed the ingenuity and genius of the black man to the white intelligentsia.
After discovering the plot, Di Caprio goes back into the dining room, cuts a section from
a plastered cast skull representing a black man, and begins a discourse on the inferiority of the
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black man. These are the two histories, one “logic of fiction and the logic of fact” (Ranciere,
Politics 35) that has shed light on truth. This is a bold assertion of the hypocrisy of science and
the narrative's highly corrosive and persuasive power. The interplay of objects previously lodged
against the black man is now his liberation in this restaging of history. In the film Get Out, in the
surgery prep scene, cotton from the arm of the chair that Chris uses to place in his ears, thereby
enabling him to avoid being hypnotized, symbolizes history, slavery, and the slave occupation of
cotton picking, which was a major industry in the South.
So, what is the argument in The Future of the Race regarding a humanist education that is
readily available to liberate the black man today? What can a humanist education provide in
political action, justice, and ethical accountability in emancipation? Let us examine “The
Talented Tenth” essay to set the stage for what will come in The Future of the Race. There is a
short disclosure preceding the essay, which states, “a strong plea for the higher education of the
Negro, which those who are interested in the future of the freedmen cannot afford to ignore”
(35). Schiller’s opening statement is similar, in particular to the argument of freedom, necessity,
and happiness, but Schiller locates these in an aesthetic education, while Du Bois sees the
humanist education as having primacy. Du Bois argued for a humanist education, believing that a
select few could save the masses.
But we know what Fanon would say to this drive for humanist education. It is the white
man’s education that drives the black man into his neurosis in his striving to be white. In seeking
equality, the black man gains some sense of belonging to the same world as the white man, but
he loses himself in the process. Fanon would state that education nor philosophy has ever saved
anyone (Black Skin, White Masks 12). And I do not disregard what is at stake here in the pleas by
Du Bois for a humanist education for the black man and emancipation. The black man has
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already had a vocational education in slavery. Booker T. Washington believed we should start at
the bottom and work our way up. I would only state that what has been tasked to the slave over
hundreds of years falls under the rubric of industrial education and the idea of the black man
working himself up has the ring of servility.
It is now the fashion of to-day to sneer at them and to say that with freedom Negro
leadership should have begun at the plow and not in the Senate—a foolish and
mischievous lie; two hundred and fifty years that black serf toiled at the plow and yet that
toiling was in vain till the Senate passed the war amendments; and two hundred and fifty
years more the half-free serf of to-day may toil at his plow, but unless he have political
right and righteously guarded civic status, he will still remain the poverty-stricken and
ignorant plaything of rascals, that he now is. This all sane men know even if they dare not
say it. (Gates, Jr., West The Future of the Race 138)
But as liberated as this discourse may sound, it cannot be disassociated with Platonic
dialogues. Du Bois is already involved in the problems of history, in the division of the
community with such phrases as “exceptional men” and “Best of this race.” In the history of
thought, experts or specialists are major progenitors of the distribution of the sensible as far as
the doing and making in a community. Power does not emanate from the bottom. Instead, it does
so from the top. Even today, the government, not the masses, regulate and orchestrate the
community. Plato’s contempt for diversity and multiplicity was his platform. He mandated that
one always take on a station in perpetuity and nothing else. This proposal was not a matter of
care but one of allocation and control. Du Bois’s phrase, “vision of seers,” also places the
oversight of knowledge in the hands of a selected elite, the philosopher. And finally, to this
point, is his attention to something that appears to come directly from the Republic, which is
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education and desires. Du Bois posits, “if we make money the object of man-training, we shall
develop money-makers . . . technical skill . . . artisans. We make manhood the object of the work
of the schools—intelligence, broad sympathy, knowledge of the world . . . this is the curriculum
of that Higher Education which must underlie true life” (The Future of the Race 133).
Du Bois, unfortunately, is performing the same acts of separating and assigning esoteric
knowledge to a certain portion of the race. Du Bois calls for educational experts, which is one of
the problems of history and a greater one for modernism. Now he sees this as adding to the
height and depth of the Negro and progress. In this statement, we see that Du Bois attends to the
idea of form and humanity. But it conjures up Platonic dialogues in the sense of the division of
the soul. And though Du Bois’s project is the postulation that the black man has a soul, it is
apparent that his soul is categorized even as the division of the soul in Plato.
West’s assessment of Du Bois is not disrespectful, but it is certainly discerning. He states
that Du Bois is disconnected from the masses even though he speaks of the masses as his chief
concern, and he has an “inadequate interpretation of the human condition” (The Future of the
Race 55). West’s reading of Du Bois goes to the heart of our discussion on knowledge in its
bipolarity. “My fundamental problem with Du Bois is his inadequate grasp of the tragicomic
sense of life . . . Even ultimate purpose and objective order are called into question—propels us
toward suicide or madness unless we are buffered by ritual, cushioned by community, or
sustained by art” (The Future of the Race 57).
Du Bois argued for a classical education for the Negro—Du Bois is a product of classical
education himself, having matriculated at Yale University—believing it would transplant him
from poverty to being economically and spiritually sound. He believed education to be the only
way to gain access to the otherwise closed portal belonging to whites only, to lift the veil that
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divides the two worlds. The sad indictment is that these two worlds still exist as if no time had
passed between Du Bois and the present condition of the black man. In “The Talented Tenth,”
Du Bois spoke of what he surmises as to the leaders of the Negro nation who must raise the
masses in their ascension through education as their only salvation. He showed through graphs
and figures that his project of a classical education had not been in vain.
In fact, in just over a generation, education in white and black institutions, HBCU
(Historically Black Colleges and Universities) had produced an entirely new Negro whose social
reflection was recognized through their occupations, manners, and overall human composition.
Most of the Negroes coming out of the universities had reputable occupations as doctors,
lawyers, clergy, as well as farmers, clerks, government employees, and artisans. Du Bois’s entire
argument may rest on this statement. He asks, “how then shall the leaders of a struggling people
be trained and the hands of the risen few strengthened? There can be but one answer: The best
and most capable of their youth must be schooled in the colleges and universities of the land… I
willingly admit that each soul and each race-soul need its own peculiar curriculum” (West, The
Future of the Race 140).
On a fundamental level, Du Bois raised himself and other elites above the masses without
thinking that he positions himself in the hegemonic order he seeks to overthrow. But it is his
blindness in light of his education that has created another veil. That veil does not separate him
from the white world but from the black world. In Du Bois’s division of the community, he has
always already made a distinction between himself as an elite black man, a thinker, and those
whom he would qualify as being lower black men, not educated as he was in the finer schools of
the privileged few. The masses for Du Bois have become the Other. But he also indicates that he
too suffers the same injustices. This is a double slight for Du Bois. On the one hand, he stands as
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a black man with the white man. He was raised to be educated in similar fashion as the white
man. On the other hand, the educated and uneducated black man, as far as the white man is
concerned, are equally unquantifiable to the full status of humans. Du Bois, therefore, perceives
himself as suffering along with the black masses. However, the discourse in The Souls of Black
Folk does not convey Du Bois as suffering with the black masses as he claims.
Du Bois’s work in both Souls of Black Folk and The Talented Tenth is not polyphonic or
intersubjective in the making of the community but is ambiguous, at best, for its dialogue, in
many instances displays an air of privilege. I will not state that, in his blackness, Du Bois did not
see something of the suffering, hear something of the complaints, note the injustices because
these writings are not distilled measures. But according to Cornell West commentary in “The
Talented Tenth,” he distinguished himself from the masses. West noted of Du Bois’s The Souls
of Black Folk that, “there are eighteen references to “black, backward, and ungraceful” folk,
including a statement of Du Bois’s intent “to scatter civilization among a people whose
ignorance was not simply of letters, but of life itself” (The Future of the Race 58). Du Bois is no
doubt categorically a man of science, and this remains consistent in his dealing with the problem
of the black man. Du Bois presents his argument as primarily a dichotomy between the elite
group, highly removed from the masses and enlightened to the “benighted masses” (The Future
Image of Race 60).
West understood Du Bois’s project as an Enlightenment sentiment. Du Bois was doing to
the Negro what the white man had done to the Negro, discounting the masses’ intelligence and
raising himself up as the philosopher-king. Du Bois saw the masses in much the same way as the
white man viewed the Negro in general. But his insistence on rationalistic knowledge and a
complete disavowal of the emotive desensitized him to the true plight of the black man. Du Bois’
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position was similar to Socrates on art in that he knew the power but was not willing to make it
primary. West tells of Du Bois attending a church meeting in a country church, perhaps
Pentecostal in nature. Du Bois’ description of the scene was as if he was experiencing an
exorcism. West stated, “in short, a black ritualistic explosion of energy frightened this black
rationalist. It did so not simply because the folk seems so coarse and uncouth, but also because
they were out of control, overpowered by something bigger than themselves” (The Future Image
of Race 60).
Gates’ reflection on Du Bois’s essay “The Talented Tenth” embraces what he considers
to be the opportunities afforded by the intellectually advanced black man and his responsibility
to the community in the wake of his achievement. In his Preface, he notes that “Dr. King did not
die so that half of us would “make it,” and half of us perish, forever tarnishing two centuries of
struggle and agitation for our equal rights. We, the members of Du Bois’s Talented Tenth, must
accept our historical responsibility and live King’s credo that none of us is free until each of us is
free” (The Future Image of Race xvii). Much in the same spirit of Du Bois, Gates believes that
these groups of black men must move in place to access otherwise closed portals. Gates writes a
historical narrative of the progressive movement of the black elite, which divided the black
nation in the same way the black nation previously was separated by a chasm from the white.
The black bourgeoisie who had climbed up the ladder was not there to assist the uprising of the
masses. Instead, many, including King, complained that the middle-class Negro had forgotten the
other in his pursuit of freedom. So, we see then the same turn of the tide that occurred in the
white race toward the blacks is now occurring in the African American community, one to the
other. Yet education claimed Du Bois would be the savior for us all. What Du Bois had forgotten
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perhaps is to look at history. History is replete with the automaton making of Being that has
stripped the soul from its place in exacting science.
In one instance, Gates speaks of the tradition of education passed down through his
family as a social heirloom available to those who would stay the course. He states that “we were
to get just as much education as we possibly could, to stay the enemies of racism, segregation,
and discrimination. (If we heard it once, we heard it a thousand times: education is the one thing
nobody can take away from you).” (The Future of the Race 11). And what of the new slavery
predicated on the same system Du Bois praised, strategically readying our sons for the
capitalistic system. The educational system is leading our boys as young as five and six years old
down the rabbit hole of doom, already destined to a death that is not so easy reversed. The
triangulation of corruption will lead the way to the last leg of what I have proposed, as well as so
many scholars—the new slavery—the prison system. And so, it is the division of knowledge that
must be eliminated in the images of art and life. This is the liberation, the dialectic of seeing.
How is this accomplished in Ranciere? Again, in Ranciere’s Future, he states that “art forms and
life forms would no longer be bound together by the equivocal forms of imagery, but tend to be
directly identified with one another” (28). In other words, an art of liberation will not present a
division or separation of form as a distinction that is automatically within itself a call for
categorization but will have the appearance of the same having been emptied of former
disguises.
Tarantino’s film Django belongs here for the equilibrium of freedom that was pivotal in
exposing the scientific racist project of phrenology that was one of the agencies of the birth of
the black man in eighteenth-century Europe. The images in this film evoke liberation against the
stereotypes of history. They propose a certain order of moving and being in the world. Though I
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will not discuss this film in detail, I would like to note several instances that locate it as a
dialectic image, not bound by slavery but with its roots in emancipation. Spike Lee offered his
take on the film by stating that Django is “disrespectful to my ancestors.” Lee further states,
"American slavery was not a Sergio Leone spaghetti western. It was a Holocaust. My ancestors
are slaves. Stolen from Africa” (Zakarin).
I was hoping in my research to better understand why the film was associated with
Blaxploitation, as claimed by a film critic who states that it is set in the same model type. It is my
position that instead, this is the
reversal of the Blaxploitation films.
This is the argument that I uphold
for Walker. We must be taught to
see in a new way, not what to see,
but how to see. For it is in this
seeing that lies emancipation.
Understanding exploitation on any
Figure 149. Film still from Django 2012.

level reveals the ill treatment of

subjects as objects to use, not to serve the individual or the community, but one’s own selfish
desire. One of the main themes Ranciere explores is the emancipated subject, who is no longer
given a predetermined image conceived and manipulated by others, but these images are recast
by perception. This film runs in the opposite direction to the critique of Blaxploitation. In the
epigraph, Schiller notes this, “to make Beauty from beautiful objects is the task of aesthetic
education” (On the Aesthetic Education of Man 83). The beauty which Schiller is proposing is
two-fold: Firstly, artists are free agents to create out of free will, not demand of state apparatus.
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On the other hand, the viewer stands before the object, not as one drawn into deception or
propaganda serving the state apparatus, but with free will to formulate a testament of freedom
from the object.
Django permeates with such beauty because beauty is understood here as equilibrium,
equality. In an early part of the movie, there is a beautiful scene of Django as he walks away
from slavery, away from the group still enslaved, and he casts off the cloak of slavery and begins
his reinvention, though still marked with the inscriptions of slavery (e.g., see fig. 149). What may
appear as the black man shown as a mythical figure in this setting is the black man remaking
himself. From the form of a slave to the evolution of a man with equal standing and rights,
defying all matters of history, including that imposed on him through the slave market and
Antebellum South. So, we see here that Django has transcended slavery. He stepped into realms
that he could only enter as identified as a slave in the past. Now, he is recognized as an equal
moving in and out of spaces, qualifying himself in all matters of liberation. The slave in the
image with Django still has on the raiment of slavery.
Then there is the entrance of Django and Dr. Schultz riding into the plantation as equals
on horseback (e.g., see fig. 150). The plantation is understood to embody the entire system of
slavery, from the initial acquisition through the dissemination to the fastening of the bodies in
eternal use value. In several major scenes, Tarantino has placed the black man and the white man
as equals, and sometimes the white man is in the Hegelian stance of recognition. The
master/slave narrative is not carried through because of the suspension of the impulses
culminating in egalitarianism. The two men are on horses; the two are riding into the plantation
on the same footing, not Django walking and Dr. Schultz riding; the two reside at the big house
at once, not Django as a slave or servant but both as guests.
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Critical themes such as mass incarceration as the new slavery, Nat Turner’s Rebellion is
possibly signified in various scenes from the slaughtering of dozens of men in the battle at
Candyland to the merciless killing of the
Southern Belle. But Sartre would declare,
whose violence is it (Fanon, The Wretched of
the Earth lii)? This is no mockery here, no
buffoonery, no shame to the ancestors, nor
callous handling of slavery, as Lee seems to
insist in his commentary of the film mentioned

Figure 150. Film still from Django 2012.

previously. The question begs, how long will we hold on to slavery, making it a lasting
monument, untouchable by the winds of aesthetic change? Fanon insists that he was not a slave
to slavery (Black Skin, White Masks 205). The problem is not in what is present in this work; it is
our perception. At every turn, this is
a work of emancipation, and I dare
say the future image of the race.
Films such as Twelve Years A Slave
are simply reportage in that they do
not alter the fate of the black man but
Figure 151. Film still from Django 2012.

instead concretize his state

perpetually, in my opinion. It reiterates a certain order of power and master/slave relationship in
perpetuity. The direction of Django is so precise in its re-presentation of the master/slave
narrative that defies slavery and dares it to speak (e.g., see figs. 151-152). It is not about
replacing the white hegemonic order with the black, but the creation of a common world.
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Education is an epistemological model for shaping a certain type of humanity. So, the
question derives, what type of humanity will further the black man’s agenda of emancipation? Is
he to receive an inferior education or one on the same level as any free man? Does he seek an
education of equal quality to the white man, even if it binds his soul and the heartstrings of his
humanity? Or does he seek to go
beyond the form of his humanity?
It is not necessarily about the
space you occupy now. It is about
transcending that space. Fanon
initiates his aesthetic discourse in
Black Skins, White Masks by

Figure 152. Film still from Django 2012.

stating, “it’s no longer a question of knowing the world, but of transforming it” (1). But how do
we transform the world set before us? By way of conclusion, Fanon states, “And it is going
beyond the historical and instrumental given that I initiate my cycle of freedom” (Black Skin,
White Masks 205). In this brief statement, Fanon reiterates his position as a black man in history
and present condition as invention. But he is not moved by this. Instead, he pronounces that he
must go beyond those constructed givens, moving outside of the frame of his condition to make
anew.
So, whether one is incarcerated in a cell space, an isolated division removed from
humanity geographically, or whether it is political isolation, there is potential for transcendence.
How do we move outside the realm of the shadows? What is the vital lesson of the cave
allegory? The prisoner transcended his condition in his “upward journey” to experience the
Forms. Although in the cave allegory the prisoner’s seeing was predetermined, it does not
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undermine the possibility for those willing to perceive emancipation. I have attempted to
illustrate the passage beyond the cave walls in leaving behind the discourse of slavery to open up
possibilities of emancipation. In Ranciere’s Preface to Proletarian Nights when discussing
emancipatory potential in aesthetics refused to reignite the flame of drudgery and misery in the
lives of the proletarian. To do so would be a recapitulation and a reassignment of their lot in
perpetuity. And it would support the conventional norms of the proletarian as victim. Instead, he
illustrates the men and women not as victims seeking restitutions or pity. Rather, they
transformed themselves in the act of art as living form. This too is the black man’s salvation.164
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Notes
See Greg Grandin’s The Empire of Necessity: Slavery, Freedom, and Deception in the New World for a detailed

1

account of the slave ship.
2

See Karl Marx’s The Communist Manifesto, Maurizio Lazzarato’s The Making of the Indebted Man, and Friedrich

Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man for readings related to capitalism and machinery of civilization.
3

See Frantz Fanon’s assessment of the black man as invention in Black Skins, White Masks.

4

Characterology in generals terms is defined under the rubric of scientific racism in the invention of race through

negative assignments as ones essence.
5

6

See Jacques Ranciere’s Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics for detailed account of the politics of policing.
See Philip Dray’s historical account of lynching in At the Hands of Persons Unknown: The Lynching of Black

America.
7

Derek Chauvin is the police officer who for eight minutes and forty-six seconds held George Floyd down

circumventing his ability to breathe, until Floyd died. The foot on the knee is symbolic of rope used in lynching.
8

The Triangulation of Corruption which I have coined is a tracing of the dehumanization of the black man through a

system of operations and distributions from education to the penal apparatus.
9

See Ava Durvernay’s 2016 documentary 13th discourse on the Thirteenth Amendment and mass incarceration.

10

See John Strausbaugh’s Black Like You: Blackface, Whiteface, Insult & Imitation in American Popular Culture.

11

For more on the Civil War see Andrew Ward’s The Slaves’ War: The Civil War in the Words of Former Slaves,

Guernsey and Alden’s, Harper’s Pictorial History of the Civil War, William Gienapp’s Abraham Lincoln and Civil
War America: A Biography, and John Hope Franklin’s The Emancipation Proclamation.
12

See Joseph Boskin’s account of Reconstruction in Sambo. Also, Henry Louis Gates’s Life Upon These Shores.

13

America holds 5% of the world’s population yet accounts for 25% incarceration. We are the most incarcerated

country in the world.
14

See Chris Hedges’ Wages of Rebellion to understand the how the tough on crime agenda moved blacks politicians

to participate in legislation that crippled the community in the proliferation of black male incarceration.
15

This references Plato and the censoring of the poets in the republic.
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16

See Friedrich Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man and Andrew Bowie’s Aesthetics and Subjectivity in

which he includes a document believed to be the oldest of German Idealism in which it states that, “the highest act
of reason, which embraces all Ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness are brothers only in beauty”
(Appendix 334).
17

This dichotomous position of art is understood in Ranciere as the representative and aesthetic regime respectively.

18

See Sebastin Gardner’s Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason.

19

See Susan Buck-Morss’s The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project. Dialectic turnabout

is a theoretical concept identifying history as redemptive through perception.
20

See Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge: And the Discourse on Language. See also Jacques Derrida’s

Of Grammatology, Louis Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” in Art in Theory 1900-2000: An
Anthology of Changing Ideas.
21

This italicized statement refers to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in the incarnate Christ, comparison is made

of knowledge as incarnate in art.
22

Jacques Ranciere is proposing that it is Friedrich Schiller’s aesthetics letters that reveal the distribution in the first

order as an ontological one in the division of the community though specializations.
23

Specialization is the matter of subjectivity which make no allowances for intersubjectivity. One’s subjectivity then

belongs to the combined or yielded identificatory of the State. Marx cannot be disregarded in his assessment of the
relationship of the alienated subject from the political body or the social body. In Maurizio Lazzarato’s The Making
of the Indebted Man “economic production and the production of subjectivity, labor and ethics, are indissociable”
(49).
24

For more reading on the topic of specialization and its effects See Habermas’s essay in Art in Theory 1900-2000

“Modernity-An Incomplete Project,” pp. 1123-1137, Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man. The theme of
specialization is at the heart of Jacques Ranciere’s enterprise.
25

See Arthur Schopenhauer’s, The World as Will and Idea.

26

In Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming Community the entire writing retains an awareness of history and its division

as unnatural.
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27

See Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror in which she identifies abject as the repressed understood as the

unconscious. She states at one point, “The abject has only one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I.”
28

Donna Haraway in her Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature implicates science in the

reordering not only of what constitutes all naming and being, but nature.
29

See Louis E. Lomax’s The Negro Revolt.

30

See Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, Alexandre Kojove.

31

See Ranicere’s Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, Chapter Nine, “The Aesthetic Revolution and Its

Outcomes.”
32

I surmise that grace is a concept in the reworking of the theological strand of grace as the middle ground between

law and the penalty of death, now attributable to art in aesthetics.
33

Positivism refers to a methodology of validation through observation instead of the conventional scientific data.

34

This references the Biblical creation from Genesis, and it noted here as a parallelism to Plato.

35

See Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy.

36

See Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, Chapter Six, “The Black Man and Psychopathology” in its entirety.

37

See Jacques Ranciere’s Politics and Aesthetics, p. 22, in which he explicates this division of the doing and making

as a parceling of the community.
38

See Jacques Ranciere, p. 2.

39

See Plato’s Republic, Book 3, p. 99.

40

The Platonic Myth of the Metals is discussed in Book 3 in the Republic and is required reading in the setting in

order of the ontological division.
41

See Friedrich Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man, “Fourth Letter, and the ‘Twenty-fourth Letter.”

42

See Henry Louis Gates’ Life Upon These Shores: Looking at African American History, 1513-2008 for a historical

record of African Americans in their fight for freedom.
43

44

The Tower of Babel is a theological reference in the Bible, Genesis 11:1-9.
See Kathryn T. Gines’ Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question in which she addresses the violence persisting in

Frantz Fanon writings.
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45

See the Holy Bible KJV, Luke 24:5. I make the concatenation here regarding Walker’s work as belonging to the

dead files of historical stereotypical showings.
46

See Hegel’s Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, and Kojève’s Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on

the Phenomenology of Spirit for a more indepth examination of this phenomenon.
47

Du Bois in the original writing of “The Talented Tenth” raised himself above the black community in his assumed

role as a type of philosopher-king, a mediator of knowledge which he insinuates that other blacks may not be
capable of ascertaining in terms of intelligibility.
48

The burning bush reference is found in Exodus 3:1-15 in the calling of Moses as the deliverer of the Children of

Israel from the Pharoah’s captvitiy.
49

This comment regarding the entry found in the textbook is in no way a negative reflection. It is rather

commendable that one would see this turn in a primary reportage document not generally philosophically adherent.
50

See John Hendrik Clark’s William Styron’s Nat Turner:Ten Black Writers Respond. These scholars are responding

to William Styron’s The Confessions of Nat Turner.
51

See Emmanuel Levinas’s Entre Nous: Thinking of the Other a directive of the repudiation of the Hegelian

master/slave narrative in the death of the Other.
52

See Henri Bergson’s Creative Evolution.

53

See Heidegger’s essay “Being and Time” where he argues the inclusion of nothing in the interrogation of Being.

54

It is argued by theorists that the publishing industry is part of the state apparatus purporting a distribution of the

sensible to promote a certain knowledge continuum.
55

Raphael’s The School of Athens, 1509-1511 is an oil painting produced during the High Renaissance denoting the

two major figures of Western philosophy. Their hand motion in the direction in which they are philosophically
bound, Plato Otherwordliness, and Aristotle, actual world.
56

See Arthur Herman’s The Cave and the Light.

57

Jacques Lacan Mirror image concept is argued as the state in which subjectivity is formed as the false ‘I’.

58

See Arthur Herman, The Cave and the Light for the complete quote.
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59

See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics in which he explicates the development

of man from the sensuous nature of desire to consume the object, to the rational contemplation of the object.
60

See Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community.

61

See Jean-Francois Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge in the section entitled “The

Narrative Function and the Legitimation of Knowledge.”
62

See Jean-Francois Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.

63

Polykleitos’s Kanon in which the Doryphoros embodies, is a treatise on the mathematically standardization of

Greek sculpture.
64

Reference to the softening turn to the sensible is understood during the Enlightenment as the rejection of reason to

observation and the empirical model in vogue in the sciences during this period.
65

See Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Emile: Or On Education in which he cites civilization as the problem. The opening

line of the introduction reads, “civil man is born, lives, and dies in slavery.”
66

See the opening statement to Richard Gray’s About Face, Preface, p. xvii.

67

See Ranciere’s Politics of Aesthetics, pp. 13-14 on a brief discussion of the theatre and writing as forms of

dissensus.
68

See Jacques Ranciere’s Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, p. 119. A self-education refers to an education that

is not predicated on a predetermined gaze, but one that is governed by the training of one’s perception and using
one’s free will.
69

See Richard Gray’s About Face, page xxxvi in which Helmut Konig states that, “the absolutist society had no

conception of the individual as individual, instead, each person was the representative of a trans-individual system
of reference that detected personal essence not in terms of psychological or physiological traits, but rather on the
basis of external identifiers such as clothes, hairstyle, manner of speech, gestures, and general habitus.”
70

See Richard Gray’s About Face, the section, “Goethe as Found(l)ing Father of Modern German Physiognomics.”

for information on Goethe’s role in the propagation of physiognomy and doctrines that fueled scientific racist
theories.
71

See Daniel Purdy’s The Tyranny of Elegance.

72

See Vigarello’s The Silhouette, p. 23, inset.
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73

See Richard Gray’s About Face, p 93. This quote is written here in full as noted in on physiognomy taken from

Hegel’s The Phenomenology of the Spirt. “Now if the external form, insofar as it is neither an organ nor an activity,
and as such just a passive totality, were truly capable of expressing internal individuality, then it would thereby
function as an existing thing that would placidly receive this internal quality, as something foreign, in its passive
being and thereby become its sign—an external, accidental expression whose real aspect would be meaningless for
itself; a language whose sounds and sound combinations are not linked directly to the thing itself, but instead are
connected by free choice … and hence have an accidental relationship to the thing.”
74

See Tomlinson’s Head Masters in which he states that, “Combe, the leading phrenologist of the day, demonstrated

how the physiological laws of heridty and experience governing the structure and development of the brain could be
employed to adapt human behavior to the moral laws of nature” (x). Head Masters provide substantial information
on phrenology.
75

See Richard Gray’s About Face.

76

See Richard Gray’s About Face, quote by Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Lavater’s fierce opponent on

superstition, p. 3.
77

See Tomlinson’s Head Masters, Chapter 3, Gall, “Naturalist of the Mind.”

78

This fear is perhaps what can account for the various means in which white society has kept the black man at bay

through characterological smear campaigns and other exterminating measures including mass incarceration.
79

The Reconstruction noted here is the Post Civil War initiative to rebuild the colonies.

See Joseph Boskin’s Sambo: The Rise and Demise of an American Jester; Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White
Masks.
80

81

See Stephen Tomlinson’s Head Masters for more on Samuel Howard Gridley. It is implied by Tomlinson on page

350, that Howe’s philosophy of race is a precursor to the introduction of eugenics in America.
82

For a list of anthropologists and other sciences who had a racist turn, see Gray’s About Face, Georges Vigarello’s

The Silhouette, and John P. Jackson, Jr., and Nadine M. Weidman’s Race, Racism, and Science.
83

See Gray’s About Face, Georges Vigarello’s The Silhouette, and John P. Jackson, Jr., and Nadine M. Weidman’s

Race, Racism, and Science, and Stephen Tomlinson’s Head Masters.
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84

See Lavater’s Physiognomy for an account of his attribution of the perfection of form divined to the white race by

God and the deformity belonging to the black race. See also, Plato’s Meno.
85

See Richard Gray’s About Face, in specificity on Lavater’s Christian hermeneutics in his physiognomic project.

86

Richard Gray’s research indicates that, “less than forty years after the publication n of Lavater’s magnum opus, no

fewer than sixteen German, fifteen French, and twenty English editions had appeared. Additionally, in smaller
numbers, Russian, Dutch and Italian translations were available.
87

See Richard Wolin’s The Seduction of Unreason, Introduction.

88

See Jacques Ranciere’s Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, especially as it regards policing and politics proper.

Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, and Angela Davis’s
Policing the Black Man: Arrest, Prosecution, and Imprisonment.
89

See Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, pp.97-139.

90

See Henry Lewis Gates, The Henry Gates, Jr. Reader. Gates included a criticism from Mikhail Bakhtin of

Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic system in which he stated that, “the signifier…is fixed, not free, with respect to
the linguistic community that uses it. The masses have no voice in the matter, and the signifier chosen by language
could be replaced by no other…[The] Community itself cannot control so much as a single word; it is bound to the
existing language,” p. 239.
91

See Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn.

92

See Richard Gray’s About Face: German Physiognomic Thought fro Lavater to Auschwitz, p.100 as it regards

panopticism.
93

See Georges Vigarello’s The Silhouette, p.65, “The Silhouette: A Social ‘Museum’ in the 19 th Century.”

94

See Georges Vigarello’s The Silhouette, p. 60.

95

Georges Vigarello’s The Silhouette is more theoretically composed on the subject of the silhouette. For more on

the artform materiality and silhouettists, see A History of American Silhouettes: A Collector’s Guide 1790-1840 by
Alice Van Leer Carrick, and Silhouettes: A History and Dictionary of Artists by Mrs. E. Nevill Jackson.
96

See Friedrich Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals on Christian asceticism and aristocratic posturing.

97

See Michel Foucault’s, Discipline & Punish; The Birth of the Prison, p. 30.
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98

See John Strausbaugh’s, Black Like You: Blackface, Whiteface, Insult & Imitation in American Popular Culture

for an extensive listing of blackface performances.
99

See Michelle Alexander’s, The New Jim Crow.

100

See Aristotle’s Poetics for a detailed account of the concept of the plot which is critical to the narrative.

101

See Jean Baudrillard’s, The Conspiracy of Art.

102

See Martin Heidegger’s essay “What is Metaphysics?” in which he explicates nothing in the assignment of

Being.
103

Biological should not be thought of as primarily physiology, but should be understood in Kittler as

belonging to the same epistemological field as the intellect.
104

For in-depth analysis of MuLuhan’s quote “the media is the message” see Kittler’s Gramophone, Film,

Typewriter, Enzensberger’s essay, “Constituents of a Theory of the Media,” Baudrillard’s “Requiem for the Media,”
as well as Krauss’s Under Blue Cup.
105

Krauss referring to McLuhan and Kittler as Cassandras of medium is inferring that they are tragedians of

media foretelling.
106

Krauss is most likely speaking of the modern artists who in their specificity in painting effaced what had

before been the role of the medium to define certain spaces, times, and subject matters. Now in its absoluteness, and
this is concluded by many theorists, modernism had not only erased the model, but they had also erased the medium.
The artist claimed this act as revolutionary in nature.
107

See Kittler’s Gramophone, Film, Typewriter.

108

Aristotle’s formulation of theatre in Poetics is expounded in detail in Ranciere’s writings which are critical for a

fecund understanding of the concept of performativity in media.
109

See Michael Inwood’s introduction of Hegel’s Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, in the section, “Art, the

Absolute and Spirit.”
110

See Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks.

111

See Gates’ Upon These Shores, “Creating a Black Atlantic,” pp. 42-45.

112

See Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, p. 37.
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113

See Ida B. Wells-Barnett’s The Red Record: Tabulated Statistics and Alleged Causes of Lynching in the United

States.
114

The Harmon Foundation was the only major white supporter of the Harlem Renaissance.

115

Snoop Dogg and Martha Stewart’s commercial for their show which seem to have disappeared from virtual view

appropriated the scene from the 1990 film Ghost with Demi Moore and the late Patrick Swayze. In the film is a love
scene in which Patrick Swayze returns as a ghost. Moore creates a container on the potter’s wheel, and Swayze is
mimicking her movements as he sits close to her from behind. The song Unchained Melody by Alex North, with the
lyrics, Oh, my love, my darling/I’ve hungered for your touch, is playing in the background. It is intended to be
provocative, alluring, evoking desire. The show’s title is Martha & Snoop's Potluck Dinner Party.
116

It is a well-known that Hilary Clinton used this term in one of her speeches. An article in Politifact states that

“The "superpredators" line comes from a 1996 speech in New Hampshire, where Clinton spoke in support of the
1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which her husband, Bill Clinton, had signed in to law”
(Graves). Though the term did not single out young African Americans, it was associated with this community of
youth in correlation to other derivatives in the speech.
117

See Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow.

118

See John Franklin Hope’s The Emancipation Proclamation for a detailed account of the decision for drawing up

the legislation by President Lincoln.
119

See Peter Gay’s The Freud Reader for the concise workings of the structures of the ego in psychoanalysis,

“Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” pp. 594-626, and “The Ego and the Id,” pp. 628-658.
120

For a more detail examination of Evan Puschak’s analysis of Williams Yeats’ Leda and the Swan visit

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j4CJ7h3mX4Q&t=144s.
121

The 1989 Central Park Five incident in New York city in which a white woman accused five young black men of

raping and beating her was who were recently exonerated after spending their young lives incarcerated.
122

Jacques Renciere’s theory of counting is deliberated in Tanke’s Jacques Ranciere: An Introduction in the section

“The Aesthetics of Counting,” pp. 48-55.
123

See Louis Althusser’s essay in Art in Theory 1900-2000, p. 953.
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124

See James Baldwin’s Fire Next Time in the section “Down at the Cross” to read the entire scenario of the parents

treatment of the black child.
125

See Chris Hayes, A Colony in a Nation, and Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the

Age of Color Blindness.
126

See Chris Hedges’ Wages of Rebellion for a disclosure of the 1994 Omnibus Bill which is said to have

precipitated prison population to its present phrase of mass incarceration, pp. 111-112.
127

Ships of Fools is important in understanding the process of the state in the expunging of all undesirables which

appears to have set in place the penal system.
128

This statement can be paralleled to the work of Kara Walker for this reason: logic as well as unframed thought is

made visible through the means of art. Walker’s work does not adhere to a semiological system; instead she disrupts
all systems of conventional visibilities.
129

For more detail on the structural system of semiology see Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics.

130

See Oxford English Dictionary Online.

131

See Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in which he examines the shift in the subject/object relationship. The object

no longer offers itself to the subject as determined perception, but the subject to the object as free will.
132

Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Idea, and Hegel’s Phenomenology of

the Spirit engages the reader in the much-debated issue of the thing-in-itself as the examination of the divisions of
knowledge and its limitation.
133

See Michel Foucault’s The Order of Thing: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences in the section

“Representing.”
134

See Rebecca Peabody’s Consuming Stories: Kara Walker and the Imagining of American Race for more

information on the theory of the suspension of disbelief and the narrative.
135

For detail reading of Greenberg’s writings on Abstract Expressionism see the essays “Avant-Garde and

Kitsch,” “Towards a Never Laocoon,” and “Modernist Painting” in Art in Theory 1900-2000.
and Norman Kleeblatt, Action/Abstraction: Pollock, de Kooning, and American Art, 1940-1976.
136

Kara Walker was granted the MacArthur Grant at the age of 27. The McArthur Grant, also
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known as the “genius” award is given cross-discipline to individuals who exhibit potential for continued productive
and creative work as a contribution to society.
137

Black Renaissance/Renaissance Noire is a publication out of New York University.

138

See Martin Luther King Jr.’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.”

139

This statement was made by Malcolm X in a speech at the Audubon Ballroom in Washington Heights, NY

(March 29, 1964). Malcolm is referring to the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and the means in which blacks arrived in
America.
140

See Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, Chapter 1, Howard Caygill’s, On

Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance, the section “Non-violence and the Capacity to Resist,” Angela Davis,
Freedom is a Constant Struggle in Chapter 7, “The Truth Telling Project: Violence in America,” and Jacques
Derrida’s Grammatology, “Violence of the Letter.”
141

See Jacques Ranciere’s, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics.

142

See Rebecca Peabody’s, Consuming Stories: Kara Walker and the Imagining of Race in America.

143

“Bartleby the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street” is a short story by Herman Melville. Bartleby is a consummate

symbol of dissensus, resistance and at once potential.
144

See Kant’s Critique of Judgment, and Karl Jaspers’ Kant for a discourse on genius.

145

See Joseph Boskin’s Sambo for historical perspective of black and white relationships and community in the

South and North.
146

See Julia Kristeva’s The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt The Powers and Limits of Psychoanalysis European

Perspectives: A Series in Social Thought and Cultural Criticism.
147

See Joseph Tanke, Jacques Ranciere: An Introduction Politics, Aesthetics, Emancipation. Tanke is referring here

to the masses left outside of the arena of the speaking animals whose speech is inaudible because they are not part of
the political consensus.
148

See Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy in which he lays out his concept of Dionysian and Apollonian states.

149

For a detail look at the implication of these reproductions in society as social phenomenon see Hillel
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Schwartz’s Culture of the Copy: Striking Likeness, Unreasonable Facsimiles. This is a fascinating text thoroughly
researched and important across disciplines.
150

See Kant’s Critique of Judgement for an explication on the concept of free play as the undergirding theory of

freedom, Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man, the Third, Sixth and Eight Letter, and Ranciere’s Politics of
Aesthetics, and Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics.
151

See Jacques Ranciere’s On Politics and Aesthetics regarding the new myth.

152

See Friedrich Schiller’s, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, p. 12.

153

The concept of nameless is embedded in a rejection of the categorization of being..

154

See Zizek’s Organs Without Bodies.

155

Knowledge as a commodity can best be understood in Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on

Knowledge.
156

See Reginald Snell’s introduction to On the Aesthetic Education of Man p. 18. Snell invokes Herbert

Read’s Education Through Art.
157

See Agamben’s The Coming Community.

158

In the dialogue “Apology” Socrates is testifying regarding the charge against him by the State. This scene

is analogous the Biblical correlative of Christ before Pilate.
159

Kant’s postulation on disinterested is the beginning of the concept of the form for itself explicated in

detail in the Critique of Judgement in the section on the “Critique of the Beautiful.” The form for itself as
disinterested eliminates the theory of the object as a form of value attending to a certain political assignment.
160

See Chris Hedges’ American Fascists: The Christian Right and the War on America.

161

See Plato’s Republic Book 10 for a detailed dialogue on imitations by Socrates. Science most likely here in

Schiller is referring to the programmatic of man through systematic memorization and mathematical precision of a
specified occupation that has become structured as science in the sense that it has become a formulation and
methodology that informs his subjectivity.
162

See Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle, and Agamben’s The Coming Community.
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163

The history and exploitation of Sarah Bartmaan is indicative of the influence in which science had on race and

perceptions in the West.
164

See Ranciere’s Proletarian Nights' translated by Noel Parker, Radical Philosophy 31, pp. 11-13. I thought this an

critical inclusion of what an aesthetic experience and life looks like. “For example, at precisely eight o'clock on that
night of October 1839, a meeting is called at the house of Martin Rose, the tailor, to found a working man's
newspaper. Vincard, the maker of measures, who writes songs for the singing club at the local bar, has invited
Gauny, the carpenter, who gives expression to his more taciturn temperament in vengeful couplets. Ponty, another
poet, who clears cesspools, will certainly not be there: Bohemian that he is, he has chosen to work at night. But the
carpenter will be able to tell him the outcome in one of those letters he copies out around midnight, after several
drafts, letters describing their blundered childhoods and their wasted lives, plebeian passions and those other
existences beyond death - which may be beginning at that very moment. He writes those letters out, in an effort to
delay to the very last minute that sleep which will restore the powers of the servile machine.”
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